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ABSTRACT 
THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF LATINO NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
SEPTEMBER 1994 
JUAN CRUZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.Ed., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by Professor Luis Fuentes 
This study was designed to analyze the sources of 
revenue, revenue variability, program and personnel 
changes, and the fiscal soundness of six Latino nonprofit 
organizations (LNPOs) in three major cities in Western 
Massachusetts, for the period 1989 to 1992. Income 
variability was assessed for the period 1985 to 1992. 
Contingency or adaptive theory formed the basis of the 
study, with emphasis on organizational uncertainty, and 
the concepts of complexity and chaos. Contingency theory 
holds that there is no best way to organize, and that any 
way of organizing is not equally effective. 
The review of the literature was exhaustive and 
presented an analysis of the history, economic impact, 
and relationship of both LNPOs and non-LNPOs with the 
modern welfare state. 
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IRS Form 990 and Form PC, filed by the six LNPOs 
with the Public Charities Division of the Massachusetts 
Attorney General, was the source of the data for this 
study. 
The study concluded that the aggregate reliance of 
LNPOs on government sources of revenue was 79.5 percent. 
Diversity of the funding base of these LNPOs was very 
limited. The average rate of revenue increase for 67 
percent of these LNPOs ranged from 14 percent to 72.3 
percent. The influence of revenue variability on the 
program mix and primary personnel was not as conclusive. 
Revenue increases correlated more with salary increases 
of primary personnel than with increases in the number of 
programs. Revenue increases correlated with salary 
increases of the rank and file for four of the six LNPOs. 
Fifty percent of the LNPOs in the study were rated as 
fiscally sound. None of the six LNPOs had contingency 
reserves and endowment funds. 
The most compelling recommendations for improving 
the infrestructures of these LNPOs include: the 
expansion of their funding base; the establishment of 
contingency reserves and endowment funds; effect changes 
in management and in governance; improve technology; and 
develop partnership with area colleges and universities 
for developing degree programs for managers of NPOs, and 
vii 
programs and workshops aimed at providing technological 
assistance to LNPOs. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study was designed to analyze the type of 
funds, level of funding, funding changes, program 
changes, personnel changes, and the fiscal soundness of 
Latino nonprofit organizations (LNPOs) in Western Massa¬ 
chusetts. The study covered six LNPOs in three major 
cities in Western Massachusetts, for the period 1989 to 
1992. Contingency or adaptive systems theory formed the 
basis of the study, with emphasis on organizational un¬ 
certainty, and the concepts of complexity and chaos. 
Contingency theory is based on the conclusions that 
"there is no one best way to organize, and that any way 
of organizing is not equally effective" (Galbraith, 1973, 
p. 2; Tausky, 1978, p. 68; and Shetty, 1975, p. 10). 
According to Tausky (1978) "Contingency theory attempts 
to mesh classical and humanistic theory by building on 
... promising insights concerning the impact of uncer— 
tainty" (p. 68). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) posited that 
contingency theory explains "how organizations must vary 
if they are to cope effectively with different environ¬ 
mental circumstances" (p. 187). They concluded "that 
different organizational forms are required to cope 
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effectively with different tasks and environmental condi¬ 
tions" (p. 203). 
Contingency theory, unlike the traditional managed 
systems theory, is an effective concept for addressing 
open systems. Open systems are characterized by uncer— 
tainty, volatility, complexity, and chaos. Managed 
systems theory is adequate for the less complex, closed 
or self-contained systems, for which the object is 
control, prediction, and prescription (Herman and 
Heimovics, 1991, pp. 38 - 66; and Tausky, 1978, p. 23). 
The object of contingency theory is description of the 
problem and to make sense out of the volatility and chaos 
in the organization's environment. The process of making 
sense out of chaos or reducing uncertainty, however, 
involves interpreting events in the external "environ¬ 
ment in order to gain partial predictability, or, as is 
sometimes possible if the environment can be controlled, 
certainty" (Tausky, 1978, p. 64; Thompson, 1967; and 
Galbraith, 1973). 
Contingency theory incorporates the concepts that 
organizations are "open systems" and that uncertainty is 
a potent influence on organizational structure (Thompson, 
1967; Tausky, 1978, p. 61; Galbraith, 1973, pp. 1-6; 
and Shetty, 1975, p. 14). Herman and Heimovics (1991) 
argued that the open system approach is helpful in under 
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standing the collective interactions of the various parts 
of complex nonprofit organizations (NPOs). 
Complex NPOs are characterized as open systems with 
permeable boundaries between the functional parts of the 
organizations and their external environments. According 
to Herman and Heimovics (1991) "some boundaries have more 
openness to allow for interaction with their environments 
.... Nonprofit organizations can be characterized as 
having highly permeable boundaries and existing within 
political, social, and economic environments that are 
rapidly changing" (p. 25). 
Nonprofit executives must be adept in spanning the 
permeable boundaries of nonprofit organizations as "Too 
little permeability may not allow the system to renew 
itself with the resources necessary for its survival. 
Too much permeability can deluge the system with changes 
as it tries to adjust to external demands" (Herman and 
Heimovics, 1991, p. 25). According to the authors, a 
system can be easily overwhelmed when the environment is 
particularly turbulent and it has highly permeable bound¬ 
aries. Since NPOs have highly permeable boundaries and 
exist in rapidly changing environments, achieving sys¬ 
temic homeostasis is crucial to the survival and effec¬ 
tiveness of the organization. 
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The open systems approach of contingency theory 
holds that "nonprofit organizations have some influence, 
but little control, over their environments" (Herman and 
Heimovics, 1991, p. 27). Thompson, 1967; Tausky, 1978; 
and Herman and Heimovics, 1991, argued that complex or 
open-systems organizations can achieve some control in 
their inner core or throughput technology by protecting 
it from the turbulence characteristic of the external 
environment of NPOs. Herman and Heimovics, 1991, cited 
the empirical findings of Gronbjerg (1989) to emphasize 
how NPO executives influence the continuance of funding 
in the complex and volatile financial environment of the 
organizations. Thus, a skilled NPO executive can bring 
and maintain organizational equilibrium by exercising the 
little control, and influence he or she has over factors 
in the inner technology, and external environment, 
respectively. 
Community-based social service NPOs (tax-exempt 
charities) with a public purpose sanctioned by states and 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended, have undergone significant changes owing to 
factors in the political, social and financial environ¬ 
ments since the 1930s. The LNPOs studied have formal 
structures with boundaries or positions designed to 
monitor environmental changes, respond and adapt to 
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fluctuations in the external environment, and secure the 
financial resources required for effective service deliv¬ 
ery . 
The literature cited showed that the financial envi¬ 
ronment of NPOs is a precarious one. NPOs are highly 
dependent on the external environment for their re¬ 
sources. The various components of these organizations 
must constantly interact with the external environment 
for their sustenance. Funds, the primary resource of 
NPOs, are characterized as highly fluctuating. Increases 
or decreases in funding levels affect the interacting 
components of NPOs. A change in one component invariably 
affects the others. Government, foundation, corporate, 
and individual donors, the four central sources of funds 
of NPOs, adopt a cautious or conservative posture in 
response to adverse changes in the economic, political or 
social forces in the external environment. The NPO 
market is replete with other NPOs competing for the same 
available funds. To continue to fulfill their public 
purpose, NPOs must remain viable and competitive. The 
history of charities demonstrates that successful 
organizations develop synergistic associations with 
entities in the external environment to facilitate 
funding and effectiveness in service delivery. In this 
sense, charities (NPOs) are inherently survivors. 
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Background of the Problem 
This study was based on the premise that NPOs are 
formal organizations, structured to engage in commensal 
relationships with the government and the philanthropic 
sector in order to achieve the fair and effective 
allocation of collective services. Government alone has 
not been able to equitably deliver services to members of 
the public whose indigent status precludes self- 
sufficiency. The for—profit sector finds little or no 
profits in the provision of collective services the 
public is entitled to and is therefore unable to 
undertake the task of delivering those services to the 
general public. 
NPOs are neither governmental nor for—profit 
entities and must rely on the government and the 
philanthropic community for their sustenance. NPOs, 
almost exclusively, rely on sources of funding that are 
external to the organization. NPOs have no control and 
only a modicum of influence over their funding sources. 
The unpredictability of these funding sources invariably 
leads to instability and volatility in the internal or 
technological environment of NPOs. 
Successful NPOs develop contingency approaches to 
mitigate the adverse forces in their external environ¬ 
ment. Any contingency fiscal measures undertaken by an 
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NPO during periods of economic austerity and fiscal 
conservatism can be determined by an analysis of the 
enterprise's official financial documents. Weisbrod 
(1977) used a similar approach in the analysis of the 
financial environment of NPOs. Moreover, any NPO in good 
standing undergoes at least one financial audit every 
year by tax lawyers, certified public accountants, or 
comptrollers. However, the primary purpose of such 
audits' is to certify to government regulators and the 
general public that the organizations' fiscal affairs are 
conducted in accordance with acceptable accounting 
standards. This study is concerned with the overall 
financial soundness and capability of the LNPOs analyzed. 
Statement of the Problem 
The LNPOs analyzed by this study are public purpose 
institutions sanctioned as such by the state and federal 
governments. In exchange for their tax-exempt status, 
eligibility to receive government funds, tax deductible 
contributions from individual donors, and corporate and 
foundations grants, these LNPOs provide collective 
services to their constituents, with the overall goal of 
improving the quality of life in their respective 
communities. The LNPOs examined are all located in 
Western Massachusetts. These ares (1) Gandara Mental 
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Health Center, Springfield; (2) La Casa Latina, 
Northampton; (3) New England Farm Workers' Council, 
Springfield; (4) New North Citizen's Council; (5) Nueva 
Esperanza, Holyoke; (6) and the Puerto Rican Cultural 
Center, Springfield. Although there was no designated 
site for this study, the data collection point or site 
was the Public Charities Division of the Massachusetts 
Attorney General. The data analysis was conducted at the 
home of record of the researcher. 
The development of LNPOs in communities with signif¬ 
icant Latino populations was influenced by environmental 
factors, such as the needs of Latinos and the allocation 
of collective services to address those needs by tradi¬ 
tional human service institutions in their milieu. These 
environmental factors can be characterized as social, 
economic, and political. How LNPOs developed is also 
influenced by whether they respond to environmental 
forces requiring the organization to structure itself as 
an advocacy or service delivery enterprise. LNPOs 
engaged in considerable advocacy on behalf of their 
constituents during their developing years. As they 
continued to develop and their constituents clamored for 
collective services, funding considerations influenced a 
shift to service delivery. Although the LNPOs analyzed 
by this study are service delivery, community-based 
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institutions, their formative years were identical to 
their earlier counterparts in other communities in the 
mainland. 
While it is true that funders in general prefer 
funding service delivery agencies over advocacy programs 
or NPOs, attaining financial independence and self- 
sufficiency are a major challenge for LNPOs. Compounding 
the quest for financial equilibrium are other environ¬ 
mental forces, such as economic recessions; conservative 
fiscal policies; forced reduction in services as the need 
for those services increases; the number of NPOs com¬ 
peting for the same available dollars; the overall capa¬ 
bility of LNPOs; and the absence of significant founda¬ 
tion and corporate support for LNPOs. NPOs that are 
largely dependent on government funds and have not diver— 
sified their funding base are likely to be the most seri¬ 
ously affected by reduction in government funds. 
The LNPOs examined by this study have been in exis¬ 
tence for more than fifteen years. Thus it was hypoth¬ 
esized that all experienced and survived the austere 
fiscal policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations, 
at least two recessions, and Massachusetts' Proposition 2 
1/2. Further, it was hypothesized that an examination of 
the official financial documents of these LNPOs would 
reveal fluctuations in their funding levels; types of 
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funds; the funds they relied upon the most; any program 
and staff changes; any funds utilized to make up for 
cutbacks; and the overall financial standing of the 
organizations. These array of outcomes are responses 
characteristic of an open system, such as LNPOs, that 
dynamically interacts with its relevant environment. 
Successful or unsuccessful responses undertaken, demon¬ 
strate that changes in the organizations' environment can 
elicit complimentary reactions to the organizations' 
needs (Hoogasian, 1986, p. 10). 
The operation of these LNPOs under the environmental 
conditions of the late 1970s and 1980s to the present, 
suggests that their survival is related to the contin¬ 
gencies implemented to adjust to radical financial 
changes in their funding environment (Hoogasian, 1986, p. 
10). Finally, it was hypothesized that, given the 
myriads of needs endemic to the constituents of LNPOs, 
present funding levels and types of funds would be 
important determinants of the organizations' capacity for 
effective and efficient service delivery. This study is 
an attempt to develop answers to these questions. 
Purpose of the Study 
Funding levels and types of funds vary within public 
purpose NPOs. While this variability is dependent on a 
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number of factors, primarily it is driven by the rele¬ 
vance of the organization's programs to the needs of its 
constituents and the appeal or fundability of these pro¬ 
grams to prospective funders. Variability is also tied 
to the capability of the enterprise to be the recipient 
and good steward of the intended funds. Wolf (1990) con¬ 
vincingly argued that "In developing the case for sup¬ 
port, an organization must also be prepared to answer an 
implied series of questions from the funder, Why you? 
What makes your organization so special? Why shouldn't I 
give my money to some other organization" (p. 211)? The 
author noted that these questions are answered through 
the capability statements in the funding proposals. 
There are four major capability statements that every 
organization must be able to express clearly to funders. 
These ares the program and activities of the organiza¬ 
tion are of high quality; the organization provides 
service to a broad constituency; the organization is well 
managed and has fiscal accountability; and the organiza¬ 
tion provides service cost-effectively (p. 211). 
By exploring these issues, the impact of LNPOs on 
the Latino community can be estimated. Camarillo (1991) 
argued that the future success of Latino organizations 
will depend in part on how they continue to adapt to 
changing circumstances at the local, state, and national 
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levels and how they respond creatively to opportunities 
as well as to problems. Key to any future development 
and success, he added, "will be the support they receive 
from corporations, foundations, and government agencies" 
(Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, pp. 31 - 32). Gallegos and 
O'Neill (1991) argued that the issues that affect the 
Latino community have received considerable attention in 
the literature and the mass media since the 1960s. The 
authors also acknowledged that there has been some anal¬ 
ysis of particular Latino nonprofit sector activities, 
such as health care, social services, arts and culture, 
religion, and philanthropy, but there has been no inte¬ 
grated discussion of the role and impact of LNPOs in the 
Latino community. LNPOs represent an important social, 
political, and economic force in the Latino community and 
in society at large, but the dynamics and extent of that 
role is far from clear (p. 2). A review of the litera¬ 
ture shows that no fiscal analysis of LNPOs, of the sort 
represented by this study, has been conducted. 
The focus of this exploratory study, concerns the 
types of funds and funding levels of six Latino non¬ 
profit organizations in three major cities in Western 
Massachusetts, during a period of purported economic 
austerity. More specifically, the study is an attempt to 
answer the following questions: 
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1. Who were the funders of these LNPOs during the 
period 1989 to 1992? 
2. What were the funding levels of these LNPOs 
during the period 1985 to 1992? 
3. What, if any, were their funding changes during 
the period 1985 to 1992? 
4. What, if any, were the program changes experi¬ 
enced by these LNPOs during the period 1989 to 
1992? 
5. What, if any, were the personnel changes under— 
taken by these LNPOs during the period 1989 to 
1992? 
6- What was the overall fiscal soundness of these 
LNPOs during the period 1989 to 1992? 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is related to the 
ability of LNPOs to raise the funds required for effi¬ 
cient and effective service delivery; their ability to 
diversify their funding base; their ability to maintain 
fiscal accountability; and to the efficient and effective 
management of these enterprises. Successful planning and 
management of nonprofits' financial resources, to some 
extent, is dependent on management's ability to identify 
environmental determinants of change and develop organi- 
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zational responses to attenuate or adapt to these 
changes. Knowing and understanding the cause of organi¬ 
zational funding variability would provide a valuable 
knowledge base for LNPO managers in planning future 
operations. 
The review of the literature has shown that the 
funds of Latino and at-large NPOs have generally varied 
during periods of austerity. However, LNPOs and few non- 
Latino NPOs have undergone an analysis of their official 
financial documents for the purpose of finding any rela¬ 
tionship between funding variability and periods of 
austerity; whether this austere environment influenced 
personnel and programmatic changes; and the LNPO reli¬ 
ance, if any, on government funds. A study specifically 
addressing these variables provides an opportunity to 
better assess the financial environment of LNPOs and non- 
Latino NPOs; the role they play in the Latino and non- 
Latino communities; and the economic and overall signif¬ 
icance of that role. The findings of this study can 
serve as guidance to managers of LNPOs and non-Latino 
NPOs seeking to improve the financial posture of their 
respective organizations. Moreover, the findings can 
serve to facilitate corporate and foundation appreciation 
and understanding of the importance of the socioeconomic 
and sociopolitical contributions of LNPOs to the quality 
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of life of both the Latino and at-large communities. The 
study can be a catalyst for future studies assessing the 
impact of LNPOs on the Latino community and the non- 
Latino milieu. 
Definition of Terms 
In order to maintain consistency of meaning, the 
following definitions of key terms used in the study are 
offered. 
Austere: Used here to denote a period of time, 
situation, economic condition, or policy characterized by 
frugality and/or fiscal conservatism. 
Classical theories: The first attempts to develop a 
scientific approach to management focused on improving 
worker efficiency. Some focused on the nature of the 
work and how it could be planned, controlled, and managed 
to improve efficiency. Others focused on the administra¬ 
tion of the organization. The term classical theory 
refers to these approaches. Among the pioneers of these 
approaches are Frederick W. Taylor, who in his book, The 
Principles of Scientific Management (1911), focused on 
the nature of specific jobs, breaking a task into basic 
work units. The work of Frank and Lillian Galbraith 
furthered Taylor's ideas of Scientific Management through 
detailed motion studies that classified actions and body 
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movements of workers doing specific jobs, calling the 
specific actions therbligs. To increase worker efficien¬ 
cy, they reduced the number of action required for 
specific jobs. The work of Henry L. Gantt brought to the 
fore the need for managers to use realistic work 
standards based on study and measurement. Gantt also 
focused on motivation and advocated in favor of pro¬ 
duction bonuses for workers who exceeded expected quotas. 
Mary Parker Follet, focused on how managers should 
address conflict. She advocated for a collaborative 
approach to problem solving, rather than overmanagement, 
or "bossism." Follet believed that through compromise, 
conflicts could be resolved. Henri Fayol, focused on the 
organization rather than the worker and outlined the 
overall functions of management as planning, organizing, 
commanding, coordinating, and controlling. 
Closed systems models Presupposes that the organi¬ 
zation is generally self-contained or self-sufficient. 
In today's environment, it would be difficult for an 
enterprise to convincingly claim self-containment or 
self-sufficiency. 
Contingency theory: An eclectic approach to 
management, borrowing techniques of other approaches if 
and when those techniques contribute to the attainment of 
management goals in a particular situation at a particu- 
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lar time. The contingency approach considers factors 
limiting an organization in environmental, technological, 
and human relations areas; the impact of a plan or 
solution not only on the specific problem but on the 
organization as a whole; the need for flexible managers 
with a wide-ranging knowledge of many management tech¬ 
niques; and availability of workers, their skills, 
abilities, and flexibility. 
External environment: The external environment of a 
nonprofit organization consists of those factors outside 
the organization that affects it and are relevant to its 
operation. 
Financial resources: A for—profit organization 
typically obtain funds through borrowing (debt capital 
from loans or bonds), through the selling of stock in the 
company (equity capital), or through retaining funds 
already earned (retained earnings). A nonprofit organi¬ 
zation typically obtains funds through government, foun¬ 
dation, corporation grants, or individual contributions. 
Humanistic theory: This is a school of thought 
which has its roots in research initiated in the late 
1920s by Elton Mayo in the Western Electric Company's 
Hawthorne plant in Chicago. Mayo and his colleagues 
found that worker productivity was related to social and 
psychological factors as well as the work itself and the 
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physical environment. The approach called on managers to 
consider human relations factors, by focusing on people- 
management. Mayo is considered the founder of the Human 
Relations Movement. Chester Bernard, in The Functions of 
the Executive (1938), focused on the need for cooperation 
within the organization. He pointed out that workers 
accept a managerial directive if it is acceptable in 
terms of their personal interests. To be effective, 
managers must be excellent communicators and motivators, 
and understand that real power comes not from their 
position but from the acceptance of the workers. Douglas 
M. McGregor, in the Human Side of Enterprise (1960), 
focused on theory x and theory y. Under theory x, the 
average human being has an inherent dislike of work and 
will avoid it if he can. Under theory y, the worker 
regards work as natural as play or rest and learns to 
accept or seek responsibility. McGregor advocated the 
optimistic and humanistic approach of theory y. 
Internal environment: Consists of the resources 
within an organization, used to achieve its goals and 
includes financial, technological, human, and physical 
resources. 
Latino: Like the term Hispanic, it refers to any 
person who traces his or her roots and/or language to the 
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Spanish-speaking countries of South America, Central 
America, and the Caribbean. 
Leasebacks Sale of an asset, usually real estate, 
and agreement to lease it back from the purchaser on a 
long-term basis. In commercial finance, this type of 
financing arrangement strengthens the seller's balance 
sheet, because a capital asset is sold and converted into 
cash or a receivable (Fitch, 1993). 
Leveraged buyout (LBO)s Takeover of a company using 
the acquired firm's assets and cash flow to obtain fi¬ 
nancing . 
Leveraged leases Under the terms provided, the 
lessor makes an equity investment equal to about 20 
percent of the equipment's original cost, and borrows the 
remaining 80 percent by issuing nonrecourse (not liable) 
notes to the lenders, and writes a noncancellable lease 
for the equipment. A leveraged lease is a true lease for 
tax purposes, because the lessor, as owner of the assets, 
is entitled to all of the tax benefits of ownership, 
including accelerated depreciation write-offs, deduction 
of interest payments on the bank loan, and the investment 
credit, if any, for purchase of the asset (Fitch, 1993). 
LNPOs Refers to a Latino nonprofit organization 
operating in the Latino community, that under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
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amended, has been awarded tax-exempt and tax deductible 
status. Donors can deduct contributions made to these 
organizations when filing their IRS Form 1040. Nonprofit 
organizations other than 501(c)(3), are tax-exempt, but 
contributions made to these are generally not deductible. 
Contributions to NPOs that are 501(c)(4) can be deducted 
only if the total amount raised does not exceed $100,000 
or ten contributors, whichever comes first. 
Management: The American Management Association 
defines management as "working with and through other 
people to accomplish the objectives of both the organiza¬ 
tion and its members." As used here, the purpose of 
management in NPOs is to ensure that the goals of the 
organization are met and that its service delivery and 
other functions are effective, efficient, and maximized. 
Open systems model: Postulates that no organization 
is self-contained or self-sufficient. A nonprofit organ¬ 
ization, of the sort used here, takes input (money, 
labor, clients) and uses funds and labor to produce 
outputs (transformed or improved quality of life of 
clients through service delivery). Some self¬ 
containment, control or predictability can be achieved in 
the inner core or technology of the enterprise if certain 
external environmental factors are appropriately influ¬ 
enced . 
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Organization of the Study 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. 
Chapter I contains the background of the problem, 
statement of the problem, purpose of the study, 
significance of the study, definitions of terms, and 
organization of the study. Chapter II presents a review 
of the literature relevant to the historical development 
and the fiscal and managerial dynamics of the LNPOs in 
the study and the factors being studied. Chapter III 
describes the methodology used in the study. Six 
research questions guided the study. A step by step 
process was utilized for obtaining data from official 
financial documents; and the quantitative approach of 
data analysis was used. Chapter IV focused on the 
display, description, and analysis of the data gleaned by 
the study, and the interpretation of the findings as they 
relate to the research questions. Chapter V includes a 
summary of the study, implications for further research, 
and recommendations for improving the managerial and 
fiscal posture of LNPOs. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This chapter includes a review of selected research 
and literature relevant to this study. It is divided 
into part I and part II. Part I provides an in-depth 
analysis of the history of LNPOs and non-Latino NPOs. 
Their funding sources; determinants of income variabili¬ 
ty; relationship with government; and their significance 
to the economy and the political life of the communities 
they serve were examined. The reliance of NPOs on gov¬ 
ernment funds and the consequences of that reliance was 
examined. Moreover, a picture was drawn of the myriads 
of needs endemic to the constituents of LNPOs targeted by 
this study. Given the magnitude of the problem faced by 
LNPOs in the 1990s, a question was raised concerning the 
fiscal and managerial capability of these organizations 
to be effective and efficient in their public purpose 
stewardship. 
Part II analyzes the research and literature 
relevant to the fiscal and managerial dynamics of NPOs. 
Specifically, the literature on NPOs was examined in 
search of a better understanding of their financial 
environment and managerial proclivities, as well as 
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strategies for expanding their funding base. It also 
examined the reasons why some community-based NPOs rely 
more on funding sources that require the written propos¬ 
al, than on sources that require different appeals and 
strategies to secure the financial resources to carry out 
the organizations' public service mission. An underlying 
theme of this review is that grantsmanship and/or fund¬ 
raising is a process inseparable from professional and 
competent management of community-based, human service 
NPOs and LNPOs. As an expose of the fiscal and manager¬ 
ial posture of community-based NPOs, the review should 
serve to enhance our understanding of their unique 
dynamics. Moreover, it should serve as a general guide 
to administrators of NPOs seeking to mitigate the envi¬ 
ronmental factors impinging on the enterprises' ability 
to effectively deliver collective services to their 
constituents. 
Part I 
The culture of cooperation, central to nonprofit 
organizations, is inherent or tied, although not exclu¬ 
sively, to the human instinct of survival. Animals who 
live in colonies undertake collective efforts to sustain 
themselves and survive. Humans, however, have elevated 
the culture of cooperation to complex levels. This is 
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evident in the ability of humans to quickly master, 
attenuate or adapt to hostile and complex environments. 
Early humans, whether nomadic or sedentary, banded 
together and engaged in cooperative activities to harness 
the forces in the adverse environment and provide for the 
collective needs of the tribes. 
Mason (1984) argued that "by definition, the ear— 
liest organizations of man—hunting groups, family and 
clan, parties for foraging and defense—were nonprofit 
organizations. Mankind has formed itself into groups for 
religious purposes and to meet the demands of tribal liv¬ 
ing for thousands of years" (p. 2). The author noted 
that "From the early days of Western civilization, 
voluntary enterprises were inexorably entwined with 
democracy" (p. 2). The tenor of Mason is that society, 
as we know it, would not have been built had it not been 
for the culture of cooperation and/or voluntarism. These 
early alignments both buttressed and shaped the charac¬ 
ter of the relationships that continue to develop between 
government and charities for the betterment of the public 
interest. 
Referring to the early and more formal forms of 
collective or public services, Gidron, Kramer, and 
Salamon (1992) noted that "The origins of social services 
in the United States, as in great Britain and other coun- 
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tries ... are rooted in a combination of governmental and 
voluntary action" (p. 12). In articulating the inabili¬ 
ty of government alone to effectively provide for the 
common good, the authors highlighted how private charity 
and public law in these countries "coexisted side by side 
for hundreds of years ... each developing at its own pace 
and with gradually increasing influence over the other" 
(p. 12). The commensal relationships then forged by 
charities and government represented a joint response to 
the socioeconomic demands of the environment. 
The type of legal system adopted by a society 
influences the patterns of relationships that emerge 
between government and the third sector (NPOs). Gidron, 
Kramer and Salamon (1992) argued that "Those countries 
based on civil or Roman law tend to be more state- 
oriented, while those rooted in the common law are more 
market-oriented" (p. 15). Another factor that influences 
the relationships that develop between government and 
NPOs is the degree of decentralization of state func¬ 
tions. In Switzerland, where the NPO sector is relative¬ 
ly underdeveloped, the public sector, "through a federal 
system of cantons and municipalities is able to tailor 
the provision of public services to the diverse demands 
of different ethnic and linguistic groups without having 
to resort to an extensive voluntary sector" (p. 23). 
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Thus Switzerland decentralizes public services through 
its own devices rather than privatize these through the 
NPO sector. In the United States, many social needs 
would not be met if government fails to decentralize 
collective services through its own agencies and an 
extensive NPO sector. 
Gidron, Kramer and Salamon (1992) suggested four 
basic models to better understand the relationship 
between government and the NPO sector in the modern 
welfare state. The four models or patterns of relation¬ 
ship are the government-dominant model; the third-sector 
dominant model; the dual model; and the collaborative 
model. Of these, the authors concluded that the "collab¬ 
orative model characterizes the system that is widespread 
in the United States" (p. 19). These models have two 
sets of activities designed to make human services avail¬ 
able: "first, the financing and authorizing of services, 
and second, the actual delivery of them" (pp. 16 - 17). 
The two activities, while distinct, are often, the 
authors noted, treated as if they were one. The distinc¬ 
tion between the two functions is pronounced and they 
can, and, have been carried out by separate institutions 
(p. 17). For example, the government and the third 
sector can raise funds and provide services. Each can 
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also have other agencies provide the services through 
purchase-of-service contracts. 
In the United, the government, state and local, 
allocates the funds, authorizes the services, and 
collaboratively disseminates the services through a 
network comprised of both the public and NPO sectors (p. 
19). One virtue of the collaborative model is that 
government and NPOs work together rather than separately 
or against each other. The other three models are not 
rigid, as implied here. Positive government-third sector 
relationships exist in countries where the collaborative 
model is not dominant. From this premise, conflict in 
the relationships between government and charities is de- 
emphasized. According to Gidron, Kramer and Salamon 
(1992) conflict has been trivialized in the nine coun¬ 
tries they examined (p. 27). In countries where either 
the government or the third sector is dominant in the 
provision of public services, there is little or no con¬ 
flict, and patterns of collaboration or other forms of 
relationships between the two entities are apparent. The 
goal of serving the public takes preeminence over con¬ 
flicts that may arise (pp. 20 - 29). 
Early American charitable foundations appeared to 
have taken the lead in the financing of collective serv¬ 
ices and serving as a springboard in the forging of rela- 
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tionships with the government. These foundations provid¬ 
ed a major portion of the funds for some collective serv¬ 
ices. Mason (1984) noted that ‘'Prior to World War I the 
combined spending of Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations 
on education and social services were twice as much as 
that of the government" (p. 3). The success of American 
charities in providing services to the public served as a 
motivating force in the adoption of some of these serv¬ 
ices by the government. Functions initiated by the 
voluntary sector were later absorbed by the government. 
The Commerce and Labor departments are examples of gov¬ 
ernment programs that grew out of the early trade asso¬ 
ciations and labor union movements of the voluntary 
sector (p. 3). The pattern of charitable foundations 
bearing the brunt of fiscal responsibility for a signifi¬ 
cant segment of the social welfare field, began to shift 
toward a partnership where the government and the third 
sector shared some of the funding for public services. 
The trend in government-shared funding of NPOs began 
at the turn of the century. Warner, 1894; and Salamon, 
1987, noted that throughout the fifty years prior to the 
1930s, there was an extensive pattern of government 
support to third-sector organizations. A report on New 
York's NPOs in the 1890s noted that two-thirds of their 
income came from governmental sources (Gidron, Kramer, 
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and Salamon, 1992, p. 12). The relationship that was 
established between government and the third sector 
continued unimpaired through 1980, however, the pattern 
of financial support to the NPO sector lasting through 
the 1960s was not as magnanimous as the foregoing data 
suggest. 
For Smith and Lipsky (1993) government support to 
nonprofits was not extensive but rather restrictive or 
qualified. The authors cited a 1914 survey that revealed 
that most states made no appropriations to privately man¬ 
aged charities. Those states that did, made them spar— 
ingly and to a limited number of politically sanctioned 
human service programs. The political thought prior to 
the 1930s, the era of purported predominance of nonprof¬ 
its, postulated that government assumed only the most 
modest responsibilities for social problems; and relied 
on charities to use private funds to make up the differ— 
ence in the low public subsidy rates (pp. 47 - 48). Even 
in the mid-1960s NPOs were substantially dependent on 
private funds. A 1965 study found that public funds 
accounted only for eight percent of NPOs' income. For 
the same year, a survey of health and welfare agencies in 
13 urban areas found that public funding in all fields 
only accounted for six percent of all revenues. A study, 
conducted in the mid-1960s, of over 800 service organiza- 
30 
tions found that 80 percent did not receive public funds 
(pp. 53 - 54). The authors noted that this qualified 
pattern of government funding of nonprofits became more 
liberalized after the mid-1960s when government funding 
of nonprofits rose substantially. Increases in federal 
expenditures for social welfare services accounted for 
this sharp rise. Between 1965 and 1970, these expendi¬ 
tures rose from $812 million to $2.2 billion. Total 
federal expending in social welfare services rose from 
$1.14 billion in 1960 to $13.5 billion in 1980 (p. 53). 
Salamon and Abramson (1982) are not in full agreement 
with Smith and Lipsky (1993), concerning the inception of 
government participation in the funding of social welfare 
services. 
According to Salamon and Abramson (1982), the 
federal government entered the social welfare field in 
the 1930s, but it did not become a provider of funds for 
social services until the early 1960s. Through the 1962 
and 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, commonly 
called Title IV-A, the federal government made specific 
provisions for state agencies to privatize the delivery 
of public services to NPOs (p. 39). Salamon (1990) 
argued that the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 spear— 
headed the establishment of a network of federally funded 
NPOs that undertook local anti-poverty projects. More- 
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over, the Medicare program established in 1965 had pro¬ 
visions that made it possible for the government to 
reimburse private hospitals for the provision of health 
care services to the elderly (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, 
p. 226). By 1971, purchase from NPO providers repre¬ 
sented about 25 percent of the expenditures under various 
social service programs that in 1972, became the federal 
social services block grant—Title XX—(Salamon and 
Abramson, 1982, p. 39). As noted by Salamon and 
Abramson, 1982; Salamon, 1990; and Smith and Lipsky, 
1993, this pattern of government contracting out public 
services to NPOs increased significantly due to the 
policy momentum of the 1960s and 1970s. Salamon (1990) 
found that by 1980, the dependence of NPOs on private 
funding, significantly shifted to reliance on public 
funds. 
Salamon (1990) presented data that showed that 
government is the principal source of nonprofit-sector 
income. The author prefaced the data by remarking that 
"Given the extent of government reliance on nonprofit 
organizations to deliver publicly funded services, it 
should come as no surprise to learn that government ... 
is the principal source of ... nonprofit organization 
income in the United States" (p. 225). In 1980, the 
federal government provided $40 billion in aid to the 
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private, nonprofit sector. By contrast, NPQs received 
only $25.5 billion from all sources of private giving 
combined (pp. 224 - 225). Data from a survey of 3,400 
NPOs, exclusive of hospitals and higher education 
institutions, showed that government accounted for 41 
percent of the revenues of these organizations as of 
1981. The second largest source of support for NPOs came 
from fees and service charges, amounting to 28 percent of 
all revenues. Private giving followed with 20 percent of 
the total revenues (p. 225). Notwithstanding the data, 
NPO reliance on government is not a one-sided proposi¬ 
tion. Government and NPOs need each other for an effec¬ 
tive public service mix. 
To assess the extent of government reliance on non¬ 
profits to deliver publicly financed services, Salamon 
(1990) examined sixteen localities of different sizes in 
which state, local and federal funds were allocated. The 
data showed that 42 percent of the funds government spent 
on social services; employment and training; housing and 
community development; health; and arts and culture were 
apportioned to nonprofit providers. Public organizations 
garnered about 39 percent of the funds and for—profits, 
about 19 percent. The author concluded that nonprofits 
deliver a greater portion of the services government 
funds than do government agencies themselves. In the 
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social services field, nonprofits absorbed 40 percent of 
the funds government spent and in employment and training 
43 percent (p. 224). This pattern of government reliance 
on nonprofits sheds light on why the growth of the wel¬ 
fare state has not displaced the nonprofit sector. 
Accounting for this pattern of growth is the concept of 
"third-party government" which allows government to use 
purchase-of-service contracts and other mechanisms for 
the delivery of public services through non-governmental 
entities (pp. 222 - 224). 
NPQs played a more prominent role in the provision 
of social welfare services prior to the 1930s. However, 
according to Salamon (1990), between 1930 and 1980, "the 
nonprofit ... sector effectively disappeared from Ameri¬ 
can political discourse and debate, as public attention 
focused ... on the role of government in responding to 
national needs" (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, p. 219). The 
surge of the welfare state during this period did not 
forestall the expansion of the nonprofit sector. 
Instead, the growth of the public sector proportionally 
paralleled the expansion of the NP0 sector in size, 
importance, and breadth (p. 219). 
The most pronounced period of growth for the NP0 
sector began in the 1960s, which was characterized as a 
period of very rapid growth for the NP0 sector. For 
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example, a survey of NPOs that excluded hospitals and 
higher education institutions revealed that sixty-six 
percent of the organizations in existence as of 1982 had 
been created since I960* Several of these organizations 
had their "roots in the anti-poverty, civil rights, 
consumer, environmental, and related movements of the 
1960s and 1970s" (p. 221). Gidron, Kramer and Salamon 
(1992) noted that in spite of the emergence of the wel¬ 
fare state, the growth of the NPO sector occurred and 
produced a mixed economy in almost all fields (p. 13). 
However, the growth of the NPO sector, which began in the 
1960s and continued through 1980, and its existing part¬ 
nership with the government, were threatened by the poli¬ 
cies of the Reagan administration. 
The type of attention that the NPO sector received 
from 1980 to 1985, failed to compensate for the fifty 
years of political inattention it was subjected to prior 
to 1980. Salamon (1990) noted that during the five years 
since 1980, the NPO sector experienced extraordinary 
economic strains by the budget and tax program of the 
Reagan administration. Perhaps unwittingly, the Reagan 
administration adopted policies that threatened to 
dismantle or significantly reduce the pattern of collabo¬ 
ration that existed between government and the NPO sec¬ 
tor. Moreover, the administration failed to capitalize 
35 
on the unusual consensus of the 1970s, whereby leaders of 
the political left and the political right were in favor 
of strengthening the nonprofit sector and broadening 
existing relationships between the third sector and 
government (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, pp. 233 - 234). 
Contrary to the rhetoric of the 1980 Republican 
platform which extolled on the spirit of voluntarism and 
private and community initiative, the Reagan administra¬ 
tion "subsumed its policy toward the voluntary sector 
under its overall economic program, which called for 
substantial cuts in government spending and in tax rates 
in order to stimulate economic growth" (p. 234). Salamon 
(1990) posited that this policy presupposed the existence 
of an inherent conflict between government and the NPO 
sector, rather than an extensive partnership. The admin¬ 
istration ignored that by cutting back on federal spend¬ 
ing, it was reducing the revenues of the nonprofit sector 
and dismantling the partnership that existed between the 
two sectors (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, p. 234). Salamon 
and Abramson (1982), estimated that the administration's 
first budget for the period 1982 - 1985, would have 
reduced the overall support NPOs received from the 
federal government by $33 billion or 20 percent lower 
than it had been in 1980. In some social welfare fields, 
the projected loss of federal funds would have been 
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harsher, after adjusting for inflation. For example, 
federal support to social service NPOs would have been 64 
percent less in FY 1985 than in FY 1980; to community 
development NPOs 65 percent less; and to education and 
research NPOs 35 percent less, for the same period (p. 
51) . 
Salamon (1990) noted that in the final analysis, 
Congress did not approve all of the initial cuts proposed 
by the Reagan administration, however, significant reduc¬ 
tions occurred in the federal revenues allocated to NPOs. 
In social welfare fields where NPOs were active, federal 
spending "declined by almost $50 billion below pre-Reagan 
levels over the four years between 1982 and 1985" 
(Anheier and Seibel, 1990, p. 235). That decline in 
federal spending translated into major loss of revenues 
for NPOs. According to Salamon and Abramson (1985), 
"after adjusting for inflation, nonprofit organizations 
outside of the health field lost $17 billion in govern¬ 
ment support during this period compared to what would 
have been available had 1980 spending levels been main¬ 
tained" (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, p. 235). Specifi¬ 
cally, the enacted changes for FY 1982 - FY 1985 trans¬ 
lated into $2.8 billion (357.) loss to community develop¬ 
ment; and $1.9 billion (207.) loss to higher education (p. 
235) . 
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The vehicle used by President Ronald Reagan to 
reduce federal spending was the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981. Under this legislation, 
Title XX was renamed the Social Service Block Grant 
(SSBG). Smith and Lipsky (1993) estimated that without 
adjusting for inflation "social welfare services through 
SSBG and other grant programs declined from $8.8 billion 
in 1980 to $8.1 billion in 1988" (p. 63). Under the 
federal budget legislation federal assistance to state 
and local government declined. To compensate for the 
loss of federal revenues and rising service demand, 
"state and local spending on social welfare services 
increased from $4.8 billion in 1980 to $7.3 billion in 
1988" (p. 63). Federal social welfare expenditures 
declined from 64.6 percent in 1980 to 32.4 percent in 
1988 (p. 63). As state economies recovered from the 
recession of the early 1980s, states were able to absorb 
the federal cuts and increase funding to NPOs through 
purchase-of-service contracts (p. 66). The authors noted 
that since state funding rose significantly in many 
service areas, NPOs "remained substantially dependent 
upon government funds throughout the 1980s" (p. 66). 
Smith and Lipsky (1993) argued that despite the 
declined in federal spending in social services, federal 
support in other areas increased. They estimated that 
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federal child welfare expenditures under Title IV-B of 
the Social Security Act increased from $163.6 million in 
1981 to $273.9 million in 1991. Title IV—E expenditures 
for foster care increased from $308.8 million in 1981 to 
$1.8 billion in 1991. A survey of member agencies of the 
Child Welfare League of America found that "From 1979 to 
1986 median agency revenues from government rose from 
$453,000 to $1,032,000" (p. 63). In 1988 Family Service 
America conducted a study that concluded that "the pro¬ 
portion of total revenues from government sources was 34 
percent in 1979, 30 percent in 1982, and 37 percent in 
1986. Overall revenue growth from 1982 to 1986 was 23 
percent, outpacing the four—year inflation rate of 13 
percent" (p. 63). There were several other increases 
through the passage of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless 
Assistance Act in June 30, 1987. Public funding for drug 
and alcohol treatment increased significantly. 
The foregoing increases appeared to have positively 
impacted the revenues of NPOs. However, while NPOs felt 
the impact of the federal cuts immediately after the 
passage of the Reconciliation Act, the increases in 
revenue to the NPOs and programs noted above, happened 
incrementally and over a period of time. Worth noting, 
is that the efforts of state and local government to make 
up for the ensuing federal revenue shortfall of NPOs, 
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also, did not happen immediately after passage of the 
Reconciliation Act. Accounting for the delay in the make 
up of that general revenue deficit, was that the passage 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, coin¬ 
cided with the recession the states' economies were expe¬ 
riencing at the time. Consequently, states were in no 
position to offer immediate compensation to NPOs for 
their revenue shortfall. They did, when their economies 
recovered from the recession. A report of the American 
Public Welfare Association (1981) noted that it is at the 
state and local levels "where the true impact of the 
human service changes made by the Reconciliation Act will 
be felt and can be most accurately measured" (p. 3). The 
report added, that its is also at the state and local 
levels, where policies are developed and implemented to 
comply with the Reconciliation Act (p. 3). 
Shapiro and Greenstein's (1988) findings are indic¬ 
ative of the weakening effect the Reagan administra¬ 
tion's policies had on the state and local government 
anti-poverty safety net programs (p. 35). Using the U.S. 
Census data for 1986, they showed that "only one of every 
nine families with children who otherwise would have been 
poor (11 percent of these families) was lifted out of 
poverty by federal, state, and local cash assistance 
benefits such as AFDC, general assistance, Social Securi- 
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ty, and unemployment insurance” (p. 35). By contrasts, 
one of every five families living in poverty (19 percent) 
in 1979, was lifted out of poverty by the same cash 
assistance benefits programs (p. 35). The authors noted 
that the "decline in the proportion of poor families 
lifted out of poverty by government programs ... is 
related to the erosion of benefits and coverage in a 
number of government programs” (p. 36). Between 1981 and 
1982, when the large federal budget cuts were effected, 
AFDC and unemployment insurance experienced the largest 
reduction (p. 36). 
The foregoing statistics affected NPOs on two 
fronts. First, the reduction of federal funds to safety 
net cash assistance programs reduced the ability of state 
and local government to utilize NPOs for the provision of 
social welfare services through the purchase-of-service 
contract modality. Second, with less families being 
lifted out of poverty, the need for NPOs to service more 
families increased, with less funds available to do so. 
Notwithstanding the federal, state, and local government 
increases to some social welfare programs, on balance, 
the economic impact of President Reagan's federal expen¬ 
diture reduction policies adversely impacted NPOs during 
the 1980s, under his and President Bush'es administra¬ 
tion . 
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Federal expenditure reduction was not the only 
policy tool that adversely impacted the revenues of the 
nonprofit sector. The other mechanism that the Reagan 
administration used to encourage economic growth was the 
tax bill passed in 1981. Tax rates on individuals in the 
upper income strata influence private giving to charita¬ 
ble organizations. High tax rates on upper income 
accounts for generous giving. Lower tax rates on upper 
income, encourages frugality among donors. According to 
Weisbrod (1988), the federal income tax laws in the 
United States were enacted in 1913. Income tax deduc¬ 
tions for charitable giving became part of the tax laws 
in 1917. In 1918, the tax laws added an estate tax 
deduction for charitable bequests. It was not until 1935 
that tax laws allowed corporate America to make tax- 
deductible contributions to charitable organizations (p. 
94). The author noted that prior to World War II, income 
tax rates were small and had very little effect on chari¬ 
table giving. He added that with the increase on person¬ 
al and corporate taxation in subsequent years, tax rates 
became a major influence on charitable giving (p. 94). 
The Reagan administration's policy, designed to 
encourage economic growth, included the lowering of tax 
rates on individuals with high income. Through its tax 
bill of 1981, the administration reduced the tax rates on 
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top-bracket individual income and changed the tax treat¬ 
ment of bequests (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, pp. 235 - 
236). Weisbrod (1988) pointed out that in 1985 the 
Reagan administration proposed a major reduction of the 
top-bracket personal income tax rates from 50 percent to 
% 
35 percent. That amount was later reduced to 28 percent 
by the Senate-House Conference Committee. The proposal 
was adopted in 1986 and took effect in 1987. Based on 
the reduced tax rates, the Independent Sector, a national 
association representing nonprofits, estimated a loss of 
$4 billion in gifts to charities (pp. 94 - 95). 
Williams (1992) reported that from 1987 to 1991, 
donors, under the new tax law, were only allowed to 
deduct the original purchase price—not the present 
value—of appreciated property donated to charities 
(p. 36). In May, 1992, bipartisan legislation was 
introduced in the Senate, seeking a tax break on gifts of 
appreciated property. "The legislation would allow all 
taxpayers to claim the full charitable deduction for all 
gifts of appreciated property, including stocks and real 
estate, from July 1, 1992, through December 31, 1993" (p. 
36). According to Stehle (1993), the rules on gifts of 
appreciated property were eased when that legislation was 
made retroactive to January 1991, allowing donors to 
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deduct the full value of gifts to charitable organiza¬ 
tions (p. 32). 
Stehle (1993) added that since the tax-reform law of 
1987, it has been difficult for charities to obtain dona¬ 
tions of appreciated property from wealthy taxpayers (p. 
32) . According to Williams (1992), data released by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), showed "a continuing 
decline in the percentage of individual federal tax 
returns that included deductions for charitable contribu¬ 
tions from 1975 to 1990" (p. 33). The decline of these 
returns became more pronounced after 1985, when the 
percentage of such returns was 35.6 percent. The per— 
centage dropped to 30.1 percent in 1987; 26.5 percent in 
1988; 26 percent in 1989; and 25.7 percent in 1990 (p. 
33) . In spite of this decline, the IRS reported that for 
the same period (1975 - 1990), "deductions that were 
claimed for contributions increased from $15.4-bi11ion to 
$57.2-bil1ion" (p. 33). The average contribution claimed 
on each return increased from $625 in 1975 to $1,954 in 
1990 (p. 33). Since these are not the types of contribu¬ 
tions that are representative of the wealthy taxpayers, 
one can surmise that the tax reforms of the Reagan and 
Bush administrations had a greater chilling effect on 
wealthy taxpayers than it did on the average taxpayers. 
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Stehle (1993) reported that under President 
Clinton's tax bill, individual income tax rates were 
increased from 31 percent to 39.6 percent for taxpayers 
with incomes above $250,000. The author emphasized that 
higher tax rates on top-bracket income encourages giving 
because it reduces the out-of-pocket cost to the donor. 
The new tax law also increased the estate taxes for the 
wealthiest from 50 percent to 55 percent. To avoid 
paying higher taxes on their estates, donors, the author 
projected, will be more predisposed to make charitable 
gifts of annuities and other planned gifts (p. 1 and pp. 
32 - 33). Charities like the American Cancer Society, 
have reported a significant increase in 1993 contribu¬ 
tions which have been attributed to the Clinton tax bill 
(p. 32). 
In a more recent article, Stehle (1994) reported 
that the new federal tax law of the Clinton administra¬ 
tion "is already paying big dividends for many charities. 
Non-profit organizations saw an especially sharp rise in 
donations of stock, real estate, and art work at the end 
of 1993" (p. 1). One Texas foundation had its donations 
for Baptist charities increased to $30-million, an amount 
three times as much as in 1992 (p. 1). Memorial Sloan- 
Kettering Cancer Center in New York raised $73.3-mi11ion, 
an increase of about 24 percent more than in 1992 (p. 1). 
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Harvard University received 708 gifts of securities in 
the second half of 1993, compared with 550 in the second 
half of 1992 (p. 1). Stehle (1994) noted that in spite 
of the increases to many charities in 1993, "the majority 
of affluent people did not step up their giving" (p. 27). 
He offered two explanations for the reluctance of some 
wealthy taxpayers. One is that while high tax rates 
encourages giving by taxpayers with liquid assets, these 
rates leave those without liquid assets with little 
discretionary cash. The latter would be more inclined to 
cut back rather than increase giving. The other impedi¬ 
ment to giving, is that in spite of the efforts of chari¬ 
ties to explain the tax law to wealthy donors, "they 
remain uninformed" (p. 27). 
Unlike the for—profit sector, which over the years 
has enjoyed voluminous scholarly attention, the NPO 
sector, with its reach history and enormous record of 
achievement, is seriously under—represented in the 
literature and research. In most colleges and univer 
sities the issue is not one of under—representation but 
one of lack of representation (Young, Hollister and 
Hodgkinson, 1993; and Wolf, 1990, p. 4). It should come 
as no surprise that the NPO sector is little understood 
and taken for granted. Notwithstanding this lack of 
adequate representation, the NPO sector, in addition to 
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its major contribution to the welfare state, is of 
enormous significance to the economy of the United 
States. 
Weisbrod (1977) determined the economic magnitude of 
the NPO sector by examining "the total revenues of the 
organizations that constitute the nonprofit sector" (p. 
4). Data was gathered from a random sample of 432 Form 
990 tax returns, filed by NPOs with the IRS in 1973. 
Excluding foundations, the total revenues of all legally- 
nonprofit organizations in 1973, was an estimated $531 
billion (pp. 20 - 21). Legally-nonprofit organizations 
includes both tax-exempt, tax deductible (philanthropic) 
organizations; and those that are only tax-exempt such as 
country clubs, agricultural marketing coops, professional 
advancement organizations, labor unions, and trade asso¬ 
ciations, etc. (p. 22). Using the same data, Weisbrod, 
(1977), made an evaluation of the revenues of philanthro¬ 
pic or collective-good intensive organizations. These 
NPOs represented 37 percent of all the legally-nonprofit 
organizations or 158 out of 432. The estimated income 
for these NPOs in 1973, was $132 billion or 25 percent of 
$531 billion (pp. 20 - 22). Weisbrod (1988) reported 
that "The total revenues of the charitable nonprofits 
have increased ... from $115 billion in 1975 to $314 
billion in 1983" (pp. 62 - 63). 
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Weisbrod (1977) also conducted an evaluation of the 
assets and liabilities of legally-nonprofit organiza¬ 
tions. The data was obtained from a random sample of 269 
Form 990 tax returns from a sample of 650 such returns, 
filed with the IRS in 1973. The data was arranged into 
what the author termed a National Aggregate Balance 
Sheet, for the end of Fiscal Year 1973. The balance 
sheet showed estimated assets of $578 billion; total 
liabilities of $292 billion; total net worth of $288 
billion; and total liabilities and net worth of $580 
billion. Based on these data, the author concluded that 
the nonprofit sector represents about 15 percent of U.S. 
private national wealth; and that the sector is, indeed, 
large (pp. 26 - 27). 
Kotler and Andreasen (1991) reported on a study by 
the Independent Sector which found that in 1987, there 
were 1,368,000 private nonprofit organizations and 
government entities in the United States. Of these, 
561,000 (417.) were tax-exempt, tax deductible NPOs, as 
reported to the IRS; 378,000 (27.6V.) were described as 
’’Other Nonprofits;" 346,000 (25.37.) were churches; and 
83,000 (6.07.) were government entities (p. 11). As 
stated earlier, 66 percent of the NPOs in existence as of 
1982 had been created since 1960. In spite of the fast 
rate of growth for that period, from 1977 — 1987 the NP0 
48 
sector only grew by 13.7 percent, while the business 
sector grew by 38.B percent. Kotler and Andreasen (1991) 
attributed this significant growth of the business sector 
to the promotion of private enterprise by the Reagan 
administration (p. 11). 
Kotler and Andreasen (1991) also reported that in 
1987 the NPO sector employed nearly eight million full¬ 
time and part-time workers, earning $132 billion in wages 
and salaries. The number of employees and wages earned 
substantially increases when six million or more NPO 
volunteers are factored in (Kotler and Adreasen, 1991; 
Neisbrod, 1988; Smith and Lipsky, 1993; and Young, 
Hollister, and Hodgkinson, 1993). Wolf (1990) reported 
that NPOs "provide employment to between 8 and 10 million 
individuals ... almost 25 percent of all professional and 
technical workers in the United States..." (p. 4). NPOs 
own more than two percent of all the nation's assets, 
which is more than half of what the federal government 
owns (p. 4). In 1987, philanthropic NPOs reported 
expenditures of $290 billion. The "most dramatic indica¬ 
tor of the growing importance of the third sector is the 
fact that current operating expenditures of private non¬ 
profits comprise 6.4 percent of the U.S. gross national 
product..." (Kotler and Andreasen, 1991, p. 13). This is 
an important milestone when one considers that in 1960, 
49 
the NPO sector represented only 3.6 percent of the gross 
national product (p. 13). 
The number, rate of growth, and economic impact of 
tax-exempt, tax deductible NPOs, however, is greater than 
what the IRS data presented indicates. Not all NPOs are 
required to file reports with the IRS. Weisbrod (1988) 
noted that "The data on religious organizations are only 
for those filing the form 990 tax return, and most do 
not, since they are required to do so only if they have 
unrelated business income" (p. 234). Moreover, religious 
organizations are regarded as tax-exempt and are not 
required by the IRS to register unless they wish to 
obtain an IRS letter determining their tax-exempt status. 
Thousands of religious organizations are thus absent from 
the data. Another factor limiting the data is the IRS 
requirement that only NPOs that gross more than $25,000 
file tax return form 990. 
Organizational Complexity and Uncertainty 
Organizations are designed to respond to the product 
or service need prevalent in the marketplace. The 
design, structure or form of an organization must be 
flexible enough to adapt to unexpected events in its 
environment. If the organization operates effectively 
within a closed system, the implication is that it has 
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control over all of the forces in its environment, 
including predictability of unforeseen events. More 
complex organizations operating as open systems, also 
predicate their effectiveness in performance on the 
particular design of the organization. Burns and Stalker 
(1961) studied British and Scottish firms and emerged 
with two models of organization—the mechanistic and the 
organic. The mechanistic, comparable to closed-system 
organizations, was effective in stable markets, and the 
organic, operating as open-system organizations, was 
effective in rapidly changing markets and technologies 
(Galbraith, 1973, p. 2). Open-systems or complex 
organizations have wider flexibility when their design 
includes both the mechanistic and organic model. Hall 
(1962) found that the research and development depart¬ 
ments of complex organizations were organic in form, 
while the production departments were more mechanistic in 
form (Galbraith, 1973, p. 3). Galbraith recognized that, 
realistically, not all variables in the external environ¬ 
ment of complex organizations can be brought under total 
control or be made totally predictable. Uncertainty, he 
said, "limits the ability of the organization to preplan 
or to make decisions about activities in advance of their 
execution" (p. 4). For Galbraith the unknown causes 
uncertainty. Thus, it is not surprising that he defined 
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organizational uncertainty "as the difference between the 
amount of information required to perform the task and 
the amount of information already possessed by the organ¬ 
ization" (p. 5). Galbraith also recognized that there 
is no best way to organize. To that end, he concluded 
that "the best way to organize is contingent upon the 
uncertainty and diversity of the basic task being 
performed by the organizational unit" (p. 4). 
Building on the work of Burns and Stalker (1961); 
Hall (1962); and Galbraith (1973), Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) added that the dominant competitive issue for 
organizations operating in dynamic markets or envi¬ 
ronments was the ability to tap on continually emerging 
body of knowledge, and the innovative capacity to use 
that body of knowledge to improve both processes and 
products. The concepts of differentiation and integra¬ 
tion employed by Lawrence and Lorsch facilitates under— 
standing of organizational uncertainty. They defined 
differentiation as "the difference in cognitive and 
emotional orientation among managers in different func¬ 
tional departments" and integration as "the quality of 
the state of collaboration that exists among departments 
that are required to achieve unity of effort by the 
demands of the environment" (p. 11). Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) postulated that "As organizations deal with their 
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external environments, they become segmented into units, 
each of which has as its major task the problem of 
dealing with a part of the conditions outside the firm" 
(p. 8). These differentiated units, cognitive levels and 
tasks must be linked or integrated for "the accomplish¬ 
ment of the organization's overall purpose" (p. 8). 
Using the concepts of differentiation and integra¬ 
tion, Lawrence and Lorsh (1967) studied low-performing, 
medium-performing and high-performing for-profit organ¬ 
izations. They found that neither of the "low-performing 
organizations met the demands of the environment for high 
differentiation and integration so well as either the 
medium- or the high-performing ones" (p. 52). A close 
relationship was found between the extent to which these 
organizations met the environmental requirements for 
differentiation and integration and their ability to 
effectively address the level and type of uncertainly in 
the organization's external environment (pp. 52 - 53). 
In a subsequent study, Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) 
examined the same type of organizations in three differ 
ent industries, along a certainty-uncertainty continuum. 
The findings were identical. "There was a closer fit in 
the high-performing organizations than in the low per 
formers between the attributes of each unit and the 
demands of its relevant part of the environment" (p. 25). 
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The job of relating effectively to an organization's 
environment is simpler if the environment is relatively 
stable. The job of maintaining viability requires that 
the organization "become more complex in order to deal 
adequately with an uncertain and rapidly changing sector 
of the environment" (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969, pp. 25 - 
26) . 
Thompson (1967) made a major contribution by synthe¬ 
sizing the rational model (closed-system) with the 
natural-system model (open-system). Prior to this syn¬ 
thesis, organizations were basically regarded as either 
closed-system or open-system. The main concern of 
students of organization was efficiency or performance, 
control and prediction, and not the organization per se. 
Thompson noted that proponents of the closed-system 
avoided uncertainty to achieve determinateness, while the 
proponents of the open-system assumed uncertainty and 
indeterminateness. More specifically, the closed-system 
strategists were interested in organizations as vehicles 
for rational achievements, while the open-system strate¬ 
gists were attempting to understand organizations per se. 
Thompson conceded "that each approach leads to some 
truth, but neither alone affords an adequate understand¬ 
ing of complex organizations" (p. 8). One of the barri- 
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ers to creating a synthesis of the two strategies was 
"the fact that our culture does not contain concepts for 
simultaneously thinking about rationality and indetermi¬ 
nateness (pp. 11 ~ 12). 
Thompson (1967) convincingly merged the two strate¬ 
gies as intrinsic to a realistic definition of complex 
organizations. Complex organizations, he said, were 
"open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with uncer— 
tainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of 
rationality and hence needing determinateness and cer— 
tainty" (p. 10). Thompson recommended that organizations 
cope with external uncertainty by adapting their struc¬ 
ture to the uncertainties generated by the external envi¬ 
ronment and internal technology. For Thompson, this is 
accomplished by buffering, smoothing or leveling, fore¬ 
casting, and rationing both at the input and at the out¬ 
put level of the organization. Stockpiling materials and 
supplies, preventive maintenance, and the recruitment and 
training of personnel are examples of buffering at the 
input level. Buffering at the output level involves the 
warehousing of the finished product for prompt market 
distribution. Smoothing or leveling involves attempts to 
reduce fluctuations in the environment. Bargain sales by 
departments stores during slow periods, and the sched¬ 
uling of nonemergencies cases by hospitals are examples 
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of leveling. The ability of universities to forecast 
levels of enrollment is crucial for scheduling operations 
in the technical core (classrooms, housing, dining facil¬ 
ities, and book and supply outlets). When buffering, 
leveling, and forecasting do not protect the technical 
core from environmental fluctuations, organizations 
resort to rationing to achieve a modicum of rationality. 
NPOs faced with a major reduction of funds would be 
forced to reduce or ration services or concentrate on 
cases most likely to yield satisfactory outcomes (pp. 20 
- 23). Thompson warned that the inner or core technology 
(where the work is done) of the organization can never be 
completely closed or protected from environmental influ¬ 
ences (p. 20). Tausky (1978) summarized Thompson's 
contribution: "Thus, the imagery is of a closed system 
(the technical core) operating within the protective 
boundaries of an open system" (p. 69). 
Complexity and Chaos 
The concurrence in the literature presented thus far 
is that complex organizations, for-profits and nonprof¬ 
its, are open systems with inter—dependent components 
interacting with the internal and external environment. 
Given that organizations are formed in response to 
particular demands from the environment, it should be 
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logical for organizations to adapt to changing markets to 
remain viable. As Thompson (1967) put it, "organizations 
do some of the basic things they do because they must, or 
else" (p. 1). Thompson added that dysfunctions are con¬ 
ceivable in organizations, but that offending components 
must adapt to produce a net positive contribution or be 
disengaged. If corrective action is not forthcoming, the 
organization will degenerate (pp. 6-7). Organizations 
that successfully respond to new markets, in a sustained 
way, may do so because they have freed themselves from 
the shackles of the old concepts of control, reductionism 
and predictability. Taylor (1911) developed these con¬ 
cepts in The Principles of Scientific Management. In the 
decades following publication of his work, Taylor's brand 
of scientific management significantly influenced produc¬ 
tivity and the standard of living of workers in industry. 
Freedman (1992) acknowledged Taylor's contributions, but 
noted that "the experience of the last twenty years has 
taught managers that in the new business environment such 
scientific principles are a recipe for disaster. In 
fast-changing markets, Taylor's fragmentation of work, 
the separation of planning from execution, and the 
isolation of workers from each other create a rigid 
organization that can't adapt quickly to change" (p. 
28) . 
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Senge (1990) addressed the learning disabilities of 
complex organizations. "Learning disabilities," he said, 
"are tragic in children, but they are fatal in organiza¬ 
tions" (p. 18). Most corporations, Senge argued, die 
before they reach the age of forty. Corporations can 
defy these odds by becoming learning organizations. 
Senge believed that a learning organization "is contin¬ 
ually expanding its capacity to create its future " (p. 
14). Survival or adaptive learning is crucial, but it 
"must be joined by generative learning, learning that 
changes our capacity to create" (p. 14). Senge spoke of 
two types of complexity in organizations—detail complex¬ 
ity and dynamic complexity. Under detail complexity both 
the system and the manager gets bogged down in a quagmire 
of detail and forecloses opportunities for seeing the 
total picture and the environmental forces impinging upon 
it. Dynamic complexity, allows the manager to take a 
step back and use detail knowledge to make a systemic and 
wholistic analysis of the enterprise, determine its dys¬ 
functions, and the environmental conditions bearing upon 
it. Dynamic complexity is integrative, analytic and 
abstract. The organization must have a cadre of indi¬ 
viduals with detail complexity and a management group 
with dynamic complexity. One learning disability of 
corporations is that "most systems analyses focus on 
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detail complexity not dynamic complexity" (p. 72). Un¬ 
fortunately, managers find themselves creating a mismatch 
by developing detailed solutions to increasingly complex 
problems, something Senge labeled "the antithesis of real 
systems thinking" (p. 72). Senge noted that "The real 
leverage in most management situations lies in under— 
standing dynamic complexity, not detail complexity" (p. 
72). Senge developed five disciplines for ensuring 
organizations are always in a learning mode. These are 
systems thinking; personal mastery; mental models; 
building shared vision; and team learning. Mastering 
these disciplines "fundamentally will distinguish 
learning organizations from traditional authoritarian 
controlling organizations" (pp. 5 - 11). 
The concept of complexity is not unique to social 
organizations. Owing to the revolutionary work of Albert 
Einstein—the theory of relativity—the scientific commu¬ 
nity, since the 1920s, has been re-examining Sir Isaac 
Newton's concepts of linearity, reductionism, control, 
and predictability. Scientist from different disci¬ 
plines, including economics, have observed complexity in 
the simplest organism or system when nontraditional anal¬ 
ysis is employed (Gleick, 1987; Waldrop, 1992; and 
Freedman, 1992). As a result of the effort to look 
beyond complexity, some members of the scientific commu- 
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nity in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s began to develop a 
new science called Chaos (Gleick, 1987). According to 
Gleick, "the most passionate advocates of the new science 
go so far as to say that twentieth-century science will 
be remembered for just three things: relativity, quantum 
mechanics, and chaos. Chaos ... has become the century's 
third great revolution in the physical sciences" (pp. 5 - 
6). Moreover, chaos "cuts away at the tenets of Newton's 
physics.... Relativity eliminated the Newtonian illu¬ 
sion of absolute space and time; quantum theory elimi¬ 
nated the Newtonian dream of a controllable measurement 
process; and chaos eliminates the ... fantasy of deter— 
ministic predictability" (p. 6). The most compelling 
definition of chaos, of the many gleaned by Gleick, is 
"Dynamics freed at last from the shackles of order and 
predictability.... Systems liberated to randomly 
explore their every dynamical possibility.... Exciting 
variety, richness of choice, a cornucopia of opportunity" 
(p. 306). 
Chaos, Gleick added, represents the irregular side 
of nature, the discontinuous and erratic side, which in 
the past have been puzzles or monstrosities to science 
(p. 3). One of the startling revelations of chaos theory 
is that tiny differences in input quickly become over 
whelming differences in output, a phenomenon labeled 
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"sensitive dependence on initial conditions" (p. 8). 
Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at M.I.T. in 1961, planted 
the seed for the new science of chaos. Lorenz, instead 
of entering .506127 in his Royal McBee weather computer, 
entered the rounded-off version of .506, assuming that 
the difference, one part in a thousand, would be inconse¬ 
quential. He observed that his computer was producing a 
weather printout that diverged rapidly from the pattern 
of the last run. Lorenz was confident that the small 
numerical error he made in the initial input would not 
change large-scale features of the weather since the 
computer used a purely deterministic system of equations 
of the earth's weather. Based on what his computer was 
generating, Lorenz's faith that these equations captured 
the essence of the real atmosphere was shaken. To his 
amazement, this minuscule change caused drastic altera¬ 
tions in the weather pattern. As a consequence of 
Lorenz's serendipitous finding, scientist from different 
fields have simulated other physical systems and found 
that in chaos theory, indeed, minute changes can lead to 
radical deviations in the behavior of a natural system 
(Gleick, 1987; and Freedman, 1992). 
Waldrop (1992) argued that chaos by itself doesn't 
explain the structure, the coherence, the self—organizing 
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cohesiveness of complex systems (p. 12). All complex 
systems, he went on to say, have somehow acquired the 
ability to bring order and chaos into a special kind of 
balance. According to Waldrop, chaos theory scientists 
have called this balance point "the edge of chaos" (p. 
12). At the edge of chaos, he said, components of a 
system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite 
dissolve into turbulence, either. "The edge of chaos is 
where new ideas and innovative genotypes are forever 
nibbling away at the edges of the status quo. The edge 
of chaos is where centuries of slavery and segregation 
suddenly give way to the civil rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s. The edge of chaos is the constantly 
shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the 
one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, 
adaptive, and alive" (p. 12). 
Waldrop (1992) believed that a changing environment 
provides opportunities for species, corporations, and 
industries to evolve for better survival. Examples of 
this are seen when the marketplace responds to changing 
tastes and lifestyles, immigration, technological devel¬ 
opments, shifts in the price of raw materials, and a host 
of other factors (p. 11). The contributions facilitated 
by the concepts of complexity, chaos, and the edge of 
chaos, Waldrop argued, also "have the potential for 
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immense impact on the conduct of economics, business, and 
even politics" (p. 13). Senge (1990) in his treatment of 
social "learning organizations," saw them as having 
characteristics remarkably similar to the complex 
adaptive systems that scientists are discovering in 
nature. Senge expects human organizations to replicate 
the organic control found in nature. 
MicroworIds 
Microworlds has been hailed as the technology of the 
learning organization (Senge , 1990, pp. 313 - 338). 
Through microworlds, social organizations can simulate 
the contingencies discussed under the headings Organiza¬ 
tional Complexity and Uncertainty; and Complexity and 
Chaos. The microworlds concept is nothing more than an 
extension of the microworlds of children—the playroom 
and the playground. In these microcosms of reality, 
children learn basic principles of geometry an mechanics; 
natural language; and social systems, without ever being 
taught (p. 314). Through microworlds complex business 
situations can be explored by trying out new strategies 
and policies and seeing what might happen, without the 
risk of cost or the resulting catastrophe of a failed 
policy or strategy (p. 315). 
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First year business school students at MIT's Sloan 
School, use microworlds computer games to simulate the 
rise and fall of People Express airline. Through these 
models, students explore the interrelated forces that 
caused this airline, with the fastest growth rates in the 
airline history, to experience a devastating financial 
crisis and eventual purchase by a competitor (Freedman, 
1992, p. 38). For Senge (1990), microworlds can help 
turn the managers of today into researchers or scientists 
who study their own organizations. "They most be 
designers who create the learning processes that make 
self-organization possible, the processes that are 
essential to effective performance in a world character¬ 
ized by perpetual novelty and change" (Freedman, 1992, p. 
38) . 
Historical Development of Latino Nonprofits and 
Demographics 
According to Gallegos and O'Neill (1991), Latino 
nonprofit organizations "have played a highly significant 
role in the development of the Hispanic community in the 
United States" (p. 5). Latino NPOs have been involved in 
protecting the legal and political rights of their cons¬ 
tituents; and improving their socioeconomic plight as far 
back as the mutualistas (mutual aid/assistance societies) 
of the mid—nineteenth century, following the enactment of 
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the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (Camarillo, 1991, 
pp. 15 - 18). 
Through this treaty, Mexico ceded the Southwest to 
the United States. Many Mexicans opted to remain in 
their homeland, the Southwest. Although the treaty 
guaranteed Mexican residents in the Southwest region 
constitutional rights as citizens of the United States, 
the history of the period is filled with violations of 
those rights (p. 16). The socioeconomic and political 
conditions experienced by Mexican-Americans in the 
Southwest, gave rise to the mutual aid societies of the 
middle and late nineteenth century. The fundamental 
objectives of these early societies have not changed. 
The issues they faced then—economic security, political 
rights, equal education opportunity, health care, and 
cultural identity—continue to be a major challenge to 
present day Latino NPOs (p. 31). 
While Mexican-Americans remained in the rural 
Southwest as strangers in their own homeland, "Puerto 
Ricans emigrated from an economically devastated homeland 
to the United States and stayed mostly in major urban 
areas like New York, Newark, and Chicago" (Gallegos and 
O'Neill, 1991, p. 3). Puerto Ricans had U.S. citizenship 
granted through the 1917 Jones Act and were able to enter 
the country since the early part of the nineteenth centu- 
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ry, and free entry since 1904 (Cruz, 1977, and Camarillo, 
1991). Notwithstanding these historical differences, 
both groups recognize that they are at the bottom of the 
U.S. socio-economic and political ladder. Owing to their 
situational likeness, it is not surprising to find many 
similarities in the development of Latino NPOs in both 
communities (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 4). 
Unlike their Mexican-American and Puerto Rican 
counterparts, Cuban-American immigrants of the early 
1960s "were characterized by relatively high levels of 
economic, professional, and educational status; they were 
politically more conservative ... (Gallegos and O'Neill, 
1991, pp. 4-5). The authors intimated that these 
socioeconomic advantages "created a situation in which 
nonprofit organizations were less important in the Cuban 
than in the Mexican and Puerto Rican communities" (p. 5). 
Empirically, community-based human service agencies are 
more prevalent among Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans 
than among Cuban-Americans. 
Since the predominant Latino ethnic group in the 
three Western Massachusetts cities selected for this 
study is Puerto Rican, the ensuing focus will be on 
Puerto Rican NPOs. 
In presenting a historical view of the development 
of Puerto Rican nonprofits, Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
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Sanabria, and Tirado (1991) advanced a broad definition 
of nonprofit organizations. These are defined as 
"nongovernmental associations established by and for 
Puerto Ricans for the specific purpose of delivering 
services—social, economic, and cultural—and/or acting 
as advocates on behalf of the community" (p. 34). One of 
the main themes in the history of Puerto Rican nonprofits 
(PRNPOs), the authors added, is the ongoing tension 
between service delivery and advocacy. This conflict is 
driven by the struggle in the Puerto Rican community or 
sectors thereof for empowerment through a consideration 
of broader political issues. Coloring this tension is 
the traditional preference of funders to support service 
delivery significantly more than advocacy programs. 
According to Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado 
(1991), the tension between service delivery and advocacy 
has affected the internal functioning of PRNPOs as well 
as relations among them and with the larger community. 
Adding to the tension, is the increased dependence of 
these agencies on outside funding sources which serve to 
steer them away from advocacy causes and diminish their 
independence in that realm. For the PRNPOs that by 
choice or circumstance elected to pursue service deliv¬ 
ery in favor of advocacy, the search for financial 
independence and self-sufficiency is a central issue (p. 
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34) . It is a central issue because of shrinking dollars, 
the number of agencies competing for the same dollars, 
the reluctance of funders to support dysfunctioning NPOs, 
and a number of other factors. 
In the presentation that follows, it will be dis¬ 
cussed how PRNPOs have historically tried to cope with 
the uncertainty and complexity of attaining independence 
and self-sufficiency to better serve their constituents. 
Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado (1991) divided 
the history of PRNPOs into five main stages. These will 
be discussed here. 
The first stage covers the period from the nine¬ 
teenth century to World War I. According to Sanchez- 
Korrol (1983), the Puerto Ricans that settled in the 
mainland in the early part of the nineteenth century were 
mostly merchants and students who came to study in U.S. 
colleges and universities (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 
35) . The expansion of the U.S. economy in the 1860s, 
growing political unrest on the island, and repressive 
Spanish colonial policies, forced skilled workers, and 
separatists leaders, predominantly middle-class profes¬ 
sionals, to settled in the United States, mostly in New 
York City. This early mixture of skilled and profession¬ 
al Puerto Ricans banded together and formed mutual aid 
societies to address their social, economic, political 
66 
and spiritual needs. After the United States took 
possession of Puerto Rico in 1898, the island rapidly 
became a large sugar plantation (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 35). Centro de Estudios 
Puertorriquenos (1979), noted that the process of land 
acquisition by the U.S. displaced Puerto Rican campesinos 
(peasants) and accelerated the formation of a large 
surplus labor force. As living conditions deteriorated 
in the island, migration became one of the few alterna¬ 
tives for the impoverished working class (Gallegos and 
O'Neill, 1991, p. 35). According to Centro de Estudios 
Puertorriquenos (1982), labor agents representing the 
tobacco industry in the U.S. turned to the island as a 
source of cheap labor, and contracted workers for 
different parts of the mainland (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 35). 
The second stage, Formation and Growth of the Puerto 
Rican Community, covers the period from 1917 to 1948. 
During this phase, the New York City neighborhoods of the 
earlier period began to emerge as clearly defined Puerto 
Rican communities with their own organizational and 
institutional structure. In the 1920s, Puerto Rican- 
owned bodegas (grocery stores), barber shops, lawyers' 
and physicians' offices, and storefront churches began to 
appear in response to the needs of these communities 
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(Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, pp. 35 
- 36). This period was also marked by the emergence of 
the hometown social clubs such as the Club Caborrojenos, 
the Mayaguezanos Ausentes, and the Hijos de Penuelas. 
According to Sanchez-Korrol (1983), through these meeting 
places or associations, Puerto Ricans "developed social 
and cultural networks necessary for survival in an alien 
and increasingly hostile society" (Gallegos and O'Neill, 
1991, p. 36). According to Vega (1984), other civic and 
cultural organizations were established along class 
lines. The professionals and intellectuals founded the 
Casa de Puerto Rico in 1925, to promote Puerto Rican 
culture, customs and traditions. The workers created 
organizations like the Ateneo Obrero in 1926, for 
cultural and educational purposes, and to address the 
needs of the second generation of Puerto Ricans (Gallegos 
and O'Neill, 1991, p. 36). 
Concerned with the new realities experienced by 
Puerto Ricans in the metropolis, Puerto Rican leaders 
from Manhattan established the Porto Rican Brotherhood of 
America in 1923. According to Sanchez-Korrol (1983), 
this was the first successful citywide organization, 
predominantly working class, which promoted the impor— 
tance of unity and concerted action to defend the 
interest of the nascent Puerto Rican communities. The 
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Brotherhood propounded the belief that Puerto Ricans 
themselves had to define their own problems and needs and 
devise their own solutions (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, 
p. 36). According to Vega (1984), in the summer of 1926, 
thugs hired by Jewish merchants attacked Puerto Ricans in 
East Harlem. Puerto Ricans fought back; and the Brother— 
hood took the lead in defense of the community before the 
establishment (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 37). To 
address the growing threat to the entire Latino communi¬ 
ty, Sanchez-Korrol (1983) noted that the Brotherhood 
sponsored the formation of La Liga Puertorriquena e 
Hispana, comprised of Puerto Ricans and other Latino 
groups. The objectives of La Liga were to unite all 
Spanish-speaking organizations in New York City, 
represent the community before the authorities, promote 
harmonious relations with other ethnic groups, and 
educate the city's Latino population. La Liga also 
carried out efforts aimed at urging Puerto Rican partici¬ 
pation in the electoral process (Gallegos and O'Neill, 
1991, p. 37). 
Sanchez-Korrol (1983) and Vega (1984) noted that 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s, Puerto Ricans 
in New York City became an embattled community as the 
anti-Puerto Rican campaign reached new heights. Puerto 
Ricans were portrayed by the more established European 
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ethnic groups as criminals, carriers of contagious 
diseases, and social leeches. Calls for end to Puerto 
Rican migration to the city intensified in 1935. The 
Brotherhood, the Liga and other Puerto Rican organiza¬ 
tions were the avant-garde in the defense of the commu¬ 
nity from these inhumanities (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, 
p. 37). When alliances with the Democratic and Republi¬ 
can parties proved unresponsive to the needs of the 
Puerto Rican community, Puerto Rican leaders sought 
support from the more progressive American Labor and 
Communist parties. The Communist and the Nationalist 
parties, in turn, established their own social and 
cultural clubs such as the Club Eugenio Maria de Hostos 
and the Club Pomarosas. These clubs became centers of 
intensive community activity (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, pp. 37 - 38). 
The third stage covers the period from 1948 to the 
early 1960s. The highlights of the period were the 
culmination of a redefined and more benign colonial 
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico; 
the institution of a series of political reforms and a 
new economic development project known as Operation 
Bootstrap; the attraction of U.S. capital to the island 
in return for cheap labor, tax exemptions, and political 
stability; the exportation of surplus labor to the 
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mainland; the postwar economic expansion in the mainland; 
the growth of the Puerto Rican community in New York; and 
the emergence of a second generation of Puerto Rican 
leadership in the new communities of New York (Rodriguez- 
Fraticelli, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 38). 
One immediate impact of the economic and political 
changes in the island and the economic expansion in the 
mainland, was an increase in the number of Puerto Ricans 
migrating to the United States. Wagenheim (1975) noted 
that between 1940 and 1950, the Puerto Rican population 
in the United States rose from 69,967 to 301,375. Of 
these, over 80 percent resided in New York. In 1960, the 
U.S. Census Bureau reported 612,574 Puerto Ricans living 
in New York City (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 38). In 
the first decade, the numbers of Puerto Ricans entering 
the mainland more than quadruple, and in the second, it 
more than double. Mills, Senior, and Golden (1950); and 
Senior (1965) noted that the mass migration of Puerto 
Ricans to New York City coincided with the migration of 
thousands of blacks from the southern states. This dual 
migration intensified the existing anti-Puerto Rican 
sentiment in the city. Public officials became alarmed 
with the rapid growth of the Puerto Rican population and 
its spread to other boroughs of the city. Puerto Rico's 
migration policies were blamed for exacerbating the 
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city's problems (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 38). 
After debating the issue, several important agreements 
were reached between the two governments. One accord was 
the coordinated effort to channel the migration of Puerto 
Ricans to other regions of the country. Another, was the 
creation, in 1949, of the Mayor's Committee for Puerto 
Rican Affairs, in New York City (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 38). Wakefield (1959) 
noted that this committee was to ease the migration of 
Puerto Ricans into the city; develop a politically 
acceptable Puerto Rican leadership, not identified with 
progressive or militant struggles and organizations; and 
draw the rapidly growing Puerto Rican population into the 
Democratic Party. These efforts were undertaken at the 
same time that a large-scale campaign at the federal, 
state, and city levels was launched by conservative 
political forces against left-leaning Puerto Rican 
community leaders, and Communists (Gallegos and O'Neill, 
1991, pp. 38 -39). 
Fitzpatrick (1987) noted that in 1948, the govern¬ 
ment of Puerto Rico established the Migration Office in 
New York, for the purpose of assisting with the develop¬ 
ment of Puerto Rican organizations. This program was 
later renamed The Commonwealth Office of Puerto Rico. 
Its overall responsibility was to assist all Puerto 
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Ricans living in the United States to adapt to their new 
reality (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 39). The 
Hispanic Young Adult Association (HYAA) was one of 
several organizations the Migration Office supported in 
New York City. HYAA was founded in the early 1950s by 
concerned Puerto Rican college students and young 
professionals. The bulk of the membership consisted of 
second-generation Puerto Ricans trained in social work. 
HYAA was an adherent of the assimilation or melting pot 
theory; believed in the efficacy of social intervention; 
and in education as the great equalizer against the 
social ills plaguing the Puerto Rican community 
(Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 
39) . 
HYAA was a harsh critic of existing Puerto Rican 
organizations and characterized them and their leaders as 
culturally and ideologically centered on the island. It 
regarded them as social clubs with short-sighted views; 
little concern for the needs of the community; and 
inadequate for undertaking the arduous task of leading 
the integration of Puerto Ricans into the mainstream. 
HYAA had identified a void in the leadership of the 
community and felt it had the wherewithal and the calling 
to fill that void. HYAA eventually came to terms with 
its Puerto Rican identity and in 1956, after heated 
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debate, it became the Puerto Rican Association for 
Community Affairs (PRACA) (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 39). 
In 1959, PRACA, using the principles of its 
predecessor HYAA, undertook the task of developing Puerto 
Rican leaders that would become part of New York City's 
power structure. PRACA was successful in bringing 
together high school students, college students, and 
young professionals to help with the community develop¬ 
ment peocess. According to Glazer and Moynihan (1963), a 
group within PRACA began to question the role played by 
the Migration Office in the development of the Puerto 
Rican community. The Office had exacted the right to 
represent the community before government agencies. 
PRACA felt the Office could not be effective in serving 
the community and the government of Puerto Rico at the 
same time since its allegiance was to the political party 
in power. With the aim of replacing the Migration 
Office, a new organization was developed within PRACA— 
the Puerto Rican-Hispanic Leadership Forum, now the 
National Puerto Rican Forum. The Forum was founded in 
1957, and was modeled after the NAACP and the American 
Jewish Committee. The Forum viewed the Migration Office 
as an obstacle to the development of an independent 
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Puerto Rican leadership (Ridriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, 
and Tirado, 1991, pp. 39 - 40). 
Like PRACA, the Forum's objective was the creation 
of a new Puerto Rican leadership. It propounded on the 
need to create financially sound and well-organized 
Puerto Rican nonprofit organizations, with full-time 
personnel and financial support from outside sources like 
foundations, corporations, and the government. The Forum 
projected its leaders as responsible and educated New 
Yorkers. Politically, the Forum succeeded in replacing 
the Migration Office when it became the power broker 
between the city and the Puerto Rican community 
(Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 
40). Gotsch (1966) noted that in 1961, in exchange for 
the Forum's support of Robert F. Wagner's reelection as 
mayor of New York City, several of its leaders were 
appointed to top city administrative posts. Among these 
were Herman Badillo, deputy commissioner for Relocation 
of the Department of Real Estate; John Carro, special 
assistant to the mayor; Luis Hernandez, city tax 
collector; and Max Gonzalez, deputy commissioner of the 
Department of Market (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, pp. 40 
-41). 
Following the Forum's success in guiding the 
integration of the Puerto Rican leadership into the 
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city's political structure, its most ambitious project 
was the establishment of Aspira, an educational organ¬ 
ization concerned with the future leadership of the 
Puerto Rican community. According to an Aspira (1959) 
proposal, the agency was to assist Puerto Rican youths in 
pursuing careers in professional, technical, and liberal 
arts fields as well as fostering skills in community 
organizing. The expectation was that these young 
professionals would return to the community and assist in 
its social, economic, and political advancement (Gallegos 
and O'Neill, 1991, p. 41). 
The Forum pressed forward Aspira's proposal for 
funding by presenting it to several foundations. 
Herbstein (1978) argued that until the early 1960s, 
foundations have paid little attention to the Puerto 
Rican community. Most foundations were concerned mainly 
with the conditions of African-Americans, and regarded 
Puerto Ricans as a regional problem. Compounding the 
issue was the perception that the Puerto Rican community 
was relatively small in comparison to the African- 
American and Mexican-American communities. The rapid 
growth of the Puerto Rican community and the recognition 
that it was an integral part of U. S. society prompted 
foundations to look favorably at the Forum's proposal for 
Aspira. Initial funding for Aspira came from the Taconic 
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Foundation, Nathan Hefheimer Foundation, New York Founda¬ 
tion, New York Fund for Children, the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund, and the Field Foundation. Aspira was 
incorporated in 1961, and was the first Puerto Rican 
organization in New York City funded by outside monies. 
The impact of Aspira was immediately felt in the Puerto 
Rican community. By 1963, there were 52 Aspira clubs 
throughout the city. These were mainly established by 
high school students. By 1965, Aspira was firmly 
established and decided to break away from its creator, 
the Puerto Rican-Hispanic Leadership Forum (National 
Puerto Rican Forum) to become an independent agency 
(Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 41). 
In 1972, the Puerto Rican-Hispanic Leadership Forum 
was incorporated in New York as the National Puerto Rican 
Forum (NPRF). The NPRF is a nonprofit organization 
devoted to the economic, educational, and leadership 
development of the Puerto Rican community and other dis¬ 
advantaged groups. Its service offices are located in 
the Bronx, New York, New York City, Hartford, Connect¬ 
icut, Chicago, Illinois, Cleveland, Ohio, and Miami, 
Florida. In 1982, the NPRF received a Presidential 
Citation for a national record of achievement in service 
delivery to the educationally and economically disadvan— 
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taged (interview with Hector Velazquez, President and 
CEO, National Puerto Rican Forum, February 25, 1994). 
Herbstein (1978) noted that in the mid-1950s, other 
citywide Puerto Rican nonprofits emerged. El Desfile 
Puertorriqueno (Puerto Rican Day Parade) was one of the 
most notorious in these genre. Originally, the Desfile 
was a coordinating council seeking to further organiza¬ 
tional activity in the community, strengthen Puerto Rican 
identity, and struggle for Puerto Rican civil rights. It 
conducted massive cultural demonstrations to show unity 
and highlight the growing numerical importance of the 
Puerto Ricans in New York City. By the late 1960s, the 
Desfile had changed its original focus and opted to 
become a showcase for politicians from Puerto Rico and 
New York City. Notwithstanding its new posture, the 
Puerto Rican Day Parade remains to this day an estab¬ 
lished Puerto Rican tradition in the city (Gallegos and 
O'Neill, 1991, pp. 41 - 42). 
El Congreso del Pueblo (Council of Hometown Clubs), 
founded in 1956, was another key organization of this 
period. The Congreso, unlike HYAA and PRACA, was 
primarily comprised of working-class migrants. It re¬ 
garded Puerto Rican cultural tradition as an important 
force in the struggle for civil rights. The Congreso 
fostered the formation of other such groups throughout 
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the city. It helped newcomers find housing, jobs, and 
occasionally provided them emergency financial assis¬ 
tance. The Congreso developed into a broad-based organ¬ 
dy' 
ization, comprising approximately 80 clubs throughout New 
York City. In the 1960s, the Congreso mobilized the 
Puerto Rican community in the struggle for civil rights. 
It was at the forefront of the struggle for better 
housing, against police brutality, racism, and discrim¬ 
ination. The Congreso worked closely with Aspira and 
United Bronx Parents for better educational facilities 
and programs, including bilingual education. It partici¬ 
pated in the efforts of the 1960s to decentralize New 
York City's school system. The Congreso, while a New 
York City-based organization, served as a model for the 
formation of organizations in other urban centers. Like 
many Puerto Rican organizations of that period, the 
Congreso was a self-supported, voluntary organization. 
However, Congreso, as well as other self-supported 
organizations, began to lose its independence in the mid- 
1960s when it started to accept antipoverty funds 
(Rodriguez—Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 
42) . 
The fourth stage covers the period from the 1960s to 
1975. It is characterized by Puerto Rican organizational 
responses to the War on Poverty and the effects of their 
81 
growing dependence on outside funding. Three legisla¬ 
tions are pivotal during this period; the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1965. The force behind the 
passage of these laws was the clamor for political and 
economic equality, fairness, and justice in the area of 
civil rights emanating from the African-American, Puerto 
Rican, and Mexican-American communities throughout the 
United States. Of these legislations, the one that made 
the greatest impact in the nonprofit arena was the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1965. Through this law, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration launched an 
ambitious nationwide anti-poverty program. It allowed 
federal funds to be funneled to community-based organiza¬ 
tions for the development of self-help projects aimed at 
improving socioeconomic conditions (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, pp. 42 - 43). 
Bonilla (1965) noted that many Puerto Rican 
organizations in New York City welcomed the antipoverty 
legislation. The Puerto Rican-Hispanic Forum (National 
Puerto Rican Forum) opined that it presented a unique 
opportunity to develop the particular strengths of the 
Puerto Rican community in fighting poverty and, at the 
same time, in attacking some of the major barriers to the 
Forum's emergence as an effective actor in the city's 
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affairs (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and Tirado, 
1991, p. 43). 
To turn this legislation into a successful venture 
for the Puerto Rican community, the Forum, in 1964, 
designed the Puerto Rican Community Development Project 
(PRCDP). This was a far—reaching proposal whereby the 
PRCDP would serve as a clearinghouse for a variety of 
self-help programs for increasing family income; reducing 
poverty and dependence; raising the educational level of 
the community; and strengthening family life, cultural 
institutions, and Puerto Rican organizational life 
throughout the city. The project envisioned public 
funding for over 60 community-based groups, including 
Aspira, PRACA, and the Puerto Rican Family Institute, a 
nonprofit organization created in 1963 to assist migrant 
families acclimate to the new sociopolitical environment. 
The establishment of a Puerto Rican college and a 
research center were also built into the plan (Rodriguez- 
Fraticelli, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 43). 
Although the PRCDP received the support of most of 
the Puerto Rican organizations in the city, it was not 
implemented as originally conceived. Elements within the 
city government were reluctant to fund a project of this 
magnitude. They feared that PRCDP, could be the basis 
for the formation of a solid Puerto Rican bloc that could 
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seriously challenge the established political structure. 
City officials opposed it, arguing that the Puerto Rican 
community did not constitute a majority in any of the 
existing city districts (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, 
and Tirado, 1991, p. 43). 
According to Herbstein (1978), the Forum and its 
supporters resigned from the PRCDP over an impasse as to 
the most meaningful and realistic approach for imple¬ 
menting the project. The proposal was rewritten by those 
that remain in the PRCDP. The new proposal reflected the 
community action approach over the Forum and Aspira's 
approach which stressed educating youth and training 
professionals to serve the community. The city funded 
the modified version of PRCDP, which in turn subcon¬ 
tracted with 100 local agencies to provide community 
organizing tutoring, job training, and addiction 
prevention programs. Initially PRCDP was a militant 
organization, but by the early 1970s, as a result of 
another split, control of the organization passed into 
the hands of the less militant faction. Problems erupted 
concerning PRCDP's fiscal management, and that of pro¬ 
grams under it auspices. The Hunts Point Multi-Service 
Agency, for example, was accused of mismanagement of 
funds. Corruption charges were also leveled against 
PRCDP, and in 1978, the city government ceased to fund 
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it. The consensus in the Puerto Rican community was that 
in spite of the amount of funds invested in antipoverty 
programs, the socioeconomic conditions of minorities 
changed little (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, and 
Tirado, 1991, pp. 44 - 45). 
The final stage covers the period from 1975 to the 
present. According to Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, Sanabria, 
and Tirado, (1991), during the 1970s, the socioeconomic 
conditions of the Puerto Rican community in the United 
States, and specifically New York City, continued to 
worsen. By 1976, the authors added, Puerto Ricans not 
only trailed far behind whites on key socioeconomic 
indicators but were also below other major Latino groups. 
These conditions coincided with the economic crisis the 
United States was experiencing. In New York City, the 
economic crisis was attributed to the decline of jobs in 
the manufacturing sector, where large numbers of Puerto 
Rican workers were concentrated. As a consequence, a 
disproportionate number of Puerto Ricans were displaced 
from the job market. The authors noted that austere 
fiscal initiatives by federal, state, and city govern¬ 
ments to address the crisis made a bad situation worse 
for the Puerto Rican community and its nonprofit organi¬ 
zations (p. 46) 
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The gains made during the 1960s under the Economic 
Opportunity Act in the areas of health, education, and 
housing were eroded, leaving Puerto Ricans more 
vulnerable to economic policies over which they had 
little control. Puerto Rican nonprofits that developed a 
dependency on public funds under the antipoverty policies 
of the 1960s, were strongly affected by the major 
reduction in government funds. Some organizations closed 
their doors due to the massive cutback in funds. Others 
were forced to streamline their services and reduce the 
number of staff to remain operational. PRACA, for 
example, became essentially a foster care agency. The 
National Puerto Rican Forum limited its functions to 
administering several occupational skills training, adult 
education, and job development programs (Rodriguez- 
Fraticelli, Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 46). 
In addition to the belt-tightening measures taken, 
the Puerto Rican leadership, as in the past, created new 
organizations in response to the changing conditions. In 
1981, the Institute for Puerto Rican Policy (IPRP) was 
incorporated in New York. Through research, advocacy, 
and networking, IPRP attempts to develop new problem¬ 
solving strategies for the Puerto Rican community in New 
York City. To maintain its independence, IPRP refuses 
government funds, and relies instead on private founda- 
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tions, corporations, and individual donors for support. 
Another organization founded in 1981 was the National 
Congress for Puerto Rican Rights (NCPRR). The New York 
City chapter of NCPRR has worked to end discrimination, 
opposed the English only movement, and defended the 
rights of Puerto Rican workers to organize for better pay 
and working conditions. In 1983, several Latino organi¬ 
zations in New York City, including Aspira, NCPRR, Puerto 
Rican Educators Association, and Centro de Estudios 
Puertorriquenos, participated in the formation of the 
Puerto Rican/Latino Education Roundtable. The Roundtable 
advocates and organizes around educational issues, 
including parent involvement and community empowerment, 
bilingual education, student retention, and opposition to 
the English only movement. Efforts by these organiza¬ 
tions to attract major funding from foundations and 
corporations have proven to be very difficult. " Many of 
these corporations demand that organizations expand their 
programs to serve Hispanics in general, and, in some 
instances, corporations have sought to redefine the 
agenda of the organizations" (Rodriguez-Fraticel1i, 
Sanabria, and Tirado, 1991, p. 47). 
The Puerto Rican communities of Springfield, 
Holyoke, and Northampton, located in Western Massachu¬ 
setts, and part of the Pioneer Valley, have patterns of 
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development identical to those of New York City and other 
urban centers. These communities began to develop during 
the late 1950s and became progressively more defined 
during the 1960s. The economic conditions in Puerto Rico 
as well as those of the Pioneer Valley caused Puerto 
Ricans to migrate to the New England region. Cruz 
(1977), supported by a study by the University of 
Hartford, noted "the majority of Puerto Ricans who live 
in poor areas of Connecticut and Massachusetts got there 
because of a recruitment process by regional industries, 
and not because of the welfare system. There were 
agricultural jobs to be done in the area so food could be 
brought to the American tables" (p. 66). 
Cruz (1977) added that thousands of Puerto Ricans 
were brought to the Pioneer Valley, under contract, to do 
the jobs Americans would not do. The contracts under 
which the Puerto Rican migrant workers were under clearly 
stated that employers were to hire them for one year and 
not just three to six months. However, many employers 
did not abide by the conditions of the contract and 
dismissed the workers once the agricultural season was 
over. Faced with unemployment, many were able to find 
work in the local factories, again doing the jobs nobody 
else would do. When in 1968 the U. S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the Massachusetts' law requiring residency to 
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qualify for welfare benefits was unconstitutional, the 
Puerto Rican community-building process was somewhat 
systemically enhanced. The less fortunate Puerto Ricans 
who couldn't find jobs in the cities' factories, were 
forced to seek welfare. Hartford City Councilman 
Nicholas Carbone, who made public the study of the 
University of Hartford, said Puerto Rican workers came to 
the states for the same reason that other immigrants 
came—in search of better employment opportunities (p. 
66). Even during the early period of their development, 
the Puerto Rican communities of the Pioneer Valley were 
credited with contributing in excess of three million 
dollars each agricultural season to the area's economy 
(p. 66). 
The economic significance of any community is not 
difficult to arrive at. Empirically simple calculations 
can be made. For example, the population of Springfield, 
according to the 1990 U.S. Census is 26,528. Using 
13,059 or 49 percent of the Springfield population and 
assuming that many Puerto Ricans worked during the year 
at the minimum wage of $4.50 per hour, their estimated 
contribution to the city's economy would be $122,232,240. 
Another way would be to assume that 7,602 Puerto Ricans, 
28 percent of the Springfield population, are unemployed 
and dependent on a minimum welfare check of $350 per 
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month. Their contribution to the city's economy would be 
estimated at $31,928,400. Similar estimates can be made 
for the cities of Holyoke and Northampton. 
,/* 
Typical in the development of Puerto Rican communi¬ 
ties are the establishment of the bodegas, storefront 
churches, social clubs, political action groups, and 
nonprofit organizations. The communities targeted by 
this study followed this pattern of development. These 
structures and institutions are not only formed to 
respond to the myriads of needs of the community, but, 
also, to ensure its growth and continuity for generations 
to come. The ability of Puerto Ricans to establish 
enduring communities with very little or no outside help, 
is a tribute to their inherent knowledge of social 
engineering, resourcefulness, and determination. Puerto 
Rican communities must be strong and resourceful to 
successfully address the issues brought to the fore by 
the following data. 
There is concurrence with the assertion that Latinos 
are among the largest and fastest growing ethnic groups 
in the United States. Gallegos and O'Neill (1991) 
estimated there are 20 million Latinos in the mainland 
United States and another three million in Puerto Rico. 
The Latino population, they added, is growing five times 
as fast as the non-Latino population (P. 1). Rio, 
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Santisteban, and Szapocznik (1991), using 1987 U. S. 
Department of Commerce demographic data, placed the 
Latino population at an estimated 22 million, approxi¬ 
mately nine percent of the total U.S. population (p. 
191). Weyr (1988) made a convincing argument in 
addressing the problem of census undercount in Latino 
communities and suggested the U.S. Latino population 
could range from 18 to 30 million (p. 1). Another 
barrier affecting an accurate accounting of Latinos is 
that persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race. 
Spencer and Antonio (1991) noted that “Hispanic may be 
listed as white, black or under the “other race" category 
in the racial breakdown data" (p. 9). 
The 1980 and the 1990 U.S. Census showed that the 
Latino communities in Springfield and Holyoke (two of the 
three cities in Western Massachusetts targeted by this 
study) experienced significant population increases. 
Latinos, according to the data from both census, "are the 
largest minority group in Western Massachusetts" (Spencer 
an Antonio, 1991, p. 1). The 1990 census showed 45,785 
Latinos live in Hampden County, with the bulk of them 
clustered in Springfield and Holyoke. This count is 
nearly twice what it was in the 1980 census (p. 9). The 
total Latino population of Springfield grew from 13,804 
in 1980 to 26,528 in 1990, representing an increase of 
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92.2 percent. While in 1980 Latinos represented 9.1 
percent of the total population of Springfield, in 1990 
they represented 16.9 percent of the total population of 
156,983 (Latinos in Springfield, 1992). Holyoke is home 
to 13,573 Latinos or 31 percent of the total population 
of 43,704. In 1980, Latinos comprised 13.8 percent of 
the Holyoke population (Spencer and Antonio, 1991, p. 9). 
Spencer and Antonio (1991) also noted that the flight of 
Latinos into the suburbs was insignificant. In 1980, 95 
percent of Latinos were largely clustered in Springfield 
and Holyoke, contrasted with 95.5 percent in 1990 (p. 9). 
In Massachusetts, the state-wide Latino population 
grew from 141,043 in 1980, to 287,549 in 1990, repre¬ 
senting an increase of 103.9 percent (Latinos in 
Springfield, 1992). At the national level, the rate of 
growth of the Latino community has been estimated at 30 
percent (Rio, Santisteban, and Szapocznik, 1991, p. 191). 
The rate of growth of Latinos and the size of the Latino 
population are not the only factors having a major impact 
on the resources of Latino nonprofit enterprises and 
their ability to effectively and efficiently allocate 
collective services. There is a litany of issues that 
are endemic to Latinos and taxing on Latino nonprofits 
called upon to address these needs. To these, I now 
turn. 
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The Latino population in Massachusetts is relatively 
young, with 33.8 percent being younger than 16 (Latinos 
in Springfield, 1992). At the national level, 33 percent 
of Latinos are younger than 15, compared with 20 percent 
of the general population. The Latino adolescent popula¬ 
tion is expected to increase by 29.4 percent by the end 
of the century, compared with a projected 6.4 percent 
increase in the white non-Latino adolescent population. 
Nationally, 40 percent of Latino youths are growing up in 
poverty and approximately half drop out of school before 
completing the 12th grade (Rio, Santisteban, and 
Szapocznik, 1991, pp. 191 - 192). In Massachusetts, the 
poverty rate for Latinos is 47 percent or four to eight 
times that of white residents. Latino unemployment is 
usually 40 - 50 percent higher than the average rate and 
is particularly acute among Puerto Ricans which consti¬ 
tute the largest ethnic group among the Latino population 
in Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, Latinos have a drop 
out rate of 12.6 percent which is three times greater 
than the 3.6 percent drop out rate for white students 
(Massachusetts Latino Public Health Agenda, 1992). The 
1987 FBI Uniform Crime Reports presented data that showed 
that Latino youths accounted for 13.5 percent of violent 
crimes and 11.8 percent of property crimes (Rio, 
Santisteban, and Szapocznik, p. 193). According to the 
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Center for Disease Control, the number of violent deaths 
in the 15 to 24 age group increased by 40 percent from 
1985 to 1991(C-SPAN, February 20, 1994). 
Latino Health Issues 
The health of Latinos is a major challenge to Latino 
nonprofits. Latinos represent about nine percent of the 
U.S. population and constitute approximately 15 percent 
of all reported cases of AIDS. More than 7.5 million 
Latinos (34 percent) lacked health insurance for at least 
part of the year. Specifically, 41.4 percent have gone 
without health insurance for at least part of the year, 
and 25.3 percent for the full year (Novello, Wise, and 
Kleinman, 1991). Thirty percent of Puerto Rican females 
age 15 to 19 have given birth (Hispanic Health in the 
United States, 1991); and only 57.4 percent of all 
Puerto Rican mothers in the continental United States 
began prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy, 
whereas 81.9 percent of non-Latino whites did (Becerra, 
Hogue, Atrash, and Perez, 1991). 
Although Latinos constitute nine percent of the U.S. 
population, less than five percent of all U.S. physician 
and students in medical schools are Latino. Latinos 
suffer from excess incidence of cancer of the stomach, 
esophagus, pancreas, and cervix. Death due to stomach 
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cancer is twice as high for Latinos as for whites. 
Latino women suffer from cervical cancer twice as often 
as white women, but their five-year survival rates 
slightly exceed those of whites. About half of Puerto 
Ricans with hypertension did not know they had the 
condition. Twenty-five percent of Puerto Rican males and 
37 percent of Puerto Rican females suffer from obesity. 
Of Puerto Ricans age 45 - 74, 26.1 percent had diabetes 
(Hispanic Health in the United States, 1991). 
Continental Puerto Rican infants of normal birth 
weight (greater than or equal to 2,500 g) were 1.4 times 
more likely to die in the neonatal period (less than 28 
days) than non-Latino whites. Of all infants of Latino 
descent, the postnatal mortality risk (28 - 364 days) was 
highest among continental Puerto Ricans (Becerra, Hogue, 
Atrash, and Perez, 1991). Puerto Rican women are at 
disproportionately high risk for breast and cervical 
cancer, but the majority of them gain initial access to 
the health care system via emergency departments, when 
their disease is in an advanced stage. Consequently, 
they experience less than optimal outcomes, and the cost 
of their care exceeds that of women who have received 
regular health care (Furino and Munoz, 1991). 
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Part II 
The intent of this author is to temper portions of 
Part II of the review of the literature with his experi¬ 
ences as a manager, administrator, and grantsman in the 
NPO and for-profit arenas. These experiences span a 
period of over fifteen years. Eight of those years were 
devoted to management in community-based, human service, 
nonprofit organizations (tax-exempt under Internal 
Revenue Code section 501(c)(3)). The author also managed 
a federal credit union (tax-exempt nonprofit under 
Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(14)) for more than 
five years; and was an administrator at a major universi¬ 
ty for more than a year. Colleges and universities are 
tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. In addition to these experiences with 
nonprofits, the author has owned and managed for—profit 
businesses. He is a major in the U.S. Army Reserve, 
where one of his expertise is administration; and an 
independent management and grantsman consultant, with 
specialization in both nonprofit proposals for funding, 
and financing proposals (business plans) for for-profits. 
The author's expertise in the overall management and 
administration of nonprofit enterprises, as well as the 
relative dearth in the literature, have provided the 
impetus for this study. Consequently, the background and 
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experiences of the author on the topic, as well as the 
relevant literature will be invoked. 
The financial environment of a community-based NPQ 
f 
is a precarious one. This is partly so in that, unlike 
the for—profit sector, NPOs have limited leverage, if 
any, over the money supply. Moreover, NPOs provide a 
public service for which they receive remuneration, while 
businesses create a product and sell it for a profit. 
While profit-making is the primary goal of a for-profit 
enterprise, for a NPO is serving a public purpose (Wolf, 
1990, p. 5; and Drucker, 1992, pp. 107 - 109). The for— 
profit sector also has an advantage over financial 
resources available through liquid assets, which include 
cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable 
(Toncre, 1984, pp. 63 - 94). 
Vladeck (1988) noted that NPOs cannot issue stock; 
borrow very much; and generally, they have not been able 
to amass very much through retained earnings. Moreover, 
capital generators such as "accelerated depreciation, 
loss carry forwards, leveraged leases ... and sheltered 
sale-leasebacks," traditionally available to the for— 
profit sector through the Internal Revenue Code, "have 
availed nonprofits hardly at all" (O'Neill and Young, 
1988, p. 77). The author added that NPOs have essen¬ 
tially two ways of generating capital. "Some can give it 
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to them. Or they can wisely invest assets someone gave 
them in the past" (p. 77). This does not mean that NPO 
managers cannot bring efficiency and fiscal stability to 
their organizations. It means that the demanding nature 
of NPOs is such that their managers must be better 
endowed technically and tactically, and consequently work 
harder than the average manager of a for—profit enter— 
prise. Management of a NPO is thus more complex and 
demanding than the sometimes one-dimensional management 
of a for—profit entity (Drucker, 1992). 
As noted in the introduction, financial crises in 
NPOs can be associated with austere economic periods, and 
conservative fiscal policies. They can also be associ¬ 
ated with lack of effective leadership on boards of 
directors, and lack of managerial skills among those who 
run the day-to-day operations of these NPOs. When the 
leadership and management of a NPO is ineffective, there 
are usually difficulties in developing the mission, 
goals, and objectives of the organization. Organizations 
with these limitations, tend to operate on a crisis mode, 
strive for mere survival, and move from one crisis to the 
next by addressing symptoms and not the causes of the 
problem. This day-to-day survival of the organization is 
not conducive to a healthy growth and development. An 
organization operating under a crisis mode naturally 
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assumes a defensive posture. Both of these conditions 
foreclose short and long-term planning; and can lead to 
an institutional "bunker mentality." This state of 
affairs does not set the tone for the aggressive and 
effective rebuilding of a NPO under financial siege 
(Bass, Clamson, Langford, Miller, and Wart, 1987, pp. 1 - 
3) . 
Vladeck (1988) pointed out that the chronic capital 
shortages of most NPOs have a number of managerial impli¬ 
cations. Since NPOs rarely own real estate, managers 
spend a disproportionate amount of time worrying about 
costs and other problems associated with tenancy. Due to 
the precarious nature of their capital structure, NPO 
managers are compelled to devote a lot of time and energy 
raising money. On that vein, the author added "that the 
professional training and background of most nonprofit 
managers not only fail to equip them for fundraising, but 
also tend to attach negative connotations to such activi¬ 
ty" (O'Neill and Young, 1988, p. 77). 
According to Vladeck, fundraising is perceived by a 
large proportion of NPO managers as inherently distaste¬ 
ful, outside the scope of their professional orientation, 
and a diversion from their primary tasks (p. 77). The 
chronic capital shortages of NPOs make program innovation 
difficult. This is further exacerbated by their lack of 
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reserves, and difficulty accessing venture capital (p. 
77). Mismanagement in some community-based NPOs has been 
a problem. Sometimes it is so entrenched that even 
threats of de-funding them have not discouraged the 
maladaptive behavior (Bass, Clamson, Langford, Miller, 
and Wart, 1987, pp. 1 - 3). 
When leadership and management are ineffective, 
grantsmanship and fundraising also runs the risk of being 
ineffective. Ineffective management is not the exclusive 
property of NPOs. NPOs and for—profit enterprises have, 
at some point or another, suffered from this malady. 
According to Wolf (1990) staff, volunteers and adminis¬ 
trators come to NPOs with very little knowledge and 
experience. Managers are hired without any significant 
management background or training. As a result of this 
and the nature of NPOs, the turnover rate among adminis¬ 
trators is very high (pp. viii - ix). 
The managers of NPOs are not the only ones that are 
unschooled. According to Wolf (1990) "many individuals 
accept positions on boards of directors without any 
concept of the responsibilities of trusteeship. They do 
not understand their legal and fiduciary responsibili¬ 
ties, they are not willing to give and get money, or, 
worse yet, they confuse their roles with that of the 
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staff and attempt to involve themselves in the day-to-day 
operation of the organization" (pp. viii - ix). 
O'Neill and Young (1988) noted that since the early 
1980s considerable attention has been given to how man¬ 
agers of NPOs should be educated or trained. They 
pointed out that historically, NPO managers learned 
administration almost solely through on-the-job expe¬ 
rience, sometimes supplemented by in-service training (p. 
1). The claim of "considerable attention" appears to be 
an exaggeration from the standpoint of the dearth in the 
literature on NPOs and the nearly twenty years of scant 
attention given to the sector by all concerned. 
t 
The NPO sector, as noted earlier, experienced major 
changes and environmental pressures in the 1960s and 
1970s. These changes, caused by rapid growth through 
federal infusion of funds, made management a crucial 
factor in the survival and effectiveness of NPOs. During 
these decades, NPOs were in dire need of entrepreneurial 
managers to manage these periods of rapid growth. 
Bernard (1992) reported on a study by the accounting 
firm of Peat and Marwick on the questions What accounts 
for the success of an organization? Their survey ranked 
the 200 fastest-growing private companies in a metropoli¬ 
tan area of about two million people. These companies 
experienced a healthy growth in revenues over a four-year 
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period. Lessons learned from the responses given by the 
chief executive officers of these companies concerns the 
awareness that the perfect environment for making deci¬ 
sions does not exist, even in the most successful of 
companies. There was a consensus that good decisions 
make good companies and are particularly important during 
certain periods of a company's life (p. 70). 
Bernard (1992) noted that the stages of birth, 
growth, maturity, and decline of a company all contain 
critical tasks that require attention before the organ¬ 
ization can move on. The author added that the most 
challenging of these periods is the growth stage because 
changes in the scale and scope of operations during 
growth can place a heavy burden on management (p. 70). 
Bernard agreed with Churchill and Lewis (1983), who 
concluded that management's ability to cope with problems 
associated with changes is critical to the future for— 
tunes of the organization. Decisions related to expan¬ 
sion, finances, personnel, and operations have a partic¬ 
ular impact during a period when maintenance management 
is not enough (p. 70). 
During periods of fast growth for NPOs, character— 
istic of the 1960s and 1970s, academe failed to seize on 
the opportunity to develop a curriculum and programs for 
the education of NP0 managers (O'Neill and Young, 1988, 
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p. 2). This author believes that there is a body of 
knowledge that can be mastered by NPO managers that can 
transform their dysfunctional modus operandi into a 
professional method for achieving the desired results in 
the challenging environment of the NPOs. 
Salamon and Abramson (1982) referred to the period 
of the 1980s as dramatically different for NPOs. The 
Reagan administration, they noted, not only imposed 
severe budgetary cutbacks but also created the expecta¬ 
tion that the private and NPO sector would fill the gap 
left by the withdrawal of federal funds (pp. 57 - 66). 
O'Neill and Young (1988), and Skloot (1987) noted that 
during the Reagan period, NPOs switched from the years of 
plenty, characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s, to the 
years of scarcity and survival. The 1980s thus required 
NPO managers with the requisite skills to run a tight 
ship and develop new funding sources through more 
sophisticated marketing and for—profit ventures (p. 2 and 
pp. 380 - 393, respectively). 
According to Kotler and Andreasen (1991), histori¬ 
cally, NPOs have evolved through four stages in which 
they relied for support on (1) individual willingness to 
share, (2) the generosity of the wealthy, or (3) the 
largess of federal, state, and municipal governments. 
The final stage, the competitive/market stage, is the one 
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NPOs are presently in. The authors warn that NPOs can no 
longer rely on traditional sources of support and that 
the marketplace is crowded with other NPOs scratching for 
the same subsistence. Competition, they assert, is the 
greatest challenge facing NPOs in the 1990s (pp. 10 -11). 
It behooves administrators of NPOs to improve their 
grantsmanship, fundraising, and management skills to 
successfully meet the challenge posed by the flood of 
competitors in both the traditional sources of funds and 
the new markets. Aggressive, competent, and efficient 
management and grantsmanship can provide a competitive 
edge for NPOs. 
Budgetary constraints, disproportionately prevalent 
among LNPOs, often make it difficult for NPOs to hire a 
grantsman or development person. Caught between the lack 
of funds to hire a grantsman and the need to acquire 
vital financial resources, NPOs may find themselves at 
the threshold of insolvency. However, even when hiring 
the best fund-raiser is within the means of the organiza¬ 
tion, the best course of action should be the hiring of a 
chief executive that possesses management, grantsmanship 
and/or fundraising skills. 
Senge (1990) noted that an added role for managers 
in a learning organization is that of researchers and 
designers (p. 299). Kiechel, III (1994) sees the 
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effective manager in the current environment as both a 
specialist and a generalist (pp. 68 - 72). One good 
reason for these requirements is that a grantsman and 
other technicians, like other employees, need adequate 
supervision. An executive who lacks these skills, would 
be hard-pressed to provide supervision; oversight; 
succeed in the grants market; and ensure the development 
of subordinates. 
It is not uncommon, however, for some boards of 
directors to hire executives that are new to management 
and grantsmanship, when the major requirement of the job 
is fundraising. It is not uncommon either for some NPOs 
to hire a manager during the grant season. What is an 
unschooled executive to do in the absence of an in-house 
grantsman and when the onus to produce within specified 
deadlines rests on his/her shoulders? Under these 
circumstances, the inclination of some NPOs is to resort 
to grantsmanship by whiting out, cutting and pasting, and 
photocopying. In a highly competitive market, NPOs that 
subscribe to this practice have not read "the writing on 
the walls" of funding sources. 
Another cause of financial distress among NPOs is 
the failure early on to establish a reserve for use 
during periods of financial distress. Depositing into 
the reserve five percent of every grant awarded or amount 
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donated doesn't seem like too much to expect. Some NPOs 
that have been serving the public interest for more than 
twenty years don't have a contingency reserve or an 
endowment fund. Moreover, a significant number of NPOs 
are leaseholders instead of real estate owners. Real 
estate is a good source of collateral and equity that 
enhances the financial portfolio of the NPO. These 
issues fall within the purview of the NPOs' respective 
boards of directors and raises serious questions about 
their ability to recruit the best qualified individuals 
to serve on these boards. 
Vladeck (1988), an experienced NPO practitioner, 
offers his insights on the perennial financial problems 
of NPOs, particularly capital structure. He makes two 
observations about the capital structure of NPOs. One is 
that NPOs have very little capital, and the other 
concerns how hard it is for NPOs to obtain or get more 
capital. With the exception of hospitals, foundations, 
and universities, for most NPOs, "capital is scarce, 
inadequate, and hard to obtain" (O'Neill and Young, 1988, 
pp. 76 - 77). 
Grantsmanship has been hailed in this study as the 
main or traditional fundraising modality of community- 
based NPOs. Other means of obtaining funds are presup¬ 
posed non-traditional. The underpinning of this asser— 
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tion is the recognition that the three possible major 
funding sources of NPOs require a written proposal or an 
application. What is grantsmanship? Smith and McLean 
(1988) define grantsmanship as "... the systematic de¬ 
velopment of ... external resources from the formulation 
of the initial idea through the administration of the 
project when sponsored" (p. 2). This is a thoughtful, 
process-oriented definition that implicitly links grants¬ 
manship to management functions. However, the authors 
make the disappointing assertion that grantsmanship "... 
is really quite simple when one is initiated to the 
mechanics and process of grant development" (p. 2). 
Notwithstanding the assertion of Smith and McLean, 
the experience of this author, both as a manager and 
grantsman, is that the mechanics of each proposal for 
funding pale when compared with its many complexities. 
Every grant is different and a challenge. The thought of 
rejection alone is sufficient to set aside any anticipa¬ 
tion that the grant development process will be simple. 
Experienced grantsman and writers cannot afford to be 
deceived by illusions of simplicity in grantsmanship. 
Poor (1992) writes about the dilemmas of writers: 
"There isn't a writing task worth doing that doesn't 
contain some risk for the writer, the reader, or both.... 
For almost everybody —even those who say they enjoy it 
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the writing process evokes feelings of dread and inade¬ 
quacy" (pp. 6 - 7). 
In this study, grantsmanship is defined as a process 
or a series of managerial actions or functions performed 
to secure financial resources (the lifeblood of a NPO) 
through competitive proposals for funding, drives and/or 
campaigns, and ensure the success of funded projects. 
The need for grantsmanship in NPOs is underscored by 
the dollar amount generated by funding proposals versus 
the amount raised through direct mail or telemarketing 
efforts. Kotler and Andreasen (1991) identified the four 
major funding sources of NPOs as individual givers, foun¬ 
dations, corporations, and government (p. 281). With the 
exception of individual givers, the other three funding 
sources invariably require the submission of competitive 
proposals or applications. Kotler and Andreasen (1991) 
also reported that in 1988 NPOs in the U.S. raised 
$104.37 billion in charitable contributions. Eighty- 
three percent of that amount came from individuals (p. 
279) . 
While the bulk of the funds raised by NPOs came from 
individuals, this is hardly the case for community-based 
human service NPOs. According to Kotler and Andreasen 
(1991) human service organizations only raised 10 percent 
($10.49 billion) of the total garnered by all NPOs (p. 
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279). Thus there is an apparent over—reliance by human 
service NPOs on funding sources that require grantsman- 
ship and an under—reliance on supplemental funds from 
individual donors. Over-reliance on funding sources that 
require grantsmanship, should not imply that community- 
based human service NPOs have been successful in this 
arena. The experience of this author is that some human 
service organizations are inadequate in competing both 
for grants and individual contributions. Poor management 
and poor fund raising skills share a major portion of the 
blame for this situation. 
Brown (1985) outlines five prerequisites for 
business success: " (1) a quality or unique product; (2) 
proper timing; (3) adequate capital; (4) people re¬ 
sources; and (5) effective management.... If you lack 
the fifth element (effective management), you will not 
have the first four.... Without effective management, 
correct decisions cannot be made.... The company lacking 
proper management cannot acquire, much less sustain ade¬ 
quate capital. Above all, it takes good management to 
attract the best people to coach and develop them" (pp. 1 
- 2) . 
Brown (1985) also asserted that "... management has 
a major purpose: to provide for the continuation of the 
business.... No business or institution can continue 
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without generating a surplus over and above its cost of 
operation. Even churches and not-for-profit institutions 
must maintain this discipline" (pp. 79 - 81). Goss 
(1992) reported on a landmark study of more than 2,000 
black churches, conducted by C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence 
H. Mamiya. In the area of training the study found that 
"the vast majority of black pastors and churches do not 
seem to have much knowledge about financial investments 
and economic development" (p. 18). Many churches, the 
author noted, are learning the lesson and are now hiring 
professionals to run community-development programs. 
Churches are regarded as community-based NPOs. 
Goss pointed out that an overabundance of problems 
have strained the churches' resources such that they feel 
the need to prioritize, become more sophisticated, and 
tie in to secular institutions to combat the enormity of 
the problem. The author added that foundations can 
exacerbate management's problems by making grants that 
cause a church program to grow beyond the institution's 
ability to manage it. The hope of these churches is that 
foundations turn toward financing training programs for 
ministers (p. 18). 
The Congress of National Black Churches, a coalition 
of seven historically black denominations, planned in 
1992 to begin institutes for pastors in ten communities 
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to teach them financial record keeping and coalition 
building, among other managerial skills. The Lilly 
Endowment in 1991 gave *1.1-mi11ion to the Interdenom¬ 
inational Theological Center of Atlanta, "to establish an 
institute to teach black pastors fund-raising techniques, 
including how to write foundation—grant proposals, and 
other management skills" (Goss, 1992, p. 18). 
To further address the problem of management defi¬ 
ciencies in black churches, the Ford Foundation, in 1991, 
awarded $309,300 to the New York City Mission Society. 
The grant will enable the Society to provide technical 
assistance and small grants to black churches that want 
to set up social programs. The Ford Foundation also 
awarded $400,000 to Howard University Divinity School to 
establish a national research center that will give black 
churches information on how to create social-service 
programs (Goss, 1992, pp. 18 - 19). 
The study, cited in Goss (1992), recognized that 
the newer leadership in the black churches have become 
more sophisticated in recent years. Notwithstanding 
progress made, the recommendation is that critical for 
the future of black churches is the need for more, 
better—trained, and better educated clergy. The 
researchers noted that "the black ministry was the only 
profession where only one out of every four or five 
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practitioners has graduated from professional school" (p. 
19). The experience of this author is that within the 
typical storefront churches in the Latino communities, 
the situation parallels that of some black churches. 
The perils of management extend to non-black 
churches with very strong coffers. Millar (1994) re¬ 
ported that a group of Christian Scientist sued current 
and former leaders of the Church of Christ, Scientist, 
accusing them of financial mismanagement. The lawsuit, 
filed in Suffolk Superior Court in Boston, alleges that 
it was a breach of fiduciary responsibility for leaders 
of the church to spend $325-million on a cable television 
network and $125-million on other broadcasting and pub¬ 
lishing ventures. The television network shut down in 
1992; and church leaders borrowed about $90-million to 
pay for those projects from a church employee pension 
fund. The spokesman for the church denied the allega¬ 
tions, stating the church did not have financial pro¬ 
blems. The rebuttal asserted the church had borrowed 
$83-million from an international reserve account (p. 
34) . 
In recognition of the problems of NPO management 
nationwide and across ethnic groups, the W. K. Kellogg 
Foundation has made a grant of $118,000 to start a new 
clearinghouse that will provide information on NPO 
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management. The clearinghouse will be operated by the 
Support Centers of America, a management-assistance group 
based in San Francisco. At the center, short position 
papers will be developed to address various management 
problems, with details on how to get additional advice 
and training. NPO executives across the country can 
request these papers (The Chronicle of Philanthropy, 
1993, p. 11). 
Brown (1985) pointed out that the greatest challenge 
facing knowledgeable executive directors, is convincing 
the boards of directors and staffs of the NPOs that the 
organizations cannot help anyone unless they operate with 
the same discipline as any successful business. If 
service orientation is not kept in perspective with good 
business principles, it would become the greatest weapon 
rather than the greatest strength of a NPO (p. 82). 
Drucker (1955) added that "The planning for an adequate 
supply of physical and financial resources is primarily 
top management's job.... And every business needs finan¬ 
cial resources.... To set objectives without planning 
for the money needed to make operations possible is like 
putting the roast in the oven without turning on the 
flame" (pp. 95 - 96). 
The need for planning and developing financial 
resources is a problem that management tends to neglect. 
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Drucker (1985) was concerned with this issue and ad¬ 
dressed it. "But, on the whole, management do not worry 
over capital supply until the financial shoe pinches. 
Then it is often too late to do a good job.... In far 
too many companies - including some big and reputedly 
well managed ones - failure to think through capital 
supply and to set capital objectives has stunted growth 
and nullified much of the management's brilliant work on 
marketing, innovation and productivity" (p. 99). 
Drucker (1967) saw the failure of managers to spend 
more time and thought on the future of their business as 
a universal one. The neglect of the future, he regarded 
as a symptom and added that the executive overlooks 
tomorrow because he cannot get ahead of today. As he put 
it: "The real disease is the absence of any foundation of 
knowledge and system for tackling the economic tasks in 
business" (p. 16). Drucker (1967) went on to say, "Be¬ 
fore an executive can think of tackling the future, he 
must be able therefore to dispose of the challenge of 
today in less time and with greater impact and perma¬ 
nence. For this he needs a systematic approach to 
today's job. There are three dimensions to the economic 
task: (1) the present business must be made effective; 
(2) its potential must be identified and realized; (3) it 
must be made into a different business for a different 
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future. Each task requires a distinct approach.... 
Businesses are different, but business is much the same, 
regardless of size and structure, of products, technology 
and markets, of culture and managerial competence. There 
is a common business reality" (p. 16). 
Greene (1991) reported on a study that urged NPOs do 
more to think ahead. The study, by Marion B. Peavey, an 
experienced college fund raiser and vice-president of 
development and alumni affairs at the University of 
Alabama at Tuscaloosa, tested for long-range financial 
planning in more than 300 colleges and universities, 
museums, community groups, and a variety of other NPOs. 
It found that NPOs take a careless approach to fund 
raising rather than incorporating it into a cohesive 
long-range plan. The researcher commented that because 
NPO leaders lack financial-management experience and an 
appreciation for planning, many institutions are not 
living up to their potential. He added that by devel¬ 
oping more comprehensive and forward—looking financial 
plans, NPOs will be better able to raise money, allocate 
it wisely, and ultimately to fulfill their mission. 
Regardless of the size and type of institution, the NPO, 
at a minimum, should have a three-year plan (p. 33). 
For Drucker (1967) the one ingredient that set 
businesses apart is the application of knowledge. He 
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argued that: "What does make a business distinct and what 
is its peculiar resources is its ability to use knowledge 
of all kinds - from scientific and technical knowledge to 
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social, economic and managerial knowledge. It is only in 
respect to knowledge that a business can be distinct, can 
therefore produce something that has a value in the 
market place” (p. 17). 
Thus management, in any business endeavor, must be 
knowledgeable, give financial resources top priority and 
regard these as the flame or lifeblood of the enterprise. 
According to Krueger (1992) "The effectiveness of any 
business is determined by the leaders personality, the 
extent of the leader's expertise, the adequacy of the 
business plan, and the human and material resources 
needed to carry it out.... The leader's lack of tech¬ 
nical knowledge, conceptual limitations or incapacity for 
administration ... may create problems for an organ¬ 
ization " (p. 175). 
Hay (1990) cites research evidence that supports the 
assertion that: "Two of the biggest weaknesses of NPOs 
are the lack of marketing expertise and the lack of 
finance expertise at the top management level.... Top 
managers who have a broad college education perform 
better than those who have narrow educational training 
do.... Managers who have managerial expertise in at 
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least two or three organizations have also been found to 
outperform those who do not have this characteristic" (p. 
85) . 
Management in community-based NPOs is more multi¬ 
faceted and far more complex and demanding than in the 
for-profit sector. While this lesson has been readily 
learned by some NPOs, other community-based NPOs struggle 
as though management was the exclusive property of the 
business community. 
Drucker (1989) provides a view of the attitudes of 
NPOs towards the concept of management: "Twenty years 
ago, management was a dirty word for those involved in 
nonprofit organizations. It meant business, and non¬ 
profits prided themselves on being free of the taint of 
commercialism and above such sordid considerations as the 
bottom line. Now most of them have learned that non¬ 
profits need management even more than business does, 
precisely because they lack the discipline of the bottom 
line. The nonprofits are, of course, still dedicated to 
"doing good." But they also realize that good intentions 
are no substitute for organization and leadership, for 
accountability, performance, and results. Those require 
management and that, in turn, begins with the organiza¬ 
tion's mission" (pp. 88 - 93). 
117 
Although Drucker was not directly addressing fund 
raising or grantsmanship, indirectly he was, for NPOs 
cannot exist without funds. Through grantsmanship, most 
community-based NPOs strive for financial equilibrium or 
the attainment of the bottom line. 
The community-based NPOs that this author has been 
associated with were primarily funded by the government 
through contracts; foundations; corporations; and in some 
cases, individual donors. Salamon (1987) found that 
nearly 50 percent of the revenues of nonprofits comes 
from government funding. However, with the major effort 
of policymakers to reduce the federal deficit, state, 
local government and the private sector have been 
expected to compensate for the loss in federal funding. 
The experience has been that state, local government, and 
the private sector are also facing financial constraints 
and are in no position to make up the difference. 
Herman and Heimovics (1991) warned NPOs that funding 
and sustaining financial resources will continue to be a 
challenge in the 1990s: "Corporations, foundations, and 
individual givers cannot substitute for public-sector 
funding. Burgeoning social ills compound the problem as 
nonprofit organizations are increasingly expected to care 
for persons with AIDS, help drug abusers and educate for 
drug use prevention, feed and house the poor, assist the 
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elderly, teach the illiterate, and otherwise compensate 
for failing educational and social systems" (pp. 1-2). 
Given the array of community needs during a time of 
declining financial support, and competition from other 
NPOs and for-profit businesses entering the market, the 
greatest challenge facing the leadership of community- 
based NPOs is attracting financial resources. Another 
challenge is that funding sources, particularly govern¬ 
ment and foundations, are holding community-based NPOs 
accountable for measurable goals and objectives, the 
quality and quantity of the services provided, and the 
duration of service cycles within the funding fiscal 
period. 
Herman and Heimovics (1991) recommend that NPOs 
maintain two types of bottom-line measures. One is to at 
least break even; and the other is that in order for the 
executive leader to be effective in seeking public 
dollars, he must be proficient in the political market¬ 
place (p. 3). For NPOs, breaking even can only be a goal 
not a prediction. This is so because NPOs operate in a 
highly open system, which relates to the complicated 
relationships they have with the government, the market¬ 
place, and the philanthropic community. A change in one 
interrelated component will affect the others in the 
system. Herman and Heimovics (1991) defines an open 
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system as one that interacts with its environment. The 
authors argue that NPQs have some influence, but little 
control, over their external environments (pp. 24 - 27). 
Hoogasian (1986) stated that while organizations 
have control over changes within their boundaries, there 
are factors in the external environment over which an 
organization has no control. One variable examined by 
Hoogasian was the availability of funds to local schools. 
He found that funds to local schools were primarily 
curtailed by taxpayer revolts that lead to Proposition 
two-and-one-half in Massachusetts (pp. 3 - 7). 
The primary external environment of a NPO consists 
of its funding sources. Managing changes such as funding 
reductions, as well as opportunities for new sources of 
funds are necessary but complex challenges for community- 
based NPOs. Funding reductions may occur because the 
profits of corporations were down just when the organi¬ 
zation was gearing up for an increase in the next funding 
period. If the tax base is drastically reduced, the 
consequence will be less government funds available for 
programs. These are matters beyond the control of the 
NPO. Notwithstanding the funding uncertainties of 
community-based NPOs, if they are to survive in the 
present environment, they must maintain a competitive 
edge. The factor of competition is inherent in the 
120 
external environment of a NPO. A competitive advantage 
doesn't happen naturally; it must be created by the NPO. 
Hay (1990) argues that: "Every organization has 
direct and indirect competitors. Consequently, a 
characteristic of an effective strategy is the concept of 
a competitive advantage. An organization that has a 
competitive edge over its competitors will be more likely 
to attract resource contributors or stakeholders to its 
cause than will an organization that does not have a 
competitive advantage.... An organization that has a 
competitive edge will attract more and better clients, 
donors, employees, suppliers, and other resource contri¬ 
butors, all of whom will contribute to its success in 
accomplishing both the organizational and the personal 
objectives of the resource contributors" (p. 57). 
The future of community-based NPOs that lack the 
wherewithal to compete in a market with dwindling finan¬ 
cial resources and stringent programmatic constraints is 
not promising. The days of liberal giving to NPOs with 
poor performance, fiscal and programmatic, are over. 
Funding sources are becoming more cautious and conser 
vative with their awards. Their conservatism is partly 
driven by concerns over the funds they hold in trust, the 
audits they are subjected to, economic hard times, past 
failures of NPOs, and a generally frugal public. Houle 
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(1989) eloquently speaks of the adverse consequences for 
an NPO that fails to appraise its fiscal and programmatic 
efficiency. Houle recommends the development of an 
evaluation system, which includes monthly, as well as 
annual appraisals for the board of directors and staff 
(pp. 141 - 165). 
A foundation or a government entity that funds 
marginal and financially strapped NPOs, would face 
embarrassing questions during and after a mandated annual 
fiscal audit. Audits that show that the funders were not 
managing their fiscal affairs according to generally 
accepted accounting procedures, have not done a good job 
of protecting the funds entrusted to them. The same is 
true for community-based NPOs that show poor performance 
in an outside programmatic and fiscal audit. Audits 
encourage conservatism, accountability and efficiency 
among funders and the recipients of government, founda¬ 
tion, and corporate funds. Audits can also be the cause 
for recommending that poorly performing NPOs which can no 
longer fulfill their public service mission be de-funded 
or forced to liquidate. 
O'Neill (1989) addressed the issue of conservative 
giving: "Foundations and corporations often play the 
sustainer rather than the venture-capital role.... Their 
funding is typically neither far left nor far right but 
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more middle—of — the road and if anything somewhat conser— 
vative. Descriptively, not judgmentally, the profile of 
their activity is clearly conventional, not reformist. 
They are overwhelmingly institutions of social continu¬ 
ity, not change" (p. 143). 
Another issue that can bring instability to the 
financial environment of NPQs, is the charge of unfair 
competition levied against them by the for—profit sector. 
The business community's basic argument is that when two 
types of organization engaged in identical commercial 
activities are treated differently under the law, there 
is unfair competition. Bennet and DiLorenzo (1989) 
pointed out in their book that the government has granted 
nonprofits special privileges that give them significant 
advantages in the marketplace. NPOs are exempt from 
federal, state, and local taxation and from many 
regulations; they receive preferential postal rates and 
other subsidies; and they often have preference in 
obtaining government grants and contracts (pp. 9 - 42). 
These exemptions and privileges, Bennet and 
DiLorenzo (1989) stressed, reduce the production cost for 
nonprofits and give them an edge over their private 
competitors. The suggestion is that if NPOs want to 
behave like for—profit enterprises, they should be 
subjected to the same tax laws, pay the same postal 
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rates, and be governed by the same regulations as their 
profit-seeking counterparts (pp. 9 - 42). 
Weisbrod (1988) argue that: "The cries of unfair 
competition by the private sector, result partly from 
judgments about how to define a nonprofit's unrelated 
business income. That income is fully taxable; in that 
sense nonprofits are somewhat discouraged from engaging 
in the activities that generate it. Under the law, net 
income for a nonprofit is taxable if it resulted from an 
activity that is not "substantially" related to the 
"charitable... purpose which fixes the basis for its 
exemption...." Depending on how broadly or narrowly the 
IRS interprets the "exempt purpose" of the organization, 
the nonprofit will have a larger or a smaller domain in 
which it can compete with proprietary firms at a tax 
advantage" (pp. 114 - 115). 
When NPOs venture into the commercial marketplace, a 
valid concern is the extent to which they deviate from 
their public service mission or tax exempt purpose. 
Anheier and Seibel (1990) attempted to settle this issue: 
"Paradoxically, the current concern in the United States 
that commercial activity may deflect nonprofits from 
their charitable goals seem misplaced. Increasing the 
share of commercial activity in a nonprofit's revenue 
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base may actually increase the ability of managers to 
carry out their goals" (pp. 157 - 163). 
Williams (1991) reported on an Idaho study of twelve 
NPOs that engaged in unrelated business income ventures. 
The study found that nine of the twelve each had less 
than six percent of sales in relation to all nearby for— 
profits. The obvious conclusion is that these NPOs were 
not taking away a significant number of sales from for— 
profits (p. 24). 
The concerns raised over NPOs venturing into the 
commercial marketplace, and fears of these organizations 
deviating from their tax-exempt purpose, is not a major 
issue among community-based NPOs managed by racial or 
ethnic minorities. With some exception, the LNPOs 
targeted by this study have not yet ventured into the 
commercial arena for additional dollars. NPOs that are 
managed well and are in a reasonably sound fiscal 
footing, are bound to have a modicum of success if they 
pursue revenues from commercial endeavors. A corollary 
from this statement is that community-based NPOs that 
have been issued a "poor bill of fiscal health," would 
not be able to get from their daily crisis modus 
operandi, to executing a commercial venture plan to 
alleviate their fiscal maladies. 
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Competitive community-based NPOs, however, should 
improve their advantage by pursuing unrelated business 
income (UBI), particularly when a large proportion of 
their funds emanate from government contracts. Lauffer 
(1983) argued that one good reason for pursuing UBI is 
the private sector's tendency, during economic hard 
times, not to make up for cuts in government funding (p. 
85). Moreover, government grants now have a "cost 
reasonableness" requirement that impacts on the 
competitiveness of the NPO and the request for funds. 
Cost reasonableness requires that in the budget and 
budget narrative appended to the proposal for funding, 
the proposer explain and justify, line item, by line 
item, the stated cost of the proposed project. One 
immediate consequence of cost reasonableness would be the 
rating given to the proposal by the review committee, in 
contrast to the rating received by the other competitors. 
If a competitor can provide the proposed services for 
less money, chances are your NPO won't be awarded a 
contract. UBI, income from commercial ventures, can be 
used as matching funds to reduce cost to the government 
and make the proposal more appealing to the funder. 
Another consequence of cost reasonableness is that 
if the NPO receives the government award and provides the 
services for less money than it was proposed, it must 
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return the difference to the government. Foundations, 
usually, are not as stringent on cost reasonableness as 
government funders are. The current practice of govern¬ 
ment funding sources and foundations is to fund a percent 
of the proposed project. For funders, it is a bad sign 
when a NPO expect that total funding for the proposed 
project be provided by one funding source. To reiterate, 
what makes a proposal attractive and cost effective to 
funders is the ability of the NPO to show matching funds 
from other sources. Besides UBI, another good source of 
matching funds is corporate dollars. Corporate and UBI 
dollars usually fall under the "unrestricted funds" 
category. Government and foundation funds are restricted 
and can only be spent on the contracted project. 
The "landscape" of nonprofits is fraught with all 
sorts of risks and actual mishaps. Henry (1991) reported 
that in New York City alone "... hundreds of small non¬ 
profit organizations are seeing their government con¬ 
tracts dry up as the city and state find tax collections 
depressed by the shrunken local economy" (pp. 27 - 29). 
To try to make up for these cuts, these NPOs, the author 
reports, are flooding private foundations with requests 
for funds. The New York Community Trust, which awards 
$50 million a year to some 2,700 NPOs, reported that the 
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government cuts are too large to be offset by foundation 
dollars (pp- 27 - 29). 
In another article, Henry (1991) interviewed Frank 
Schneiger, a consultant on management of nonprofits. 
Schneiger predicted an unraveling of the city's NPOs. 
The reason for this, he said, was that the state of New 
York was broke, the federal government was of no help 
whatsoever, and a sense of fatigue had set in among 
private givers. Schneiger went as far as preparing a 
guide for nonprofits in which he urges managers of NPOs 
and their boards to give up dreams of being saved from 
their budget woes (p. 30). 
Henry (1991) also quotes Elaine Allen, national 
director of not-for—profit services for Ernst & Young, an 
accounting firm. She added that the solution to the 
massive fund reduction is not for NPOs to go out and 
raise another dollar, as the relative cost of doing that 
is very expensive (p. 30). 
Sladek and Stein (1981) stated that: "Because of 
writing time - along with clerical support, duplicating, 
and mailing - costs can be higher than anticipated. Even 
a modest proposal can cost upwards of $1,062.... Because 
it is expensive and time-consuming to prepare a proposal, 
you should make a realistic assessment of your chances of 
receiving an award before embarking on the proposal¬ 
writing adventure" (p. 20). 
Sladek and Stein (1981) recommend that NPOs use the 
prospectus or miniproposal, which should be no more than 
two to three pages in length, to determine if the funding 
agency is interested in the proposed idea. A prospectus 
is merely an inquiry to see if the NPO's proposed project 
falls within the grantor's funding interest. It is cost- 
effective and can be a strategic tool for obtaining 
valuable information from the prospective sponsor (pp. 20 
-21). 
Moore and Williams (1991) and Goss, Greene, and 
Williams (1991) reported on the fiscal woes of more than 
two dozen states and how this has forced NPOs to pare 
programs and staffs or even go out of business. In 1991, 
Massachusetts lawmakers were grappling with a budget 
deficit that soared to more than $800-mi11ion. Governor 
William F. Weld, a Republican, proposed a budget for 
1992 that would be $1.8-billion less than earlier 
projections. Driving this budget slashing frenzy is that 
unlike the federal government, most states are not 
allowed to run a deficit (p. 1, and 34, and p. 1, and 24- 
27, respectively). 
Millar and Moore (1991) and Lauffer (1983) warn that 
corporate gifts are harder to get because of the 
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recession. Many corporations, they point out, are not 
increasing their giving budgets to keep pace with 
inflation. They note that some corporations are in so 
much financial trouble that they have either cancelled 
all grant making for the year (1991) or made big 
reductions in the amount of their contributions. 
According to the authors, the lack of growth is not the 
only reason corporate giving is on the decline. 
Officials from more than 40 corporations told Millar 
and Moore (1991) that they are abandoning the scattershot 
approach they used for funding NPOs when company finances 
were robust. These corporate grant makers were direct in 
stating that: "They want projects that will offer high 
visibility for their companies and generate concrete 
accomplishments - both because they want to improve 
society and because they want consumers to think favor— 
ably about their companies. The preference is for causes 
that are popular with the public, such as school reform, 
the environment, and neighborhood development" (pp. 12 - 
14) . 
Millar and Moore (1991) also noted that colleges and 
universities, arts and cultural institutions, and human- 
services groups are finding that fewer corporations are 
interested in making donations to them. Corporate donors 
expressed a desire to avoid funding NPOs that approach 
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them for the first time. As they put it, these NPOs 
might not be reliable. The authors quoted David S. Ford, 
vice-president and director of philanthropy at Chase 
Manhattan Corporation, which in 1991 had a charitable 
gifts budget of $7.6 million (a third less than in 1990). 
Mr Ford stated: "We're giving mainly to groups we've 
given to in the past.... It makes sense, since we know 
and think highly of the groups that we supported in 
previous years. There will be some new grants, but not 
as many as in good years" (pp. 12 - 14). 
Millar and Moore (1993) reported that many big 
companies (corporate foundations) will decrease their 
charitable giving due to falling revenues and the 
attitudes of new chief executive officers (CEOs). A 
survey of the biggest Fortune 500 companies attributed 
this posture to the failure of corporations to rebound 
from the recession. Moreover, many companies undergoing 
downsizing have hired new and younger CEOs who are 
characterized as bloodless and with a less generous 
commitment to philanthropy than their predecessors (p. 1 
and 12 - 14). 
More recently, Millar and Moore (1994) reported that 
most of the nation's foundations (community foundations) 
plan to give away at least as much in 1994 as they did in 
1993. However, the authors warned that due to the slow 
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growth of foundation assets, the increases to NPOs will 
be modest. Of 88 major foundations surveyed, 42 fore¬ 
casted increases in giving, 23 said grants would remain 
about the same, and 18 predicted decreases. Five de¬ 
clined to reveal their grant-making plans. The survey 
showed, that in spite of the recession and little growth 
in their endowments, foundations increased their giving 
by six percent in 1993, outpacing the 2.7 percent rate of 
inflation. Improvements in the stock market, was over— 
shadowed by anemic interest rates that prevented many 
foundations from seeing significant gains in their 1993 
assets portfolio (pp. 6-7 and 12 - 15). 
The generosity of foundations has not been of 
statistical significance to NPOs serving African- 
Americans, Asian-Americans, Latinos, and American 
Indians. Although there has been an increase in 
foundation support to these four principal minority 
groups in recent years, total awards in a given year 
remain at around five percent of all private foundation 
giving. "Crumbs of the pie are what minorities still 
receive" from foundations (Foote, 1990, p. 68). 
The Annie E. Casey Foundation, for example, an¬ 
nounced that for 1994 it has committed $15.8-mi11ion to 
make poor communities safer and better places for 
children and families to live. The Foundation targeted 
132 
five communities nationwide for the project and have 
selected five NPOs to carry it out. Although the 
identified need of the project is central to Latino 
communities throughout the United States, none of the 
NPOs chosen were Latino (The Chronicle of Philanthropy, 
1994, p. 12). 
The Casey Foundation, however, is not among the top 
10 givers to minority causes. Foote (1990) listed these 
in descending order as Ford, the Pew Charitable Trust, 
the W. K. Kellogg, Robert Wood Johnson, and Charles 
Stewart Mott foundations; Lilly Endowment; Carnegie 
Corporation; and the Andrew W. Mellon, Rockefeller and 
William Penn foundations (p. 72). 
Foote (1990) also presented the Foundation Center's 
statistics for 1988 showing the dollar aggregates in 
foundation awards to the four leading minorities! 
"Blacks, $120.6 million; Hispanics, $45.8 million; 
American Indians, $10.7 million; Asian-Americans, $5.6 
million" (p. 72). Foote noted that giving trends were 
relatively steady over the decade, with an overall net 
loss for Blacks and a gain for Hispanics. These changes, 
he added, may be poor indicators of the strength of 
giving since the dollar amounts were so small that one 
grant of a few million dollars can alter the entire 
picture (p. 72). 
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Lord and Daubon (1991) in a study by the National 
Puerto Rican Coalition, Inc., noted that "The vast 
majority of major American corporations have not yet 
accepted the reality of the growth of the Puerto Rican 
community and its increasing impact on American society" 
(p. iv). The study surveyed grants made by the 125 
largest private foundations, the 125 largest corporate 
foundations, and the ten largest community foundations in 
terms of awards to causes identified as Puerto Rican in 
nine key states where Puerto Ricans are concentrated. 
Only grants of over $5,000 for the years 1986, 1987, and 
1988 were measured by the survey (p. 1). 
One of the states included in the survey was 
Massachusetts. This author analyzed the survey data 
on Puerto Rican giving by private, community, and 
corporate foundations in Massachusetts for the period 
1986 to 1988. The analysis revealed that private 
foundations' total giving for the period was $76,638,755. 
The combined award to Puerto Rican NPOs was $180,500, or 
.002 percent of their total award. Only two of six 
private foundations gave to Puerto Rican causes (pp. 49 - 
74) . 
Only one community foundation (The Boston Charitable 
Foundation) with a combined giving for the three-year 
period of $37,907,786, awarded $324,995 to Puerto Rican 
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NPOs and $185,000 to Hispanic causes. This represented 
.009 percent and .005 percent, respectively, of its total 
giving (pp. 77 - 80). Corporate foundations in 
Massachusetts with combined giving of $47,644,901 for the 
same period, awarded Puerto Rican NPOs $269,725, or .006 
percent of their total giving. Additionally, they gave 
Hispanic causes $154,000, or .003 percent of their total 
giving, for a combined contribution of .009 percent (pp. 
83 - 114). The LNPOs targeted by this study were not 
among the recipients of these foundations' awards. In 
fact, none of the recipients were from Western 
Massachusetts. 
□ne technique available to NPOs for expanding their 
financial base is raising money through the Combined 
Federal Campaign. This is a NP0 drive for federal- 
government employee contribution to their favorite 
charity. The Chronicle of Philanthropy (1992), reported 
that in the 1991 campaign, 640 charities were allowed to 
participate and raised $204-mi11ion. The 1992 list 
included 787 charities, a 23 percent increase from 1991. 
While several black organizations made the 1992 list, 
only the National Hispanic Scholarship Fund made it. 
National Hispanic organizations such as ASPIRA and the 
National Puerto Rican Forum were not included in the 
list (pp. 24 - 25). 
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The criteria for eligibility to participate in the 
Combined Federal Campaign are established by the U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management. The requirements are 
stringent, even for national Hispanic organizations. To 
participate in the federal-employee drive, the NPO must 
prove that it has conducted programs or provided services 
in 15 states during the previous three years preceding 
the application. Moreover, the charity must show that 
its fund-raising and administrative expenses do not 
exceed 25 percent of its budget (pp. 24 - 25). 
At the private company-worker level, NPOs seeking 
to expand their financial base through employee-drives, 
also face obstacles. The current practice is for 
business to give preference to federated NPOs such as 
United Way. Millar (1993) reported that the Council of 
Federations, which represents five national organizations 
of charities that run on-the-job drives, predicted that 
$l-billion more could be raised each year if business 
allowed more charities to participate in the drives (p. 
27) . 
The Council of Federations urged companies to allow 
federations other than United Way to solicit workers. 
Fifty million workers nationwide currently participate in 
on-the-job drives. In fiscal year 1992 - 1993, the 
charities represented by the Council raised $62 million. 
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United Way raised $3.04-bi11ion. According to United 
Way, data from companies do not support the claim that 
additional funds could be raised from workers by 
increasing the number of participating-charities (p. 
27). However, Stehle (1993) reported that charity 
federations, created as alternatives to United Way, 
raised eight percent more in 1992 than in 1991. The non- 
United Way federations expected to raise $157-million in 
contributions in their 1993 drives, an 11 percent 
increase from 1992 (p. 30). Gaining approval to partici¬ 
pate in company drives is basically left to the whims of 
corporate management and the persuasiveness of the NPOs 
applying for recognition. 
LNPOs have at their disposal a modality for 
expanding their funding base that is rooted in Latino 
and/or ethnic generosity that both transcends and rebuts 
aspersions of lack of munificence. Lord and Daubon 
(1991) reported that "The collective buying power of 
Hispanics has risen sharply from slightly more than $70 
billion in 1983 to about $130 billion in 1988" (p. 3). 
Ambler (1990) noted that NPOs "within each of the 
nation's four largest minorities have raised money from 
their communities both for crises and for enduring 
causes" (p. 46). 
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Ambler added that the success of several minority- 
focused organizations at this mode of fundraising has 
been astonishingly good. "On the other hand, such groups 
as Washington, D.C.-based ASPIRA and Albuquerque's 
American Indian Graduate Center have just begun to 
explore the potential for financial support in their own 
ethnic and racial communities" (p 46). In spite of the 
fortunes of other ethnic-focused NPOs, the League of the 
United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) "have never 
considered targeting their own people for fundraising;" 
and "considers the concept preposterous" (p. 46). 
The practice of raising money internally is a very 
old idea for people of color. Each of the four major 
ethnic groups—American Indians, African-Americans, 
Asian-Americans, and Latinos) "has a history of giving to 
extended families and to churches, motivated by empathy, 
loyalty and occasionally a reluctance to seek help from 
whites" (p. 46). The executive director of the American 
Indian Science and Engineering Society having asked 
corporations and foundations to fund 95 percent of the 
NPO's budget told his community "I am convinced, however, 
that the only ones who are going to save us are 
ourselves, with some friends along the way" (p. 46). 
Through individual Indian generosity, the Society's 
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endowment in 1990 was fast approaching the goal of $1 
million (p. 46). 
Estrada (1990) noted that the number of Latino 
families with incomes of $50,000 or more has increased 
steadily during the last decade. In 1986, about nine 
percent of 500,000 Latino households were earning $50,000 
or more, compared to 17 percent of all American families. 
In 1980 20,000 Latino families earned more than $75,000. 
In 1986, that number jumped to 103,000. This develop¬ 
ment, in large part, was due to the combined earnings of 
Latino households (p. 34). 
The increased wealth of Latinos translate into in¬ 
creased giving. According to Estrada (1990) and Leonard 
(1990) the Independent Sector reported that 56 Percent of 
Latino families give to charity, compared to 71 percent 
of all American households. The greatest sums were 
provided by individuals rather than families (p. 34 and 
24, respectively). However, Estrada added that although 
wealthy Latinos make charitable contributions, donations 
are, for the most part, haphazard and informal. "Even 
though Latinos mirror the American mainstream in terms of 
investment strategies, they have thus far not established 
similar, formal mechanisms for giving" (p. 34). 
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Estrada (1990) identified four basic constraints 
that hinder the development of formal philanthropy in the 
Latino communities. These are the transitional nature of 
the community caused by patterns of continued immi¬ 
gration; its youthfulness, far from its peak earning 
years; urban concentration; and the separateness of 
Hispanic subgroups. Estrada sees community empowerment 
as a countervailing force to these constraints. As the 
concept of community empowerment progressively develops 
within Latino communities, formal philanthropy also 
develops (pp. 34 - 36). 
Schardt (1990) addressed the impact of multi- 
culturalism on traditional philanthropic behavior. He 
noted the growing recognition that the continuity of 
social attitudes and institutions will soon be dependent 
on non-Europeans, whose giving and helping traditions 
have rarely been acknowledged, studied or appreciated (p. 
20). The population of the world, Schardt pointed out, 
is 82 percent non-white. Although in the United States 
whites comprise 84 percent of the population, Schardt 
predicted by the year 2000 one of every three workers 
will be non—white. " Many parts of our nation will be a 
richly textured mosaic, made up of a majority of 
minorities" (p. 20). The impact of this change is 
already being reflected in many facets of society, and, 
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although slowly, in organized philanthropy (p. 20). 
Schardt invited critics and NPOs to acknowledge the 
benevolent traditions and current giving practices of the 
four major minority groups "who are often seen as the 
recipients of charity rather than as generous communities 
in their own right" (p. 20). 
Ruffin (1990) opined that once minorities acquire 
the monetary means and have a clearer understanding of 
the role of philanthropy in American life, they turn to 
the foundation form of giving (p. 53). According to the 
Pluralism in Philanthropy Project of the Council on 
Foundations, there are approximately 200 minority founda¬ 
tions in the U.S. (p. 53). Since education is regarded 
as the means to upward mobility, it is not surprising to 
find that education consistently claimed the largest 
single share of giving by both minority foundations and 
individuals (p. 53). 
Ruffin observed that "Through foundations and giving 
programs, minority-controlled corporations have begun to 
have an impact on institutional philanthropy" (p. 56). 
An example, according to Ruffin, is the Goya Foods, the 
largest Hispanic-owned company in the U.S. It gives not 
only to a broad range of Latino NPOs but also to the 
United Negro College Fund and to the Black West Indian 
annual cultural festival. Among others are the Angel 
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Ramos Foundation in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Bacardi and 
the Puerto Rico Community foundations, which are broad in 
their philanthropic behavior (pp. 56 - 57). 
Williams (1990) spoke of the vitality of a true 
philanthropic melting pot in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
The Bay Area contains substantial numbers of all four 
minority groups. Latinos in 1990 established the 
Hispanic Community Fund (HCF). The HCF has been de¬ 
scribed by its founder, Miguel F. Barragan, as the 
beginnings of a United Way in the Hispanic community. 
The goal of HCF is to raise more than $1 million over its 
first five years from professional Hispanics and "by 
snuggling into the Bay Area United Way's annual campaign 
as well as conducting its own ..." (p. 64). Latino 
leaders in the Bay Area acknowledged that getting appre¬ 
ciable amounts of support from Latino professionals is a 
difficult and tricky business. They are seen as suppor— 
tive of mainstream institutions and not as responsive to 
Latino interests and needs. In spite of the concerns 
over Latino professionals' misplaced generosity, observ¬ 
ers of philanthropic behavior have seen "a significant 
increase in medium-to-large-scale giving by Latinos, as 
well as their increased presence on mainstream nonprofit 
boards" (p. 64). 
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Summary 
The review of related research and literature exam¬ 
ined the unstable and unpredictable financial environment 
of NPOs, particularly, community-based NPOs. On examina¬ 
tion, the for profits were found to have more leverage 
over the money supply than nonprofits. Capital for NPOs 
was characterized as scarce, inadequate, and hard to get. 
The pronounced financial advantages of for—profits were 
linked to their business or commercial product-orienta- 
tion. The financial disadvantages of nonprofits were 
linked to their public purpose or collective-service 
nature. Financial variability in NPOs was generally 
related to austere economic periods, conservative fiscal 
policies, and suggested lack of effective leadership and 
managerial skills. 
The relationship between the welfare state and NPOs 
was analyzed. The contributions of the NPO sector are 
pivotal to the ability and effectiveness of government to 
allocate collective services to the public. The existing 
partnership between government and the NPO sector, 
enhances both the modern welfare state and the third 
sector. 
The 1960s and 1970s were characterized as periods of 
rapid growth for NPOs. The 1980s, on the other hand, 
presented a more austere period requiring the search for 
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new sources of funds and/or reduction in the allocation 
of collective services. The reliance of community-based 
NPOs on three major sources of funds that required the 
submission of the written funding proposals or applica¬ 
tions was noted. 
The giving behavior of foundations and corporations 
to the leading four minority groups was examined, and, 
notwithstanding progress made, they were found wanting. 
The vast majority of major American corporations, it was 
pointed out, have not yet accepted the reality of the 
growth and socioeconomic impact of the Puerto Rican 
community on the American society. In Massachusetts, 
private, community, and corporate foundations gave less 
than one percent of their total giving to Puerto Rican 
organizations in the Boston area. 
While it is difficult for community-based NPOs to 
expand their financial base through federal employee 
drives, it is feasible for them to participate in 
company-level employee drives. LNPOs can expand their 
funding base by raising money within their own community. 
NPOs within the four largest minority groups, it was 
shown, have been successful at raising funds within their 
respective communities. As the philanthropic behavior of 
Latinos is formalized through their own foundations, 
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institutional philanthropy may look more favorably at 
Latino NPQs. 
For LNPOs to survive in an environment full of 
inherent uncertainties, they must maintain a competitive 
edge. An organization that has a competitive edge over 
its competitors will be more likely to attract resource 
contributors or stakeholders to its cause. Competitive 
LNPOs should further improve their advantage by pursuing 
unrelated business income (UBI). LNPOs must watch that 
by pursuing UBI they don't deflect from their charitable 
goals. UBI should improve the ability of managers to 
carry out their goals. Through UBI, the LNPO can show 
better cost reasonableness in its request for funds than 
the competition. Corporate and UBI dollars are generally 
unrestricted and can be used as matching funds that make 
the proposal more attractive. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the procedures utilized in 
this study. The purpose of the study was to analyze the 
types of funds, programmatic and personnel changes, and 
fiscal soundness of LNPOs, during a three year period; 
and funding variability, during a seven year period. The 
study initially involved seven Latino nonprofit organiza¬ 
tions in three major cities—Holyoke, Northampton, 
Springfield—with large Latino concentrations in Western 
Massachusetts. However, because the official file of one 
of the LNPOs selected for the study was not available in 
the Public Charities Division of the Massachusetts 
Department of the Attorney General, only six LNPOs were 
included in the study. The research was approached from 
an empirical perspective and sought to understand the 
data observed through quantitative methods. The choice 
of the quantitative method over the qualitative was 
governed by the statistical nature of the documents that 
were analyzed. 
Key (1966) noted that "quantitative procedures may 
be best regarded as particular techniques by which more 
general methods of reasoning may be applied to the 
data..." (p. vii). "A virtue of the statistical ap- 
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proach," Key added, "is that it brings explicitly and 
nakedly to attention general questions of analytical 
method" (pp. vii - viii). Mann, Cate, Ingrum and Briggs 
(1968) noted that "without statistics, scientists and 
scholars could not organize and interpret facts in ways 
which bring about so many changes in people's ways of 
living" (p. 42). Huff and Geis (1954) pointed out that 
"statistical methods and statistical terms are necessary 
in reporting the mass data of social and economic trends, 
business conditions, opinion polls, the census. But 
without writers who use the words with honesty and 
understanding and readers who know what they mean, the 
result can only be semantic nonsense" (p. 8). The 
authors added that "A well-wrapped statistic is better 
than Hitler's ‘big lie;' it misleads, yet it cannot be 
pinned on you" (p. 9). 
Invariably, qualitative inferences are made about 
quantitative data. In his doctoral dissertation, 
Hoogasian (1986) used the qualitative method of analysis 
as it best represented the non—numerical phenomena of his 
study, which consisted of direct observation of human 
activity and interaction in a high school setting. 
Hoogasian posited that qualitative analysis takes into 
account the enormous complexity of social institutions. 
Through qualitative analysis, he believed, these complex- 
147 
ities can be unraveled and more accurately described. 
Rogers (1984) noted "the qualitative researcher seeks to 
understand the attitudes, values, beliefs, and underlying 
assumptions of those being studied, to understand others 
view of their world" (Hoogasian, 1986, p. 60). Hoogasian 
(1986) argued that "The qualitative approach is 
descriptive as opposed to the evaluative nature of a 
quantitative study" (pp. 60 - 61). 
Generally, this study sought to determine ex post 
facto causes of observed fiscal variability and relied on 
official (governmental) sources of financial data. The 
sources of information utilized by this study consisted 
of the LNPOs' Internal Revenue Service Form 990 (Return 
of Organization Exempt from Income Tax); and the Public 
Charities (PC) report filed by NPOs with the Public 
Charities Division of the Massachusetts Department of the 
Attorney General. NPOs must file the annual returns 
(Form 990) on the fifteenth day of the fifth month 
following the fiscal year end. Failure to file can 
result in civil and criminal penalties (Wolf, 1990, p. 
188). These financial documents are prepared by tax 
lawyers, comptrollers, and certified public accountants 
and should exceed an "expert opinion" characterization. 
With noted exceptions, NPOs have a vested interest 
in filing income tax returns that are in conformity with 
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generally accepted accounting principles. Williams 
(1992) and Hall (1992) reported that the Internal Revenue 
Service is stepping up its enforcement of tax laws regu¬ 
lating nonprofits, and warned that those NPOs selected 
for an audit will be scrutinized intensely. Hall (1992) 
noted that an IRS audit can be expensive and painful, and 
can take a year or more to complete (p. 30). NPOs can 
avoid the inconvenience and added cost of an IRS audit by 
taking preventive measures. Tax lawyers recommend that a 
good time for an NPO to conduct its own internal audit is 
when it prepares its annual informational tax return, 
known as Form 990. Hall pointed out that "Many non¬ 
profits attract the IRS's interest, and increase the 
possibility of an audit, by failing to fill out tax forms 
completely..." (p. 30). IRS audits are conducted pursu¬ 
ant to "the IRS's 1988 Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, which 
explains how audits must be conducted and details the 
rights of those being audited" (p. 32). 
Williams (1992) noted that at the state level, 
charity regulators have vowed to get tough on NPOs that 
file misleading and inaccurate financial information with 
government agencies. The concern of state officials over 
the reporting practices of NPOs is identical to those of 
the federal government. They are both concerned that 
charities might be misleading rather than informing the 
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public about their fiscal accountability or stewardship., 
Williams reported that as competition among charities for 
contribution has intensified, there has been "an increase 
in the use of creative accounting and abuses of the 
accounting standards by charitable organizations seeking 
to artificially inflate their program service and, in 
some cases, to conceal exorbitant fund-raising and admin¬ 
istrative costs" (p. 33). Some charities, according to 
state regulators, are abusing an accounting technique 
based on a policy statement issued in 1987 by the Ameri¬ 
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, that al¬ 
lows NPOs to "shift some of their fund-raising expenses 
into the category for program expenses on financial 
statements" (p. 33). 
The state and federal government have proposed 
measures to address the issues of truth in the fiscal 
reporting practices of NPOs. Williams (1992) reported 
that IRS announced it will be changing Form 990. "The 
changes are intended to give the service a better idea of 
precisely how much charities spend on fund raising and on 
charitable programs" (p. 33). Part II (Statement of 
Functional Expenses) of Form 990 before the change 
required NPOs to list their expenses in the categories of 
program services management and fund raising. The new 
addition to Form 990, requires NPOs to state whether they 
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use an accounting technique that allows them to shift 
some of their fundraising expenditures into the category 
of program expenses, usually as public education. If so, 
they would be asked to provide details of the allo¬ 
cations. These changes, requested by state attorneys 
general, took effect during the 1992 calendar year (p. 
33, 35). 
Williams (1992) reported that the IRS plans to have 
an electronic system in place within the next three 
years, whereby NPOs will be able to report the Form 990 
financial data through a computer hook-up (p. 35). 
Williams (1992) noted that at the state level, regulators 
are requiring NPOs to file amended Forms 990 with them if 
errors are found, an action sanctioned by IRS. The 
National Association of State Charity Officials in 1992 
recommended the development of a standard form (not Form 
990) for requiring fund-raising groups to register. The 
Public Charities Division of the Massachusetts Attorney 
General's office, noted "that in order for uniform 
registration, and uniform financial reporting, forms to 
ever be finally drafted and adopted, non-profits need to 
get together to pay for a formal project that would 
involve regulators and non-profit officials" (p. 34). 
This is not the first time that IRS Form 990 has 
undergone revision. Weisbrod (1977) is perhaps the only 
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researcher who has used this official source of data to 
assess the financial status of charities. In 1977, 
Weisbrod noted certain deficiencies in IRS Form 990. At 
that time, he observed, it was "not possible to dis¬ 
aggregate the IRS data to determine how much of the 
contributions, gifts, and grants are from the governments 
and how much from private-sector contributions. Such 
data would be valuable to obtain and would be feasible if 
the Form 990 tax returns were modified" (p. 23). By the 
mid-1980s, the deficiencies in IRS Form 990 had been 
corrected by requesting NPQs to report the type of funds 
received and the different programs, under Part II 
(Statement of Program Services Rendered) of the form. 
The Chronicle of Philanthropy (1994) reported that 
the National Association of Attorneys General has called 
on the federal government to crack down on charity finan¬ 
cial abuses. The Clinton Administration and the House 
Ways and Means Committee's Oversight Sub-committee is 
already considering some of the recommendations of the 
association. One of these is the requirement that NPOs 
provide photocopies of their annual information tax 
returns (IRS Form 990) to anybody who requests them in 
writing or by telephone (p. 39). Hall (1992) noted that 
the effort to make NPOs' tax returns public was the ob¬ 
ject of a measure passed by the House of Representative 
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in 1992 (p. 33). Senator John W. Warner's office, 
Republican of Virginia, who pushed for this measure to 
become law was contacted by this author. The Senator's 
office reported that measure never became law (informa¬ 
tion obtained from Senator Warner's office, March 18, 
1994). 
The basis of this study emanates from a review of 
the literature concerning the impact of economic factors 
and governmental policies on the type of funds and fund¬ 
ing levels of NPOs. The literature showed how NPOs were 
keyed to their environment and responded to the forces 
influencing their collective or public service mission. 
Moreover, the literature showed that the overall capabil¬ 
ity of the NPO determines, to a great extent, how it will 
respond to environmental forces influencing change. The 
knowledge base of the NPO suggest a relationship between 
its structure, fiscal health, and its environment. The 
study was guided by six research questions. 
Research Questions 
1. Who were the funders or revenue sources of LNPOs 
during the period 1989 to 1992? 
2. What were the funding levels of LNPOs during the 
period 1985 to 1992? 
3. What, if any, were their major funding changes 
during the period 1985 to 1992? 
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4. What, if any, were the program changes 
experienced by LNPOs during the period 1989 to 
1992? 
5. What, if any, were the personnel changes under¬ 
taken by LNPOs during the period 1989 to 1992? 
6. What was the overall fiscal soundness of LNPOs 






The source of revenue of the six LNPOs 
targeted by this study was obtained from 
Part I (Statement of Revenue) of their 
annual tax returns (Form 990), for the 
period 1989 to 1992. 
The funding levels of the six LNPOs was 
determined by obtaining data from Part II 
(Statement of Functional Expenses) of their 
annual tax returns, for the period 1989 to 
1992; and from Part IV of Schedule A, Form 
990, for the period 1985 to 1992. 
Any changes in the funding levels of the 
six NPOs was determined by comparing the 
two sources of data in Step 2 (funding 
levels). 
Step 4. A determination of any program changes for 




1989 to 1992. 
was made through information 
Part III (Statement of Pro- 
Rendered) of the organiza- 
tax returns, for the period 
Step 5. Any personnel changes occurring within the 
six LNPOs was determined from paragraph 8 
and 9 of Form PC (Annual Report), filed 
with the Division of Public Charities of 
the Department of the Massachusetts 
Attorney General, for the period 1989 to 
1992. 
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Step 6. A determination of the fiscal soundness of 
the six LNPOs was made through an analysis 
of the data obtained from Part V (Balance 
Sheets) and Part I (Statement of Support, 
Revenue, and Expenses and Changes in Fund 
Balances) of their annual tax returns, for 
the period 1989 to 1992. 
For the purpose of uniform analysis, the data was 
grouped into the first, second, and third most recent 
consecutive year of available information on each of the 
six LNPOs in the study. This was necessary in that the 
Public Charities Division of the Massachusetts Department 
of the Attorney General retains the fiscal reports filed 
by NPOs annually for only three years. Another concern 
was that the fiscal year for each NPO varies. Fortu¬ 
nately, the LNPOs in the study shared essentially the 
same fiscal reporting period—July 1 to June 30. For 
these reasons, it was possible to organize the data on a 
chronological basis. The actual calendar or fiscal years 
on which the data in this study are based was thoroughly 
documented. 
All the data for this study was reported on appro¬ 
priate tables by organization, category, and year of the 
observation. Moreover, the data was analyzed using 
simple time series analysis. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study constitutes an assessment of six key 
LNPOs in three major cities in Western Massachusetts. It 
was limited to an examination of the organizations' 
mandated fiscal reports, filed with the government 
annually. The study did not include assessments through 
questionnaires or personal interviews with the primary 
staff of these organizations. Another limitation of the 
study, mentioned earlier, concerns the availability of 
the fiscal documents assessed. The Public Charities 
Division in the Department of the Massachusetts Attorney 
General, maintains these financial reports for only three 
years. For this reason, the period of the study was 
limited to 1989 to 1992, as documents for this period 
were available. However, IRS Form 990 (Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax), the major document 
examined, requires that NPOs report gifts, grants and 
contributions received for the four years preceding the 
year of the report. Owing to this requirement, the study 
was able to assess for fund variability for the period 
1985 to 1992. 
An underlying hypothesis of this study was that 
LNPOs evolve and persist in precarious financial envi¬ 
ronments. A major factor accounting for the instability 
in the financial environment of LNPOs and non-Latino NPOs 
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is the nature and unpredictabi1ity of the funding sources 
of these organizations. Because NPOs lack the fiscal 
security inherent in the for-profit sector, fiscal inde¬ 
pendence among them is a difficult goal to attain. This 
situation makes LNPQs highly susceptible to volatility in 
their funding environment. This, in turn, leads to or¬ 
ganizational changes as the system attempts to adapt to 
environmental uncertainty. 
Although the major determinants of income varia¬ 
bility in NPOs are economic recessions; and conservative 
fiscal and regulatory policies, it can also be influenced 
by managerial factors that includes failure to success¬ 
fully compete for available funds. However, these fac¬ 
tors and failed funding proposals were not assessed as 
determinants of income variability and fiscal account¬ 
ability. Generalization concerning these two variables 
were within the parameters of the data garnered by the 
study. Because the study was limited to six LNPOs, 
generalizing the results to similar organizations may be 
invalid. However, the completeness of the fiscal 
methodology utilized in the study, contributed to an 
objective and impartial assessment of the financial 
status of the LNPOs studied. This study can be 
replicated for the purpose of determining income 
variability and fiscal soundness in other NPOs. 
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Given the limitations of the government to fiscally 
assess the high volume of NPOs, the assessment model 
central to this study is encouraged. 
Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology that was 
utilized in this quantitative study. It includes 
procedures and methods of organizing and interpreting the 
data. The significance and limitations of IRS Form 990, 
as well as the overall limitations of the study were 
outlined. Efforts by both the federal and state govern¬ 
ment agencies to improve the veracity of financial re¬ 
porting by charities were elucidated. Chapter IV will 
focus on the analysis of the data and interpretation of 





The purpose of this study was to analyze the funding 
levels, types of funds, and overall fiscal soundness of 
six LNPOs in three major cities in Western Massachu¬ 
setts, during a three year period, and their income 
variability during a seven year period. Organizations 
behave in varying forms to respond and adjust to environ¬ 
mental stresses. The behavior under analysis by this 
study is associated with fiscal variability during a 
period of purported fiscal austerity and conservative 
fiscal policies. The ability of the enterprise to 
mediate between the needs of its internal environment 
(technological or inner core) and the demands of the 
external environment, can determine whether change will 
be positive or adverse to the organization. 
This chapter presents the data collected following 
the procedures outlined in the methodology and addresses 
the findings of this exploratory research study. A 
fiscal profile of the targeted LNPOs is developed. A 
brief overview of each LNPO precedes the explanation of 
the data. Of the seven LNPOs selected for the study, six 
had readily available official files in the Public Chari- 
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ties Division of the Massachusetts Department of the 
Attorney General. The data for the six organizations 
will be arranged in 34 tables at the end of the chapter. 
Each table bears a numerical identification and are 
further identified by the number of the research question 
addressed, the subject matter of the research question, a 
numerical code assigned to the LNPO represented by each 
table, and the source and period of the data. 
Tables 1 to 6 represent research question 1—source 
of revenue and level of funding—for the six LNPOs. 
Tables 7 to 12 address research question 2 and 3—level 
of funding and funding changes—for the six LNPOs. 
Tables 13 to 18 represent research question 4—program 
changes—of the six LNPOs. Tables 19 to 24 represent 
research question 5—personnel changes—of the six LNPOs. 
Tables 25 to 30 represent research question 6, fiscal 
soundness; and tables 31 to 34, additional data. 
LNPO Overview 
LNPO No. 1, based in Northampton, Massachusetts, was 
founded in 1965 and incorporated in 1983 to provide serv¬ 
ices and opportunities to Latinos in Hampshire County. 
Programs offered include remedial education, advocacy, 
information and referral, youth services, and cultural 
arts. This 501(c)(3) organization is governed by a 
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voluntary board of directors comprised, as of 1992, of 
twelve members. Five of the members were employees of 
the organization. 
LNPO No. 2, based in Springfield, Massachusetts, was 
incorporated in 1977 to provide diagnosis and treatment 
to individuals with mental health and related problems. 
The board of this 501(c)(3) organization had fourteen 
members in 1992. None of the board members were employ¬ 
ees of the agency. 
LNPO No. 3, based in Springfield, Massachusetts, was 
incorporated in 1971 to serve farm workers in the New 
England region. Since the 1980s, it has expanded its 
services and reaches a broader constituency that includes 
Latinos, whites, and African-Americans. Services provid¬ 
ed include fuel assistance, employment and training, 
health services, and voucher day care services. As of 
1992, this 501(c)(3) organization was governed by a 
voluntary board of directors consisting of fifteen 
members, of which none were employees of the agency. 
LNPO No. 4, based in Springfield, Massachusetts, was 
incorporated in 1973 to promote better education, health, 
housing, safety, and human rights for residents of 
Springfield. As of 1992, this 501(c)(3) organization was 
governed by a voluntary board of directors consisting of 
nineteen members. None were employees of the agency. 
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LNPO No. 5, based in Holyoke, Massachusetts, was 
incorporated 1982 to develop and improve the housing 
stock and meet the educational and social needs of 
residents of Holyoke. As of 1992, this 501(c)(3) 
organization was governed by a voluntary board of 
directors consisting of twelve members. None of the 
members were employees of the agency. 
LNPO No. 6, based in Springfield, Massachusetts, was 
incorporated in 1978 to promote Puerto Rican culture, and 
provide remedial and cultural arts education to Latinos 
in Springfield. As of 1992, this 501(c)(3) organization 
was governed by a voluntary board of directors consisting 
of twelve members. None were employees of the agency. 
All of the LNPOs in the study used the accrual 
accounting method. A decision was made not to character— 
ize the six LNPOs as either small, medium, or large. 
Based on the level of funding of these LNPOs, the reader 
should be able to make determinations respecting these 
characterizations. 
Results of Financial Reports 
Sources of Contributions. Gifts, and Grants to LNPOs — 
Research Question 1 
Table 1 shows that the aggregate government support 
to LNPO No. 1 was $185,870 or 55.3 percent of its total 
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revenue of $336,123 for the three-year period. Direct 
public support noted on Table 1 may include contribu¬ 
tions, gifts, grants and bequests received directly from 
individuals, trusts, corporations, estates, and founda¬ 
tions; and indirect public support are contributions 
received indirectly from the public through solicitation 
campaigns conducted by federated fundraising agencies and 
similar fundraising organizations such as a United Way 
organization and certain sectarian federations (Instruc¬ 
tions for Form 990, 1993, p. 9). 
According to Table 1, the total dollar amount 
received by LNPO No. 1 from direct and indirect sources 
for the three-year period was $69,893 or 20.8 percent of 
its total cumulative revenue of $336,123. The program 
service revenue on Table 1 is generated from those activ¬ 
ities the NPO was created to conduct. These activities 
form the basis for the NPO's current exemption from tax 
(Instruction for Form 990, 1993, p. 13). The total 
dollar amount received by LNPO No. 1 from program 
services for the three year period was $73,870 or 22 
percent of its total cumulative revenue of $336,123. 
The data on Table 1 shows that LNPO No. 1 is 
substantially reliant on government support for its 
public purpose mission. The data also shows that for the 
1991 - 1992 period, government support to this LNPO 
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declined by 58.4 percent or $43,422. The organization, 
however, was able to offset this loss with revenue from 
direct and indirect public support, and from program 
services. LNPO No. 1 did not undertake special fund¬ 
raising events and activities to generate income. 
Table 2 shows that the aggregate government support 
for LNPO No. 2 was $7,830,841 or 77 percent of its cumu¬ 
lative revenue of $10,164,709 for the three-year period. 
The data also shows increases in both government and pro¬ 
gram service support for the same period. The agency did 
not undertake special fundraising events and activities 
during this three-year period to generate additional 
income. 
Table 3 indicates that the aggregate government 
support for LNPO No. 3 was $43,343,312 or 99.8 percent of 
its total cumulative revenue of $43,411,898. Direct 
public support for the period was $79,928 or .2 percent. 
The agency had a rental income loss of $18,217 for the 
three-year period. The data shows that for the 1991 to 
1992 period, the agency lost $2,562,216 in government 
support and did not offset this loss with other sources 
of revenue. No special fundraising events and activities 
were undertaken by the agency either. The sources of 
government revenue for this LNPO are diverse, but the 
agency's reliance on them is too significant. A healthy 
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diversification of funds should exist within and between 
the various sources of revenue available to NPOs. 
Table 4 summarizes the main sources of income for 
LNPO No. 4. It shows that from 1989 to 1992, the aggre¬ 
gate support from government sources was $2,407,056 or 99 
percent of $2,431,922, the cumulative revenue for the 
same period. The data also shows that this LNPO did not 
receive support from individuals, corporations, and 
foundations. LNPO No. 4 did not undertake special fund¬ 
raising events and activities for additional dollars. 
Table 5 summarizes the main sources of income for 
LNPO No. 5. It shows that from 1989 to 1992, the organi¬ 
zation received a total of $1,303,414 from government 
sources. This represents 73.6 percent of its total 
revenue of $1,771,259 for the same period. However, 
during the preceding period, 1990 to 1991, the agency 
sustained a 42.7 percent decrease in total revenue, as 
well as an 86.4 percent decrease in revenue in the "Other 
Revenue" category. The agency was not able to compensate 
for the major loss of income for that period with alter— 
native sources of revenue. The data indicates that 
during the 1991 to 1992 period, government support to 
this LNPO increased by 120.6 percent. The LNPO garnered 
25.5 percent ($450,937) of its total revenues from 
income—producing activities related to the exempt purpose 
165 
of the organization. This income is reported under the 
"Other Revenue" category of Table 5. The organization 
did not engage in special fundraising events and activi¬ 
ties to advance its public purpose mission. 
Table 6 shows that between 1989 and 1991, LNPO No. 6 
did not receive support from government sources. For the 
1991 to 1992 period, it received $135,930 from the gov¬ 
ernment, which represents 17.3 percent of the agency's 
revenue for the three-year period. Direct public support 
netted the LNPO $186,478 or 23.7 percent of total revenue 
for the same period. While it is true that for the first 
two years, LNPO No. 6 did not receive grants from the 
government, the aggregate amount of $432,335 reported 
under "Program Service Revenue" of Table 6, for the 
period 1989 to 1991, are fees from government agencies. 
This amount represents 55 percent of the agency's total 
revenue for the three-year period. Thus total government 
support for LNPO No. 6 represents 72.3 percent of the 
agency's total cumulative revenue of $785,568. The 
organization engaged in special fundraising events and 
activities and was able to net $16,410 or two percent of 
its total revenue. This, however, was not enough to 
compensate for the 24.9 percent decrease in total revenue 
in the 1991 to 1992 period. 
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Funding Levels of LNPOs - Research Questions 2 and 3 
Table 7 shows that LNPO No. 1 experienced an 11.8 
percent increase in revenue during the 1986 to 1987 
period; a 17.7 increase in the 1987 to 1988 period; a 
20.2 percent decrease in the 1988 to 1989 period; a 17.2 
percent decrease in the 1989 to 1990 period; a 27.8 
percent decrease in the 1990 to 1991 period; and a 35.4 
percent increase in the 1991 to 1992 period. The 
decreases in revenue for all periods exceeded the revenue 
increases. Based on the data on Table 7, LNPO No. 1 
experienced no meaningful growth during the seven-year 
period. (See also Table 34). 
The data on Table 8 shows that LNPO No. 2 experi¬ 
enced a revenue increase of 25.2 percent during the 1986 
to 1987 period; a 23.9 percent increase in the 1987 to 
1988 period; an 8.1 percent increase in the 1988 to 1989 
period; a 26 percent increase in the 1989 to 1990 period; 
a 22 percent increase in the 1990 to 1991 period; and an 
18.9 percent increase in the 1991 to 1992 period. In 
spite of its heavy reliance on program fees from govern¬ 
ment agencies, LNPO No. 2 shows a fairly consistent rate 
of growth for the seven-year period. The slowest rate of 
growth (8.1 percent) for the agency was in the 1988 to 
1989 period. (See also Table 34). 
167 
For LNPO No. 3, Table 9 shows a revenue increase of 
32.7 percent during the 1986 to 1987 period; a 65.4 
percent increase during the 1987 to 1988 period; a 1 
percent increase during the 1988 to 1989 period; a 5.3 
percent increase during the 1989 to 1990 period; a 4.9 
percent decrease during the 1990 to 1991 period; and a 
16.6 percent decrease for the 1991 to 1992 period. In 
spite of the major revenue loss in the 1991 to 1992 
period, the rate of growth for LNPO No. 3 was signifi¬ 
cant. (See also Table 34). 
As indicated by tables 10 and 34, LNPO No. 4 had a 
revenue increase of 106 percent during the 1986 to 1987 
period; a 107.5 percent increase during the 1987 to 1988 
period; a 52.8 percent increase during the 1988 to 1989 
period; a 132.1 percent increase during the 1989 to 1990 
period; an 18.6 percent increase during the 1990 to 1991 
period; and a 16.9 percent increase during the 1991 to 
1992 period. The rate of growth for LNPO No. 4 stabi¬ 
lized during the last two years, but it can be regarded 
as significant. Increases of this magnitude can over 
whelm the system, especially if change is unplanned and 
both the technical staff and management are unprepared to 
manage growth. 
Table 11 represents the revenue variability for LNPO 
No. 5. The agency had a revenue increase of 30.2 percent 
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during the 1986 to 1987 period; a 44.3 percent increase 
in the 1987 to 1988 period; a 41.4 percent increase in 
the 1988 to 1989 period; a 41.6 percent increase in the 
1989 to 1990 period; a 42.7 percent decrease in the 1990 
to 1991 period; and a 154.4 percent increase in the 1991 
to 1992 period. The rate of growth for LNPO No. 5 for 
these periods was significant. The reduction in revenue 
in the 1990 to 1991 period was not compensated by other 
sources of income, but the major increase in the period 
that followed showed agency resilience. (See Table 34). 
Table 12 is a depiction of the revenue variability 
of LNPO No. 6. The first four periods show no income 
variance in that the applicable documents perished in a 
flood. However, for the 1990 to 1991 period, the agency 
experienced a 14 percent increase in revenue, and a 24.9 
percent decrease in the 1991 to 1992 period. The data 
for the three-year period shown on Table 12, demonstrate 
a negative rate of growth for LNPO No. 6. Due to the 
small size of its operating budget, the revenue fluctu¬ 
ations experienced should not be as drastic as they would 
be to a larger operation. (See also Table 34). 
Program Changes of LNPQs - Research Question 4 
Table 13 shows that LNPO No. 1 lost two programs 
during the 1990 to 1991 period. The agency was not able 
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to reinstate these two programs during the 1991 to 1992 
period. The reduction in the program mix appears to 
coincide with the agency's reduction in revenue noted on 
Table 1 and Table 7. Table 14 shows that LNPO No. 2 was 
able to maintain its program mix for the three-year 
period. The increases in revenue noted on Table 2 and 
Table 8, however, don't seem to coincide with increases 
in the program mix as the number of programs throughout 
the three periods remained essentially the same. Program 
sustainment, on the other hand, would coincide with the 
revenue increases if these were intended instead for 
program expansion. 
Although Table 3 and Table 9 show that LNPO No. 3 
lost $2,562,216 in revenue for the 1991 to 1992 period, 
Table 15 shows that there was no complimentary reduction 
in the agency's program mix. It is possible that the 
revenue reduction had the effect of reducing, rather than 
eliminating programs. Table 16 shows an increase in the 
program mix of LNPO No. 4. A positive correlation 
appears to exist between the agency's revenue increases 
noted on Table 4 and Table 10, and the increases in the 
program mix. 
Table 17 shows that LNPO No. 5 maintained virtually 
the same number of programs during the three-year period. 
The major increases in revenue noted on Table 5 and Table 
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11 are not equally reflected on the agency's program mix. 
However, the possibility exist that a significant portion 
of the increases in revenue were utilized for housing 
redevelopment. It is also likely that an austere program 
mix is the product of omission when completing the appro¬ 
priate fiscal documents. Both form 990 and the Public 
Charities Form require that the agency state clearly its 
program mix. The impression of this researcher is that 
this was not always the case. 
Table 18 depicts the program mix for LNPO No. 6. 
The income variability shown on Table 6 and Table 12 is 
not reflected on the program mix of the agency, which 
according to Table 18 remained unchanged during the 
three-year period. This might be the product of both the 
size of the agency's operating budget and the relatively 
small changes in revenue. It can also be a reflection of 
the austere manner in which programs are reported on the 
fiscal and programmatic documents filed with the govern¬ 
ment. 
Personnel Changes of LNPQs - Research Question 5. 
Table 19 shows that LNPO No. 1 made no changes in 
the number of consultants and primary staff during the 
three—year period. Based on the compensation and salary 
paid by the agency, only the two primary staff appear to 
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be full-time employees. Table 19 also shows that pro¬ 
gram staff were hired as part-time consultants. Occa¬ 
sionally this is done to offset the cost of employee 
benefits. Given the size of the agency's operating 
budget, the consultants and primary staff shown on Table 
19 may comprise the agency's entire staff. By contrast, 
the program reductions of LNPO No. 1 shown on Table 13, 
don't seem to coincide with the lack of staff reduction 
portrayed on Table 19. 
No primary staff changes are evident on Table 20 for 
LNPO No. 2. The absence of change in primary staff and 
consultants appears to correlate with the absence of 
program change shown on Table 14. However, Table 20 
shows increases in the compensation and salary of con¬ 
sultants and staff. These increases in pay also appear 
to have some correlation with the revenue increases shown 
on Table 2 and Table 8. Form 990 only requires the 
reporting of compensation and salary of the agency's 
highest paid consultants and staff. It is possible to 
know whether changes in the salaries of the rank and file 
correlate with changes in revenue. LNPO No. 2 has a 
sizeable staff and an equally sizeable payroll. 
LNPO No. 3 exhibits a pattern similar to LNPO No. 2. 
Table 21 shows generally no change in the primary staff 
and consultants of LNPO No. 3. There is some correlation 
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between the agency's revenue increases and increases in 
compensation and salary for consultants and primary 
staff. LNPO No. 3 employs a significant number of 
personnel not reflected on Table 21. Its payroll is 
equally significant. Chapter V and Table 33 will show 
that increases in revenue also correlate with salary 
increases for the rank and file. Worth noting, is that 
both the consultants, primary staff, and the rank and 
file received salary increases during the 1991 to 1992 
period, when the agency lost $2,562,216 in revenue. 
Table 22 shows no change in the number of highest 
paid consultants and highest paid staff of LNPO No. 4. 
There are noticeable increases in the salaries paid to 
the primary staff during the 1990 to 1991 and 1991 to 
1992 periods; and a noticeable decrease in the compen¬ 
sation received by consultants during the same periods. 
Table 23 shows that the number of personnel for LNPO 
No. 5 remained fairly constant during the three-year 
period. There were slight increases in the salaries of 
the primary staff and significant increases in the com¬ 
pensation received by consultants. The increases in 
revenue of LNPO No. 5 correlate more with increases in 
pay to consultants and staff than with increases in the 
program mix (see Tables 5, 11 and 17). 
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Table 24 shows a reduction in the number of consult¬ 
ants hired by LNPO No. 6, during the 1990 to 1991 and 
1991 to 1992 periods. The decreases in the number of 
consultants during the highest growth of the agency, was 
followed by slight decreases in the salaries of the 
primary staff. Conversely, during the period of lowest 
revenue growth (1991 to 1992), the agency increased the 
salaries of the primary staff (see Table 24). 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPQs - Research Question 6 
Tables 25 to 30 represent the aggregate balance 
sheets of the six LNPOs being studied. Each of these 
tables consist of aggregate balance sheets in that the 
balance sheet of each LNPO, for each of the three years 
of review, was grouped into one balance sheet. The 
balance sheet is an excellent tool in that it lists the 
organization's assets, liabilities, and net worth. 
Simply stated, it shows what the organization owns, owes, 
what is owed to it, and how much is left over. The 
balance sheet can be likened to the vital signs chart of 
a patient. By examining the balance sheet, the fiscal 
health or vital financial signs of the organization can 
be ascertained. To that I now turn. 
Table 25 represents the balance sheets for LNPO No. 
1. The assets of this organization at the end of the 
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1991 to 1992 fiscal period totals $53,515. The liabil¬ 
ities for the same period totals $17,997. The fund 
balance or net worth of LNPO No. 1 for the same fiscal 
period was $35,518. Although this is a small amount, it 
is inflated by the $29,550 listed as land, buildings, and 
equipment. In reality it represents the value of the 
equipment the agency owns. If this amount is discounted 
because it cannot be easily turned into cash, the net 
worth of this organization would be further reduced and 
would approximate insolvency. 
In fact, significant portions of all the amounts 
LNPO No. 1 listed as assets can be discounted. Cash - 
noninterest-bearing is so listed because it represents 
committed funds and committed funds equals spent funds. 
How sure is the LNPO that accounts receivable and other 
notes and loans receivable will in fact arrive? Prepaid 
expenses for an NPO usually represent security deposits. 
How sure is the LNPO that at the end of the lease, it 
will receive the amount listed as part of its assets? 
All of the items that LNPO No. 1 listed as assets are in 
agreement with accepted accounting principles. However, 
an organization cannot survive on accepted accounting 
principles alone. Moreover, in today's complex world 
just surviving is not enough. Table 25 also shows that, 
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in spite of its apparent fiscal needs, LNPO No. 1 has not 
established an endowment fund or a contingency reserve. 
A contingency reserve is a line item set up on the 
expense side of the operating budget. It is a form of 
self-insurance for unexpected expenses during the fiscal 
period. It is built by setting aside up to five percent 
of the organization's total income. The goal is to set 
aside enough so that the contingency reserve has 25 to 50 
percent of the organization's operating budget. This 
reserve has many other virtues that become apparent once 
you have it in place. For example, instead of an NPO 
paying interest on a line of credit, it can borrow from 
the contingency reserve and repay the loan when the 
pending funds arrive (Wolf, 1990, pp. 146 - 149). 
There are factors that influence the creation of a 
contingency reserve. One of them is that the less 
predictable the income of an organization, the greater 
the need for a contingency reserve. Another concerns the 
relative stability of the organization. The more unsta¬ 
ble or new the NPO is, the larger the contingency reserve 
should be. The less experienced the current management 
is, the greater the contingency reserve should be (Wolf, 
1990, pp. 146 - 148). 
An endowment fund differs from a contingency reserve 
in terms of the type of funds treated as endowments and 
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the restrictions placed upon them. According to Wolf 
(1990) "An endowment is a reserve fund with special rules 
and restrictions as to its use. Generally, endowments 
consist of invested funds (principal) that must be left 
intact (only income from the investment can be utilized 
by the organization)" (p. 149). Unlike the case with a 
contingency reserve, when funders see endowment funds 
listed in the NPO's financial statement, they don't 
expect that it utilize the principal to cover expenses 
the organization is requesting funds for. When the 
contingency reserve becomes too large, the board of 
directors can reduce its size by designating a portion of 
the cash reserve as endowment. The board can undesignate 
that cash reserve portion at a later time. 
Essentially, the same characterization of LNPO No. 1 
can be made for LNPO No. 4 (Table 28) and LNPO No. 6 
(Table 30). Although LNPO No. 2, LNPO No. 3 and LNPO No. 
5 don't have endowment funds and/or contingency reserves, 
their balance sheets indicate they are relatively healthy 
organizations which allocate massive collective services 
to their constituencies. 
Notwithstanding the relative financial health of 
LNPO No. 2, LNPO No. 3, and LNPO No. 5, the concerns 
raised with respect to LNPO No. 1 also apply to them. 
Table 26, for example shows that LNPO No. 2 has accounts 
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receivable of $1,749,239. If these are performance based 
contracts, and the performance is not 100 percent, the 
organization cannot hope to receive the entire amount. 
Under mortgages and other notes payable , the LNPO listed 
$660,111 at the end of the fiscal period. The bulk of 
this amount represents a line of credit. LNPO No. 3 also 
carries a large line of credit (see Table 27). A line of 
credit in an NPO setting generally represents the unsta¬ 
ble nature of the organization's funds. Hence a good 
reason for having a contingency reserve. 
Table 27 shows that the total assets of LNPO No. 3 
($8,340,748), exceed the total assets of LNPO NO. 2 
($2,222,777), and the total assets of LNPO No. 5 
($1,629,989). Notwithstanding the size of the total 
assets of LNPO No. 3, the fund balance or net worth of 
LNPO No. 2 ($918,233) and No. 5 ($847,303), are not 
significantly different from the net worth of LNPO No. 3. 
Of the six organizations examined, the financial records 
showed that LNPO No. 3 (Table 27) and LNPO No. 5 (Table 
29) are the only organizations that have invested in real 
estate. Table 27 shows that land, building and equipment 
owned by LNPO No. 3 totals $3,552,051, but its mortgages 
and other notes payable totals $3,754,445. While these 
investments generate other benefits, it is not evident 
that they have generated significant equity and income 
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for LNPO No. 3. LNPO No. 5 fared better with land, 
building and equipment owned totalling $608,315, and 
mortgages and other notes payable totalling $267,703 (see 
Table 29). Tables 31 to 34 will be further discussed 
in chapter V. 
Summary 
The findings of this study present a fiscal profile 
of the six LNPOs analyzed. On average, the six LNPOs 
have been serving their constituencies in Western Massa¬ 
chusetts for over sixteen years. The data presented 
shows that these LNPOs have about an 80 percent reliance 
on revenue from government sources. Only four of the six 
LNPOs experienced a significant growth in revenue. Con¬ 
cerning change in the program mix of these LNPOs, one 
lost programs and was not able to reinstate them, one 
increased the number of programs, and the other four 
showed no change in their program mix. 
Changes in the highest paid consultants and highest 
paid staff of these LNPOs were not significant. However, 
there was a tendency to increase the compensation and 
salary of consultants and primary staff both during 
periods of revenue increases and decreases. Three of the 
six LNPOs were rated as, relatively, fiscally sound. 
Two of the six owned real estate. The absence of 
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endowment funds and/or contingency reserves was 
characteristic of the six LNPOs. 
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Table 1 
Research Question 1 
Sources of Contributions, Gifts, and Grants to LNPO No. 1 
Source of Year and Level of Funding 
Revenue 89-90 90-91 91-92 
1. Government 




4. Program Service 
Revenue 
5. Membership Dues 
6. Interest on 
Savings & Temp. 
Cash Investments 
7. Net Rental 
Income or (Loss) 
8. Other Investment 
Income 
9. Net Gain or 
(Loss) from Sale 
of Assets other 
than Inventory 




11. Gross Profit or 
(Loss) of Goods 
Sold 
















TOTAL REVENUE $124,584 $89,848 $121,691 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for years 1989 - 
1990, 1990 - 1991, and 1991 - 1992. 
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Table 2 
Research Question 1 
Sources of Contributions, Gifts, and Grants to LNPO No. 2 
Source of Year and Level of Funding 
Revenue 89-90 90-91 91-92 
1. Government $2,351,308 




4. Program Service 
Revenue 412,151 
5. Membership Dues 
6. Interest on 
Savings & Temp. 
Cash Investments 5,659 
7. Net Rental 
Income or (Loss) 
8. Other Investment 
Income 
9. Net Gain or 
(Loss) from 
Sale of Assets 
other than 
Inventory 




11. Gross Profit 
or (Loss) of 
Goods Sold 





TOTAL REVENUE $2,769,118 $3,379,238 $4,016,353 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for years 1989 
1990, 1990 - 1991, and 1991 - 1992. 
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Table 3 
Research Question 1 
Sources of Contributions, Gifts, and Grants to LNPO No. 3 
Source of Year and Level of Funding 
Revenue 89-90 90-91 91-92 
1. Government $15,770,560 $15,067,484 $12,505,268 




4. Program Service 
Revenue 
5. Membership Dues 
6. Interest on 
Savings & Temp. 
Cash Investments 2,177 1,881 
7. Net Rental 
Income or (Loss) (26,903) (25,485) 
8. Other Investment 
Income 
9. Net Gain or 
(Loss) from 
Sale of Assets 
other than 
Inventory 




11. Gross Profit 
or (Loss) of 
Goods Sold 
12. Other Revenue 
2,817 
34,171 
TOTAL REVENUE $15,825,762 $15,043,880 $12,542,256 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for years 1989 - 
1990, 1990 - 1991, and 1991 - 1992. 
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Table 4 
Research Question 1 
Sources of Contributions, Gifts, and Grants to LNPO No. 4 
Source of Year and Level of Funding 
Revenue 89-90 90-91 91-92 
1. Government $677,960 $807,278 $921,818 




4. Program Service 
Revenue 
5. Membership Dues 
6. Interest on 
Savings & Temp. 
Cash Investments 
7. Net Rental 
Income or (Loss) 
8. Other Investment 
Income 
9. Net Gain or 
(Loss) from 
Sale of Assets 
other than 
Inventory 




11. Gross Profit 
or (Loss) of 
Goods Sold 
12. Other Revenue 22,211 
TOTAL REVENUE $680,615 $807,278 $944,029 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for years 1989 - 
1990, 1990 - 1991, and 1991 - 1992. 
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Table 5 
Research Question 1 
Sources of Contributions, Gifts, and Grants to LNPO No. 5 
Source of Year and Level of Funding 
Revenue 89-90 90-91 91-92 
1. Government $341,063 $300,170 $662,181 
2. Direct Public 
Support 
3. Indirect 
Public Support 7,986 2,775 4,400 
4. Program Service 
Revenue 
5. Membership Dues 
6. Interest on 
Savings & Temp. 
Cash Investments 
1,747 
7. Net Rental 
Income or (Loss) 
8. Other Investment 
Income 
9. Net Gain or 
(Loss) from 
Sale of Assets 
other than 
Inventory 




11. Gross Profit 
or (Loss) of 
Goods Sold 
12. Other Revenue 235,232 31,952 183,753 
TOTAL REVENUE $584,281 $334,897 $852,081 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for years 1989 
1990, 1990 - 1991, and 1991 - 1992. 
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Table 6 
Research Question 1 
Sources of Contributions, Gifts, and Grants to LNPQ No. 6 
Source of 
Revenue 
Year and Level of Funding 
89-90 90-91 91-92 
1. Government - 




4. Program Service 
Revenue 197,122 
5. Membership Dues 759 
6. Interest on 
Savings & Temp. 
Cash Investments 3,140 
7. Net Rental 
Income or (Loss) 
8. Other Investment 
Income 
9. Net Gain or 
(Loss) from 
Sale of Assets 
other than 
Inventory 




11. Gross Profit 
or (Loss) of 
Goods Sold 








TOTAL REVENUE $262,028 $299,134 $224,406 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for years 1989 — 
1990, 1990 - 1991, and 1991 - 1992. 
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Table 7 
Research Question 2 and 3 









$143,292 $160,265 $188,558 $150,390 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
$124,584 $89,848 $121,691 




Research Question 2 and 3 
Funding Levels of LNPO No. 2 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 
$1,310,336 $1,640,454 $2,032,919 $2,197,800 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
$2,769,118 $3,379,238 $4,016,353 




Research Question 2 and 3 





and Funding Changes 
1987-1988 1988-1989 
$6,776,108 $8,993,932 $14,876,043 $15,026,735 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
$15,825,762 $15,043,880 $12,542,256 




Research Question 2 and 3 
Funding Levels of LNPO No. 4 






$44,891 $92,477 $191,913 $293,186 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
$680,615 $807,278 $944,029 
Source of data 
indicated. 
LNPO's IRS Form 990 for the years 
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Table 11 
Research Question 2 and 3 
Funding Levels of LNPO No. 5 
Year, Level 
1985-1986 




$155,421 $202,304 $291,933 $412,718 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
$584,281 $334,897 $852,081 




Research Question 2 and 3 
Funding Levels of LNPO No. 6 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 
Note: File copy of Form 990 indicated that the data for 
these periods were destroyed by a flood. 
Year, Level of Funding, and Funding Changes 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
$262,028 $298,954 $224,406 
Source of data 
indicated. 
LNPO's IRS Form 990 for the years 
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Table 13 
Research Question 4 
Program Changes of LNPO No. 1 
Year Program or Service Provided 
1989-1990 1. After School Program 
2. Youth At Risk Program 
3. Functional Spanish 
4. English as a Second Language 
5. Cultural Activities 
1990-1991 1. After School Program 
2. Functional Spanish 
3. Cultural Activities 
1991-1992 1. After School Program 
2. Functional Spanish 
3. Cultural Activities 




Research Question 4 
Program Changes of LNPO No- 2 
Year Program or Service Provided 
1989-1990 1. Group Home 2. Residential Program 
3. Day Treatment 4. Alcohol/Drug Recover 
5. Aftercare 6. Prescreening 
7. Opt Counseling 8. Outpatient Services 
9. Criminal Jtc 10. Outreach 
11. School Brkfst 12. Hids Support 
13. Alcohol Dr Ed 14. Case Consultation 
1990-1991 1. Group Home 2. Residential Program 
3. Day Treatment 4. Alcohol/Drug Recover 
5. Aftercare 6. Hids Education/Prev 
7. Opt Counseling 8. Outreach 
9. Outreach 10. Youth Intervention 
11. Fam Sprt Servs 12. Outpatient Services 
13. Hids Support 14. Substance Abuse 
15. Puerto Rican Symposium 
1991-1992 1. Group Home 2. Residential Program 
3. Day Treatment 4. Alcohol/Drug Recover 
5. Aftercare 6. DPH Adosa Project 
7. Opt Counseling 8. Outreach 
9. Other 10. Fam Sprt Serv 
11. Opt Services 12. Hids Support 
13. Subst Abuse 14. Acupuncture 




Research Question 4 
Program Changes of LNPQ No. 3 
Year Program or Service Provided 
1989-1990 1. Fuel Assistance 
2. Employment and Training 
3. Health Services 
4. Voucher Day Care Management 
1990-1991 1. Fuel Assistance 
2. Employment and Training 
3. Voucher Day Care Management 
1991-1992 1. Fuel Assistance 
2. Employment and Training 
3. Voucher Day Care Management 




Research Question 4 
Program Changes of LNPO No. 4 
V ear Program or Service Provided 
1989-1990 1. AIDS Education and Prevention 
2. Prenatal Care 
3. Foster Home Services 
4. Assessment to Improve Services 
1990-1991 1. AIDS Education 
2. Homeless Assistance 
3. Homebuilding 
4. PAS Services 
5. Parent Aide 
6. Refugee Assistance 
7. □ur Babies - Our Future 
1991-1992 1. Community Development 
2. Mediation Program 
3. AIDS Education 
4. Homeless Services 
5. Family Services 
6. Homebuilding 
7. PAS Services 
8. Our Babies - Our Future 
9. Parent Aide 




Research Question 4 
Program Changes of LNPO No. 5 
Year Program or Service Provided 
1989-1990 1. Housing Redevelopment 
1990-1991 1. Housing Redevelopment 
1991-1992 1. Housing Redevelopment 
2. Tenant 1 Education 
Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 for the years 
indicated. 
Table 18 
Research Question 4 
Program Changes of LNPO No. 6 
Year Program or Service Provided 
1989- 1990 1. Cultural Education and promotion 
1990- 1991 1. Cultural Education and Promotion 
1991- 1992 1. Cultural Education and Promotion 
Source of data: 
years indicated 
LNPO's Public Charities reports for the 
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Table 19 
Research Question 5 





Primary Staff Salary 
89-90 1. Instruct $4,998 1. Exec Dir $25,385 
2. Instruct 6,500 2. Fiscal Mngr 16,875 
3. Instruct 2,298 
4. Coord 2,350 
5. Coord 2,040 
90-91 1. Coord 7,713 1. Exec Dir 30,000 
2. Fisc Mgr 9,600 2. Fiscal Mngr 1,731 
3. Coord 3,423 
4. Coord 2,675 
5. Coord 2,350 
91-92 1. Coord 6,600 1. Exec Dir 30,000 
2. Coord 6,305 2. Fiscal Mngr 22,500 
3. Coord. 2,354 
4. Instruct 1,600 
5. Instruct 1,360 
Source of data: LNPO's Public Charities reports for the 
years indicated ■ 
Explanation of Abbreviations Used on Table 19 
Abbreviation Full Term 
Instruct Instructor 
Coord Coordinator 
Fisc Mgr Fiscal Manager 




Research Question 5 





Primary Staff Salary 
89-90 1. Accntng *40,390 1. Exec Dir *40,011 
2. Psychtrc 43,155 2. Asst Ex Dir 43,292 
3. Psychtrc 23,673 3. Bus Mngr 40,542 
4. Psychtrc 32,876 4. Supervisor 35,001 
5. Psychtrc 29,740 5. Supervisor 30,150 
90-91 1. Accntng 48,136 1. Exec Dir 47,024 
2. Psychtrc 45,188 2. Asst Ex Dir 40,651 
3. Psychtrc 35,842 3. Bus Mngr 36,930 
4. Psychtrc 32,245 4. Supervisor 46,102 
5. Psychtrc 37,137 5. Supervisor 33,757 
91-92 1. Accntng 55,791 1. Exec Dir 53,695 
2. Psychtrc 51,665 2. Asst Ex Dir 41,157 
3. Psychtrc 47,440 3. Fiscal Admin. 38,536 
4. Psychtrc 44,555 4. Opt Director 44,830 
5. Psythrpst 42,066 5. Opt Therapist 38,858 
Source of data: 
years indicated 
LNPO's Public Charities reports for the 
• 
ExDlanation of Abbreviations Used on Table 20 

















Research Question 5 





Primary Staff Salary 
89-90 1. Auditor $26,750 1. Exec Dir $60,000 
2. Accntnt 5,500 2. Dpty Dir 56,707 
3. Attorney 2,150 3. Dpty Dir 56,707 
4. Attorney 1,325 4. Director 37,942 
5. Attorney 250 5. Director 36,069 
90-91 1. Auditor 22,910 1. Exec Dir 74,000 
2. Accntnt 8,000 2. Dpty Dir 58,955 
3. Attorney 2,807 3. Director 37,573 
4. Grnt Writ 2,000 4. Director 35,942 
5. Attorney 1,750 5. Director 35,792 
91-92 1. Sys Cnslt 26,000 1. Exec Dir 74,569 
2. Lbyg Cnslt 25,000 2. Dpty Dir 59,453 
3. Aud/Acctng 24,805 3. □pns Dir 38,635 
4. Grnt Cnslt 8,978 4. Director 36,778 
5. Attorney 2,475 5. Area Dir 36,347 
Source of data: LNPO's Public Charities reports for the 
years indicated • 
Explanation of Abbreviations Used on Table 21 
Abbreviation Full term 
Accntnt Accountant 
Grnt Writ Grant Writer 
Sys Cnslt System Analyst Consultant 
Lbyg Cnslt Lobbying Consultant 
Aud/Acctng Auditing/Accounting 
Grnt Cnslt Grant Consultant 
Dpty Dir Deputy Director 
Opns Dir Operations Director 
Area Dir Area Director 
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Table 22 
Research Question 5 
Personnel Changes of LNPO No. 4 
Highest Paid Highest Paid 
Year Consultant Comp Primary Staff Sa1 ary 
89-90 1. Case Mgr $42,750 1. Exec Dir $20,126 
2. Gen Cnslt 13,450 2. Supervisor 30,570 
3. F.C. Clin 11,994 3. Fiscal Mgr 27,175 
4. F.P. Cnslt 10,400 4. Case Mgr 20,250 
5. Attorney 5,833 5. Coord 19,817 
90-91 1. Child Guid 30,000 1. Exec Dir 30,870 
2. Attorney 10,000 2. Fiscal Dir 37,228 
3. Contracts 10,430 3. Supervisor 34,990 
4. Consultant 1,925 4. Coordinator 31,999 
5. Home Study 1,485 5. Case Mgr 23,750 
91-92 1. Viol Prev 33,334 1. Exec Dir 36,121 
2. Attorney 5,057 2. Fiscal Dir 43,434 
3. Consultant 4,584 3. Coordinator 33,319 
4. Consultant 1,980 4. Case Mgr 25,192 
5. Accounting 1,600 5. Case Mgr 24,756 
Source of data: LNPC I's Public Charities reports for the 
years indicated. 
Explanation of Abbreviations Used on i Table 22 
Abbreviation Full Term 
Case Mgr Case Mnager 
Gen Cnslt General Consultant 
F.C. Cnslt Foster Care Clinical Consultant 
F.P. Cnslt Foster Parent Consultant 
Child Guid Child Guidance Consultant 
Viol Prev Violence Prevention Consultant 
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Table 23 
Research Question 5 





Primary Staff Salary 
89-90 1. Prg Cnslt $4,608 1. Exec Dir $29,768 
2. Comp Cnslt 1,987 2. Coord 24,960 
3. Fiscal 600 3. Fiscal Dir 24,255 
4. Consultant 480 4. Case Mgr 22,880 
5. Accounting 1,528 5. Assoc Dir 22,050 
90-91 1. Accountant 2,100 1. Exec Dir 35,000 
2. Prg Consult 1,920 2. Fiscal Dir 25,468 
3. Attorney 450 3. Prg Coord 24,960 
4. Computer 50 4. Site Coord 23,920 
5. Housing Spec 23,100 
91-92 1. Cont Serv 13,836 1. Exec Dir 35,000 
2. Cont Serv 5,380 2. Fiscal Dir 24,842 
3. Cont Serv 3,581 3. Prg Coord 24,960 
4. Cont Serv 2,400 4. Site Coord 23,680 
5. Cont Serv 1,456 5. Prog Dir 23,575 
Source of data: LNPO's Public Charities reports for the 
years indicated • 
ExDlanation of Abbreviations Used on Table 23 
Abbreviation Full Term 
Prg Cnslt Program Consultant 
Comp Cnslt Computer Consultant 
Cont Serv Contractual Services 
Assoc Dir Associate Director 
Housing Spec Housing Specialist 
Site Coord Site Coordinator 
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Table 24 
Research Question 5 





Primary Staff Salary 
89-90 1. Accntng $950 1. Exec Dir 32,986 
2. Consult 200 2. Teacher 19,466 
3. Payroll 1,134 3. Teacher 19,634 
4. Consult 300 4. Off Mgr 17,907 
5. Teacher 16,946 
90-91 1. Accntng 990 1. Exec Dir 31,941 
2. Teacher 18,601 
3. Teacher 16,848 
4. Off Mgr 18,100 
5. Teacher 16,997 
91-92 1. Accntng 1,140 1. Exec Dir 39,258 
2. Ed Cnslt 2,431 2. Teacher 21,285 
3. Teacher 20,886 
4. Teacher 20,801 
5. Teacher 20,166 
Source of data: LNPO's Public Charities reports for the 
years indicated. 
ExDlanation of Abbreviations Used on Table 24 
Abbreviations Full Term 
Accntng Accounting 
Consult Consultant 
Ed Cnslt Education Consultant 
Off Mgr Office Mnager 
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Table 25 
Research Question 6 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPO No. 1 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
ASSETS 
Cash - Noninterest-bearing 





Receivables due from 
officers, directors 
Other notes and loans 
receivable 
Inventories for sale/use 
Prepaid expenses and 
deferred charges 
Investments - Securities 
Investments - land, 
building & equipment 
Other investments 
Land, buildings, & Equip. 
Other assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 















Accounts payable & 
accrued expenses 
Grants payable 
Support & revenue 
designated for 
future periods 
Loans from officers, 
directors, trustees, 
and key employees 







Continued Next Page 
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Table 25—Continued 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
FUNDS BALANCES OR NET 
ASSETS 
Current unrestricted fund 
Current restricted fund 




Capital stock or trust 
principal 
Paid-in capital surplus 
Retained earnings or 
accumulated income 
Total Fund Balances or 
Net Assets 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
FUND BALANCES/NET 
ASSETS 




Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 and Public Charities 
reports for the years indicated. 
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Table 26 
Research Question 6 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPQ No. 2 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
ASSETS Beg. of year End of year 
Cash - Noninterest-bearing $96,354 $201,626 
Savings and Temp. Cash 
Investments 127,458 77,015 
Accounts Receivable 1,436,035 1,749,329 
Pledges Receivable 
Grants Receivable 
Receivables due from 
officers, directors 
Other notes and loans 
receivable 24,918 26,555 
Inventories for sale/use 
Prepaid expenses and 
deferred charges 16,893 31,492 
Investments - Securities 
Investments - land, 
building & equipment 
Other investments 
Land, buildings, & Equip. 115,538 108,891 
Other assets 25,069 27,869 
TOTAL ASSETS 1,842,265 2,222,777 
LIABILITIES 
Accounts payable & 
accrued expenses 448,352 644,433 
Grants payable 
Support & revenue 
designated for 
future periods 
Loans from officers, 
directors, trustees, 
and key employees 
Mortgages & other 
notes payable 499,328 660,111 
Other liabilities 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 947,680 1,304,544 
Continued Next Page 
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Table 26—Continued 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
FUNDS BALANCES OR NET 
ASSETS 
Current unrestricted fund 
Current restricted fund 




Capital stock or trust 
principal 
Paid-in capital surplus 
Retained earnings or 
accumulated income 
Total Fund Balances or 
Net Assets 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
FUND BALANCES/NET 
ASSETS 




Source of data: LNPO's IRS Form 990 and Public Charities 
reports for the years indicated. 
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Table 27 
Research Question 6 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPO No. 3 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
ASSETS 
Cash - Noninterest-bearing 





Receivables due from 
officers, directors 
Other notes and loans 
receivable 
Inventories for sale/use 
Prepaid expenses and 
deferred charges 
Investments - Securities 
Investments - land, 
building & equipment 
Other investments 
Land, buildings, & Equip. 
Other assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 























Accounts payable & 
accrued expenses 
Grants payable 
Support & revenue 
designated for 
future periods 
Loans from officers, 
directors, trustees, 
and key employees 








Continued Next Page 
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Table 27—Continued 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989—1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
FUNDS BALANCES OR NET 
ASSETS 
Current unrestricted fund 
Current restricted fund 




Capital stock or trust 
principal 
Paid-in capital surplus 
Retained earnings or 
accumulated income 
Total Fund Balances or 
Net Assets 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
FUND BALANCES/NET 
ASSETS 





Source of data. LNPO’s IRS Form 990 and Public Charities 
reports for the years indicated. 
209 
Table 28 
Research Question 6 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPO No. 4 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
ASSETS 
Cash - Noninterest-bearing 





Receivables due from 
officers, directors 
Other notes and loans 
receivable 
Inventories for sale/use 
Prepaid expenses and 
deferred charges 
Investments - Securities 
Investments - land, 
building & equipment 
Other investments 
Land, buildings, & Equip. 
Other assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 














Accounts payable & 
accrued expenses 
Grants payable 
Support & revenue 
designated for 
future periods 
Loans from officers, 
directors, trustees, 
and key employees 









Continued Next Page 
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Table 28—Continued 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991- 1992 
FUNDS BALANCES OR NET 
ASSETS 
Beg . of year End of year 
Current unrestricted fund 87,845 84,633 
Current restricted fund 





Capital stock or trust 
principal 
Paid-in capital surplus 
Retained earnings or 
accumulated income 
Total Fund Balances or 
26,404 42,404 
Net Assets 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
FUND BALANCES/NET 
164,339 241,133 
ASSETS $284,896 $371,801 
Source of data: LNPO'5 IRS Form 990 and Public Charities 
reports for the years indicated. 
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Table 29 
Research Question 6 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPO No. 5 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
ASSETS 
Cash - Noninterest-bearing 





Receivables due from 
officers, directors 
Other notes and loans 
receivable 
Inventories for sale/use 
Prepaid expenses and 
deferred charges 
Investments - Securities 
Investments - land, 
building & equipment 
Other investments 
Land, buildings, & Equip. 
Other assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 


















Accounts payable & 
accrued expenses 
Grants payable 
Support & revenue 
designated for 
future periods 
Loans from officers, 
directors, trustees, 
and key employees 








Continued Next Page 
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Table 29—Continued 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
FUNDS BALANCES OR NET 
ASSETS 
Current unrestricted fund 
Current restricted fund 




Capital stock or trust 
principal 
Paid-in capital surplus 
Retained earnings or 
accumulated income 
Total Fund Balances or 
Net Assets 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
FUND BALANCES/NET 
ASSETS 










Source of data* LNPO's IRS Form 990 and Public Charities 
reports for the years indicated. 
213 
Table 30 
Research Question 6 
Fiscal Soundness of LNPQ No. 6 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
ASSETS 
Cash - Noninterest-bearing 





Receivables due from 
officers, directors 
Other notes and loans 
receivable 
Inventories for sale/use 
Prepaid expenses and 
deferred charges 
Investments - Securities 
Investments - land, 
building & equipment 
Other investments 
Land, buildings, & Equip. 
Other assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 













Accounts payable & 
accrued expenses 
Grants payable 
Support & revenue 
designated for 
future periods 
Loans from officers, 
directors, trustees, 
and key employees 







Continued Next Page 
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Table 30—Continued 
Aggregate Balance Sheet 
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991- 1992 
FUNDS BALANCES OR NET 
ASSETS 
Beg. of year End of year 
Current unrestricted fund 131,510 72,592 
Current restricted fund 




Capital stock or trust 
principal 
Paid-in capital surplus 
Retained earnings or 
accumulated income 
Total Fund Balances or 
90,528 105,473 
Net Assets 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
FUND BALANCES/NET 
222,038 178,065 
ASSETS $233,772 $209,713 
Source of data* LNP0*s IRS Form 990 and Public Charities 
reports for the years indicated. 
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Table 31 
Statement of Program Services Accomplishment - LNPO No. 3 
Program Year and Amount 
Type 89 - 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Fuel Assistance $5,283,929 $6,539,098 $6,059,292 
(479,806)- 
Employment and 
T raining 953,952 1,361,303 4,230,603 
(2,869,300)+ 
Health Services 98,599 -0- -0- 
Voucher Day Care 8,331,024 6,595,556 1,805,640 
(1,735,468)- ■ (4,789,916)- 
Total $14,667,504 $14,495,957 $12,095,535 
Source of data: IRS Form 990 for LNPO No. 3 for the 
years indicated. 
Table 32 
Statement of Functional Expenses - LNPO No. 3 
Program/Service, Amount and Year 
Program/Serv 89- 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Assistance to 
Individuals $13,148,903 $12,333,379 $9,660,950 
(2,672,429)- 
Source of data: 
years indicated 
IRS Form 990 for LNPO No. 3 for the 
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Table 33 
Salaries and Wages of Rank and File 
Year 
LNPO No. 1 89 - 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Salaries/Wages ♦43,924 ♦62,861 ♦53,801 
LNPO No. 2 89 - 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Salaries/Wages ♦1,321,737 ♦1,447,457 ♦1,767,964 
LNPO No. 3 89 - 90 90 ~ 91 91 - 92 
Salaries/Wages ♦904,644 ♦1,219,712 ♦1,310,357 
LNPO No. 4 89 - 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Salaries/Wages ♦378,206 ♦554,751 ♦622,542 
LNPO No. 5 89 - 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Salaries/Wages ♦241,998 ♦303,082 ♦371,453 
LNPO No. 6 89 - 90 90 - 91 91 - 92 
Salaries/Wages ♦154,827 ♦179,069 ♦183,669 
Source of data: 
6, for the years 
IRS Form 990 
indicated. 
for LNPO No. 1 to LNPO No. 
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Table 34 
LNPOs' Rates of Revenue Variability for the Period 1986 
to 1992 
LNPO No. 1: 
1986 - 1987, increased by 11.87. 
1987 - 1988, increased by 17.77. 
1988 - 1989, decreased by 20.27. * 
1989 - 1990, decreased by 17.27. * 
1990 - 1991, decreased by 27.87. * 
1991 - 1992, increased by 35.47. 
The revenues of LNPO No. 1 grew by 64.97. and decreased by 
65.27.. The decreases exceeded the increases. The 
average rate of growth equaled -0.3/6 = -0.05. 
LNPO No 2: 
1986 - 1987, increased by 25.27. 
1987 - 1988, increased by 23.97. 
1988 - 1989, increased by 8.17. * 
1989 - 1990, increased by 267. 
1990 - 1991, increased by 227. 






The average rate of growth for LNPO No. 2 equaled 124.1/6 
= 20. 77.. 
LNPO No. 3 s 
1986 - 1987, increased by 32.77. 
1987 - 1988, increased by 65.47. 
1988 - 1989, increased by 17. * 
1989 - 1990, increased by 5.37. * 
1990 - 1991, decreased by 4.97. * 
1991 - 1992, decreased by 16.67. * 
The average rate of growth for LNPO No. 3 equaled 82.9/6 
= 13.87.. 
LNPO No. 4s 
1986 - 1987, increased by 1067. 
1987 - 1988, increased by 107.57. 
1988 - 1989, increased by 52.8% Continued Next Page 
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Table 34—Continued 
LNPOs' Rates of Revenue Variability for the Period 1986 
to 1992 
1989 - 1990, increased by 132.1% 
1990 - 1991, increased by 18.67. # 
1991 ~ 1992, increased by 16.97. * 
The average rate of growth for LNPO No. 4 equaled 433.9/6 
= 72.37.. 
LNPO No. 5: 
1986 - 1987, increased by 30.27. 
1987 - 1988, increased by 44.37. 
1988 - 1989, increased by 41.47. 
1989 - 1990, increased by 41.67. 
1990 - 1991, decreased by 42.77. 
1991 - 1992, increased by 154.47. 
The average rate of growth for LNPO No. 5 equaled 269.2/6 
= 44.97.. 






1987, data not available 
1988, data not available 
1989, data not available 
1991, increased by 147. * 
1992, decreased by 24.97. t 
The average rate of growth for LNPO No. 6 equaled -10.9/2 
= -5.57. 
Source of data; IRS Form 990 for the LNPOs in the study, 
for the years indicated. The asterisks denote changes in 
revenue during periods of purported fiscal austerity. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommenda¬ 
tions inferred from the data and the findings presented 
in chapter IV. It discusses the implications of these 
findings for improving the financial and managerial 
posture of LNPOs. 
This study analyzed the official financial documents 
of six LNPOs in Western Massachusetts, for the purpose of 
developing a profile of their growth and fiscal sound¬ 
ness. Hay (1990) noted that financial statements commu¬ 
nicate the ways resources have been used to carry out the 
organization's objectives. They help the reader evaluate 
the enterprise's ability to implement its fiscal objec¬ 
tives, identify its principal programs, and primary staff 
(p. 363). This study was guided by six research 
questions. 
Research Question 1. Who were the funders 
or revenue sources of LNPOs during the period 
1989 to 1992? 
Research Question 2. What were the funding 
levels of LNPOs during the period 1985 to 
1992? 
Research Question 3. What, if any, were their 




Research Question 4. What, if any, were the 
program changes experienced by LNPOs during 
the period 1989 to 1992? 
% 
Research Question 5. What, if any, were the 
personnel changes undertaken by LNPOs during 
the period 1989 to 1992? 
Research Question 6. What was the overall 
fiscal soundness of LNPOs during the period 
1989 to 1992? 
The conclusions and recommendations presented relate 
to basic tenets in the review of the literature. 
Conclusions 
Research question one brought forth the sources of 
revenue of the LNPOs studied. As a corollary, it laid 
bare the organizations' level of dependence on a given 
source of revenue, as well as the breadth of their 
funding base. Salamon (1990) noted that reliance of NPOs 
on private sources of funding, shifted to reliance on 
government sources of revenue in the 1980s. He added 
that government is the principal source of income for 
NPOs. Salamon's data showed that NPOs had a 61 percent 
reliance on government sources of revenue and a 39 
percent reliance on private sources (pp. 224 - 225). 
The aggregate reliance on government sources of 
revenue of the six LNPOs studied was 79.5 percent. Of 
the three LNPOs that experienced reduction in government 
funding, only two were able to offset the loss of income 
221 
with alternative sources of revenue. Notwithstanding the 
ability to offset income loss, for one of these two 
LNPOs, developing alternative sources of revenue was not 
enough. It had an average revenue reduction of 50 
percent. 
Thus dependence on government sources of revenue can 
limit the ability of the enterprise to offset reductions 
in revenue. Developing alternative sources of revenue 
that are tantamount to a quick-fix, may not bring about 
sustained or desired results. Disproportionate reliance 
on any given source of revenue underscores the enter— 
prise's lack of a broad funding base. A narrow funding 
base can lead to disastrous financial consequences for 
the NPO. Government too is dependent on NPOs for the 
allocation of services. However, the impact of revenue 
loses may not be as deleterious to government as it would 
be to NPOs. 
The qualified generosity of corporate and foundation 
funders towards LNPOs noted by Foote (1990) and Lord and 
Daubon (1991), raises the possibility that the lack of 
diversity in the funding base of the LNPOs being studied 
has to do as much with the nature of these funders as 
with the qualified efforts by these LNPOs to expand their 
funding base. 
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Research question two and three are concerned with 
the growth and/or income variability of the LNPOs anal¬ 
yzed. Two of the LNPOs had an average rate of decrease 
in revenue of over 50 percent. Four had an average rate 
of increase in revenue ranging from 14 percent to as high 
as 72.3 percent. It was shown in the review of the lit¬ 
erature that the funds of LNPOs and non-LNPOs fluctuate 
during periods of austerity. O'Neill and Young (1988) 
characterized the period of the 1980s as the years of 
scarcity and survival for NPOs. The findings of this 
study show that 67 percent (4 out of 6) of the LNPOs in 
the study had a significant rate of increase in revenue 
during the seven-year period examined. Five of the seven 
years were during the 1980s. 
Salamon (1987) noted that the Reagan administra¬ 
tion's expectation relative to reduction in federal 
service dollars was that the state, local government and 
the private sector would compensate for the loss of 
federal funding to NPOs. Given the rate of revenue 
increase experienced by a significant number of the LNPOs 
being studied during the Reagan and Bush administrations, 
Massachusetts appears to have compensated for the loss of 
federal funding of these organizations. The exception 
was the 1991 to 1992 period. Moore and Williams (1991) 
and Goss, Greene and Williams (1991) noted that during 
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fiscal year 1992, Governor William F. Weld submitted a 
state budget reduced by $1.S-bi11ion. Legislators at the 
time were concerned with an $800-million deficit in the 
state's budget. 
As a consequence of the state's financial woes, the 
major LNPO in the study experienced a $2.5 million 
reduction in state revenue during the 1991 to 1992 
period. Table 31, shows that this major LNPO (LNPO No. 
3) actually had a revenue reduction of $4,789,916 on the 
voucher day care program, a state funded program. Table 
31 also shows that LNPO No. 3 had an revenue increase of 
$2,869,300 in the government-funded employment and 
training program, apparently not enough to compensate for 
the income loss in the voucher day care program. With 
the added loss in revenue in the health program, LNPO No. 
3 was not able to offset the total income loss of $2.5 
million. Table 32 shows that the $2.5 million revenue 
loss of LNPO No 3 was actually absorbed by the $2,672,429 
reduction in service to individuals. A review of the 
payroll data for the rank and file of LNPO No 3, shown on 
Table 33, indicates that in spite of the $2.5 million 
revenue loss, the salaries and wages of the rank and file 
also increased as revenues for the organization in¬ 
creased . 
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Three other LNPO experienced reductions in revenue, 
but due to their small operating budgets, the reductions 
did not translate into major dollars. One experienced 
the lowest growth rate during the 1991 to 1992 period, 
and another, the second lowest rate of growth during the 
same period. 
Research question four sought to determine whether 
increases or decreases in revenue triggered program 
increases or decreases. One LNPO had a reduction in its 
program mix, as well as a loss of revenue. Another 
increased the number of programs at a time when its 
revenue increased. The remaining four LNPOs were a 
hodgepodge. Two lost income but the program mix was not 
changed. The other two did not change their program mix, 
notwithstanding an increase in revenue. The findings 
did not support the determination sought. Within-program 
expansion was not a variable assessed as a contributor to 
changes in program mix triggered by revenue increases. 
The financial documents analyzed did not generate the 
required data for this type of analysis. 
Research question five sought to determine whether 
increases or decreases in revenue triggered increases or 
decreases in the number of highest paid consultants and 
highest paid staff. In this case, four of the six LNPOs 
experienced an increase in revenue, but did not increase 
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the number of consultants and primary staff. However, 
the same four LNPOs increased the compensation and 
salaries of the consultants and the primary staff. One 
of the two remaining LNPOs had reduction in revenue, but 
did not reduce the number of consultants and primary 
staff. The other, had a reduction in revenue, but only 
reduced the number of consultants. 
Increases in revenue influenced increases in compen¬ 
sation and salaries of consultants and primary staff, 
more than it influenced increases in the number of 
highest paid personnel. A review of the payroll data for 
the rank and file shown on Table 33, indicates that for 
LNPO No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 5, increases in revenue 
also correlated with increases in the salaries of the 
rank and file. 
Finally, research question six was concerned with 
determining the overall fiscal soundness of the LNPOs 
being studied. Of the six LNPOs, three or 50 percent 
were characterized in a relatively good state of fiscal 
soundness. The qualified manner in which the fiscal 
state of these three LNPOs was characterized owes to a 
number of factors discussed in chapter IV. A major 
concern was the failure of all six LNPOs to establish 
contingency reserves and/or endowments. Another major 
concern has to do with the number of years (more than 15) 
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that the six LNPOs have been serving their constituencies 
and the relative size of their operating budgets. 
Although three of the LNPOs were rated as relatively 
healthy, the conclusion of this researcher is that only 
LNPO No. 3 surpassed the other LNPOs in growth and has 
succeeded in its efforts to expand both their program mix 
and the agency in proportion to the needs of their con¬ 
stituents. In 1982, not shown by the data in chapter IV, 
LNPO No. 3 had an operating budget of two million dol¬ 
lars, and $12,542,256 in 1992, down from $15,043,880 in 
1991. It provides services in three major cities in 
Massachusetts and in five states in the New England 
region, after only 23 years of existence. NPOs with 
large operating budgets like that of LNPO No. 3, are 
capable of serving a larger constituency. 
Based on the anemic balance sheets of a significant 
number of the LNPOs analyzed, and the magnitude of the 
needs of the Latino communities in Western Massachusetts, 
discussed in the review of the literature, at least three 
LNPOs have not shown they are effective stewards of their 
public trust. Nor have they shown that they possess the 
wherewithal to address the myriads of needs of the Latino 
communities they are called upon to serve. 
The board of directors who hires the chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the organization, and the CEO who is 
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responsible for hiring the rest of the personnel, must 
know the organization and its vital functions like an 
adept physician understands the human body and the impor¬ 
tant functions of its organs. A healthy NPQ should func¬ 
tion like a healthy human body. The improper treatment 
of the functions of the vital organs of the organization 
or the human body, can have disastrous consequences for 
the effective functioning of these systems. 
Hiring personnel who lack the requisite skills is 
tantamount to expecting the human liver to perform the 
functions of the pancreas. There is a tendency in organ¬ 
izations to mis-hire and/or mal-assign personnel. Meta¬ 
phorically, when an organization needs a kidney trans¬ 
plant and instead receives a liver transplant, one has a 
manifestation of organizational problem-solving at its 
worst. Although it cannot be concluded from the data on 
highest paid consultants and staff (tables 19 - 24) that 
the LNPQs in this study mis-hired and/or mal-assigned 
personnel, the decrease in the growth rate of LNPO No. 1 
and LNPO No. 6; and the relatively small operating 
budgets of these and LNPO No. 4 and LNPO No. 5, brings 
into question the utility and efficacy of their staffs. 
With the exception of LNPO No. 3, the LNPOs in the 
study don't appear to have a development specialist or 
grantsman among their highest paid consultants or highest 
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paid staff. Development specialists or grantsmen posi¬ 
tions should not be in the low-pay scale. Development 
specialists are responsible for development, public 
information, marketing, special events and travel 
programs. They are also responsible for all fund-raising 
activities, setting goals, determining strategies, and 
working diligently to solicit gifts for unrestricted, 
restricted, capital, and endowment needs. The develop¬ 
ment specialist should be the most sought-after position 
among all NPOs. 
Among LNPOs with small operating budgets, probably 
the person least qualified and predisposed to raise 
funds, the executive director, is charged with that 
responsibility. Vladeck (1988) noted that "fundraising 
is perceived by a large proportion of NPO managers as 
inherently distasteful, outside the scope of their 
professional orientation, and a deviation from their 
primary tasks" (O'Neill and Young, 1988, p. 77). Hay 
(1990) noted that "Two of the biggest weaknesses of NPOs 
are lack of marketing expertise and lack of financial 
expertise at the top management level..." (p. 85). 
Budgetary constraints, disproportionally prevalent 
among LNPOs, often make it difficult for NPOs to hire a 
grantsman or development specialist. Caught between the 
lack of funds to fill these positions and the need to 
acquire vital financial resources, LNPOs may find 
themselves at the threshold of insolvency. 
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According to Borrero (1991) 75 percent of nonprofit 
organizations in the United States are less than twenty 
years old and a significant number have annual budgets of 
less than $163,000. Borrero further noted that in this 
country nonprofits have "weak and immature infrastruc¬ 
tures, they don't have policies, rules, systems and 
technology which ultimately are going to be required if 
they are to be long-lasting, successful, productive 
organizations" (Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 114). 
Based on the information provided on the financial 
reports of the LNPOs studied, relative to primary staff 
and board of directors composition, Borrero's assertions 
concerning infrastructures are applicable to a signifi¬ 
cant number of these LNPOs. 
Recommendations 
In order to achieve greater effectiveness and 
efficiency in allocating services to their constitu¬ 
encies, LNPOs must effect changes in their funding 
environment. Specifically: 
1. Hire chief executives that possess management, 
grantsmanship and/or development skills. 
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2. Court foundations and federated NPOs willing to 
provide at least one-year funding for the positions of 
development specialists and/or grantsmen. 
3. Establish contingency reserves by setting aside 
a small portion of the operating funds. 
4. Solicit gifts and contributions earmarked for 
endowment funds. 
5. Pursue additional funds through participation in 
corporate employee drives. 
6. Initiate fundraising campaigns designed to 
reach Latino donors. 
7. Pursue grants from foundations and corporations 
that do not presently fund LNPOs. 
8. Generate unrelated business income through rents 
and sales of goods and services. 
Borrero (1991) noted that governing boards "must be 
clear about their functions and responsibilities. The 
board sets policy, develops long-range plans, sets the 
mission and goals and objectives, hires and fires the 
director, and brings in resources to the organization" 
(Gallegos and O'Neill, 1991, p. 125). Governing boards 
must not transgress the fine line between policy-making 
and administration. To improve governance and adminis¬ 
tration of LNPOs, some of the recommendations made by 
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Borrero (1991) are adapted as appropriate for boards in 
community-based Latino nonprofits: 
Is Determine, define, and proselytize the agency's 
agenda. 
2. Provide financial guidance and fiscal overview 
to agency. 
3. Establish and maintain personnel policies. 
4. Develop close and ongoing ties with the commu¬ 
nity. 
5. Ensure that the agency's charter and laws are 
followed. 
6. Adapt, with appropriate modifications, the 
United Way of America booklet outlining the responsibili¬ 
ties of voluntary boards. 
7. Choose the administrative structure that is more 
suitable to the needs of the agency and periodically 
review the chosen structure to assess its effectiveness. 
8. Recruit board members that possess the different 
skills required by the agency. 
9. Ensure that a significant number of board 
members are qualified Latinos. 
10. Ensure that both equipment and technology are 
current and meet the needs of the agency. 
11. None of the LNPOs in the study utilizes the 
services of the nationally renowned accounting firm of 
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Ernst & Young, with expertise in both the for—profit and 
nonprofit fields. Ernst & Young has programs designed to 
rehabilitate and/or revamp the infrastructures of NPOs. 
It is therefore recommended that LNPOs give serious 
consideration to retaining the services of this firm. 
12. LNPOs can inquire about free or low-cost 
consulting services from the following firms: 
National Executive Service Corps 
257 Park Avenue South 
New York, New York 10010; (212) 529-6660. 
National Society of Fund Raising Executives 
(800) 666-3863. 
Nonprofit Management Association 
315 West Ninth Street, Suite 1100 
Los Angeles, CA 90015; (213) 623-7080. 
Support Centers of America 
2001 0 Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 
20036-5955; (202) 296-3900. 
Technology Resource Consortium 
59 East Van Buren, Chicago, IL 60605; (313) 
939-8050. 
Institutions of higher learning, as NPOs, must come 
to terms with the sociopolitical, economic impact, and 
needs of other NPOs. To that end, area colleges and 
universities are invited to consider the following 
recommendations: 
1. Develop degree programs at the baccalaureate and 
graduate levels, designed for managers of nonprofit 
organizations. 
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2. Develop a series of programs and workshops aimed 
at improving the infrastructure of LNPOs. 
3. Solicit special grants to provide technological 
assistance to LNPOs. 
The methodology used in this study is unique and can 
be used by researchers interested in the financial sound¬ 
ness of NPOs and their ability to be responsible stewards 
of the public trust. Future studies can endeavor to 
identify internal and external environmental factors that 
may cause variance in revenue, program mix, and personnel 
of the enterprise. These environmental variables can be 
labeled political, social, and economic. Although infer— 
ences can be made about these factors from data gleaned 
from Form 990, the personal interview approach with 
primary staff, suppliers, funders, and users of the 
services provided by the NPO would add valuable 
information to the findings. 
A follow-up study of the six LNPOs in this study, 
using the same methodology, is recommended for the period 
1993 to 1994. An appropriate timetable would be June 
1995, when all of the financial documents would be 
available at the Public Charities Division. A compar 
ative study of LNPOs and non—LNPOs, using the same 
methodology, can provide interesting answers respecting 
any differences and similarities in the funding base, 
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revenue variability, and overall fiscal soundness of 
these organizations. 
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